Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-8bhkd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T04:05:33.403Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

When the Party Breaks Up: Exit and Voice among Japanese Legislators

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Junko Kato
Junko Kato*
Affiliation:
University of Tokyo
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In exploring the conflicts between individual interests and the conditions that facilitate the disintegration of a political party, this article modifies the exit, voice, and loyalty framework developed by Hirschman. The utility of that framework is examined using the recent change in Japan, that is, the demise of the so-called 1955 system, in which the predominant conservatives confined the socialists to the status of a major but perennial opposition party. The quantitative analysis focuses on the split of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party and the internal dispute in the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan. These cases provide an interesting comparison of how individual characteristics and contextual conditions affect members' decisions to exercise exit and voice. At the same time, they illuminate how party-level changes have been influenced by intraparty factors.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 92 , Issue 4 , December 1998 , pp. 857 - 870
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1998

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Asahi Shimbun. Selected dates.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David, and Banks, Jeffrey. 1988. “Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcome.” American Political Science Review 82(June):405–22.10.2307/1957393CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barry, Brian. 1974. “Review Article: ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty.’” British Journal of Political Science 4(1):79–107.10.1017/S0007123400009376CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bates, Robert H., and Lien, D. D.. 1985. “A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government.” Politics and Society 14(March):55–70.10.1177/003232928501400102CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blais, Andre, Blake, Donald, and Dion, Stephane. 1993. “Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 37(February):40–62).10.2307/2111523CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Budge, Ian, and Kerman, Hans. 1990. Parties and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Cameron, David. 1978. “The Expansion of Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis.” American Political Science Review 72(December):1243–61.10.2307/1954537CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary, and Rosenbluth, Frances. 1995. “Anatomy of a Split: The Liberal Democrats of Japan.” Electoral Studies 14(4):355–76.10.1016/0261-3794(94)00009-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Hicks, Alexander, and Swank, Duane H.. 1984. “On the Political Economy of Welfare Expansion: A Comparative Analysis of 18 Advanced Capitalist Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 17(February):81–121.10.1177/0010414084017001003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hicks, Alexander, and Swank, Duane H.. 1992. “Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960–82.” American Political Science Review 86(September):658–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Hirschman, Albert O. 1993. “Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History.” World Politics 45(January):173–202.10.2307/2950657CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laver, Michael, and Schofield, Norman. 1989. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pempel, T. J. 1990. “Introduction: Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regime.” In Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regime, ed. Pempel, T. J.. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 1–32.10.7591/9781501746161CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.