It is now more than one hundred years since the substance of the Connally Resolution was first adopted by a legislative body in the United States; it is almost fifty years since the United States, at the Hague Conferences, took the lead in pressing for an international court with much more power than the Court we have since failed to join; it is about thirty-five years since Congress itself, by a unanimous vote in both houses, adopted a resolution urging that the United States Navy be combined with other navies into an international police force for the preservation of peace; it is not quite thirty years ago that the political parties, without any of the present hullabaloo on the point, and at a time when the United States was not itself at war, achieved such a unity of position in their stand for effective American participation in world order as to make debate between them on that issue virtually nil; and it is not quite thirty years ago that the man soon to become the Republican leader in the Senate joined from the same platform with the Democratic President in an appeal for a League of Nations, and a League with force, both economic and military, at its command.

Integration and coördination are terms that have long been used to describe the objectives of administrative reorganization. Thus coupled, the two words have appeared to represent mutually compatible goals. And most efforts at reform of local, state, and even federal, administration have embodied elements of both integration and coördination.

A somewhat different note was struck in the report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management transmitted to Congress in January, 1937. Here the emphasis was upon an improvement of the staff organization of the Presidency, rather than upon any large-scale effort to re-group and consolidate existing administrative agencies. Accordingly, it would not be unfair to say that coördination, even more than integration, was the objective of the proposals submitted by the President's Committee.

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.

A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER

1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITY

West Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.

For many years there has been widespread discussion of the need for reorganizing the Department of State. Students, publicists, members of Congress, and members of the Department itself have repeatedly pointed out that the Department has not been geared up to performing the functions required of the foreign office of a great twentieth-century world power.

The chief criticisms of the Department have been four: (1) that there was lacking a basic pattern of sound administrative organization, (2) that the type of personnel found both at home and abroad was inadequate for the job required in foreign affairs today, (3) that the Department was too far removed from the public and from Congress, and (4) that it was not prepared to provide leadership for, and maintain the necessary relations with, other federal agencies.

In his budget message for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, which really should be labelled the State of the Union Message, President Roosevelt presented in outline his legislative program, which occupied Congress for the session. The message was devoted primarily to war expenditures, farm and food program, stabilization program, civilian control, non-war expenditures, the debt limit, and a pay-as-you-go tax system.

Organization. The political complexion of the Seventy-eighth Congress differs considerably from that of the Seventy-seventh, particularly in the House. The Republicans gained 47 Representatives and ten Senators, while the Democrats lost 45 Representatives and nine Senators. The third parties retained the same number of Representatives, but lost one Senator. The change in personnel was even greater, with thirteen changes in the Senate's membership and 106 in that of the House. The chairmanship of three standing committees of the Senate and fifteen of the House were changed at the beginning of or during the session.

The United States must assume leadership among the nations of the world if peace is to be maintained. If, after the present holocaust, we do not create a better world, in which justice and neighborliness shall supplant tyranny and war, the sacrifices being made by our fighting men will have been in vain.

Are we prepared to assume this necessary leadership? Can we chart the course for a better world when we do not agree on our own international postwar program? Congress and the Executive must work together in our international relations if we are to have a long-range foreign policy. Some method must be found to enable the Executive and Congress to have a better understanding of the facts and closer unity on international problems. Moreover, on the home front, there is a desperate need for more direct liaison and for a clearer understanding between the executive and legislative branches of our government.

The Revenue Act of 1943 will be remembered not only as the first one in history to be vetoed by the President, but also as the cause of an outburst in Congress against the executive capable of affecting the fortunes of the Democratic party in the 1944 elections. The significance of this last act in the drama (to date) may be clarified if we review the fiscal situation of the United States at the time, the Administration's tax proposals, and the revenue legislation actually resulting.

In January, 1943, the President's budget message estimated expenditures of $100 billion for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944. Tax revenues for the same period were estimated at $35 billion. The President made three recommendations: (1) raise $16 billion in new tax revenue, or savings, or both, (2) simplify the income tax, and (3) put taxes on a pay-as-you-go basis. In the summer and fall of 1943, Congress enacted legislation to carry out certain parts of the last two proposals. Public discussion had forced on it some consideration of collecting taxes currently.

The nation at war, in mobilizing its total resources, has called increasingly upon political scientists to contribute their efforts in the public service. In most instances, the political scientist serving the federal government has not come in directly under the banner of his own profession, even though his training may be highly pertinent to his immediate responsibilities. Those who are associated with the historical records program, however, have been especially able to relate their previous preparation to their present work in the federal agencies.

This expanding program reflects the growing appreciation of the need for a full understanding of the way in which the war is being conducted by both military and civilian agencies. Not only is there a widespread desire for more adequate records than we possess of previous wars, but there is also the conviction on the part of many officials that the immediate funding of our administrative experience is essential to successful formulation and execution of policy. While adequate records as an indispensable tool of good management serve current utility, at the same time they contribute to the longer-run task of creating a full and objective account of American participation in World War II. From the standpoint of future study of government and public administration, the work on war records which has been initiated in the federal government shows distinct promise.

A wartime training program of interest to political scientists and of possible significance for postwar educational policy is the Army's Civil Affairs Training Program. This training program prepares officers for military government service in occupied territory, and is an extension of the training instituted at Charlottesville, Virginia, in the spring of 1942. The School of Military Government is an Army post located on the campus of the University of Virginia. It was originally expected to train a limited number of officers for positions in civil affairs headquarters staff, but the capacity of the School was later expanded and its graduates actually serve in either staff or field positions.

It soon became apparent that the demand for officers trained for civil affairs work would run far beyond the capacity of the School of Military Government. As a consequence, it was decided to utilize a number of universities in the training, and the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP) was established. Like the School of Military Government, already in existence, this program was placed under the control of the Provost Marshal General.

On February 28, 1942, a conference at Atlantic City was arranged by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to inaugurate discussions on the international law of the future. Since that time, a series of group conferences and smaller meetings have been held in various centers of the United States and Canada, at which nearly 200 men, chiefly Americans and Canadians, participated—judges, lawyers, professors, governmental officers, and men of special international experience. To assure continuity, a few persons—outstanding among them Judge Manley O. Hudson of the Harvard Law School and Professor P. E. Corbett of McGill University—were present at all the meetings, and a small committee prepared the different drafts.

The aim of these informal conferences, held over a period of nearly two years, was to arrive at a community of views; and this was achieved when a Statement, growing out of successive drafts, was subscribed to by some 150 of the persons who had participated in the discussions. This document, hitherto strictly confidential, has now been released for publication. Its contents are not to be taken, either in whole or in part, to represent the individual views of any particular person who participated in the discussions.

The Statement consists of six Postulates, ten Principles, and twenty-three Proposals, each explained by comment in the light of the history of international law over a period of a hundred years. The Postulates set forth the essential premises, the basic conceptions, of an effective international legal order. The Principles—so to speak, the heart of the Statement —are offered as a draft of a declaration which might be officially promulgated by the statesmen who will build the future peace. The Proposals are indications, suggestions for implementing the Principles, but are not presented as draft provisions for inclusion in an international instrument.

It is the object of the present article to summarize and comment upon the Statement's principal features.