¹ The absentees represented 3.3 percent of the total county vote.

² It might be noted here that the secrecy of the ballot applies to the voting procedure itself. The ballots are secret in the sense that it is impossible to link a particular ballot with an individual voter. After the ballot box has been opened anyone, even social scientists, can by law view the ballots as they are counted.

³ For a discussion, see Ezekiel, Mordecai and Fox, Karl A., Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1959)Google Scholar; Malinvaud, E., Statistical Methods of Econometrics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966)Google Scholar; Draper, N. R. and Smith, H., Applied Regression Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1966)Google Scholar.

⁴ For more content-oriented surveys of historical trends, see Radabaugh, Sheldon, “Tendencies in California Direct Legislation,” 42 Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 66–78 (06 1961)Google Scholar; and Crouch, Winston W., The Initiative and Referendum in California (Los Angeles: Haynes Foundation, 1950)Google Scholar.

⁵ The regression equations are displayed vertically in the table. Standard errors are given in parentheses below each partial regression coefficient; to be regarded as statistically significant, a regression coefficient should be, conventionally, at least twice its standard error. The equations as a whole were significant (F test) at the .01 level. The Durbin-Watson statistic for serial correlation was also calculated. It fell in the inconclusive area for each equation.

⁶ When the total vote cast is used as the percentage base, the Republicans tend to do “too well” for a proper fit in gubernatorial elections—particularly in the Warren era. This may suggest that Republican candidates for governor have done somewhat better than one would “normally” expect them to—a phenomenon perhaps attributable to the historically weak party structure in the state as well as to the party's ability to field candidates of bipartisan appeal. One way of overcoming this peculiarity was to take the total registration as a base thus smoothing out these disruptions in the lower turnout off-year elections. In 1946 the race for governor was won in the primary and thus the Republican vote for lieutenant governor has been used.

⁷ See Horton, John E. and Thompson, Wayne E., “Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums,” 67 American Journal of Sociology 487–88 (03 1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Coleman, James S., Community Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1957)Google Scholar. Since only general elections are being considered in this analysis, turnout tends to be rather high in all cases. The election with the lowest turnout was 1942 with 59 percent of the registered vote, the highest, 1964 with 88 percent. Local elections frequently generate much lower turnout rates.

⁸ This is assumed to be the proposition with lowest abstention. Propositions which have generated controversy seem invariably to have low abstention rates. It seems then that, as the debate is more loudly and clearly drawn on a proposition and as the voter is made aware of the arguments of both sides and of the issues at stake, he is far more likely to reach a decision than he is to come to a psychological or ideological impasse due to a discovered value conflict or to cross-pressures. In only one of the elections was the proposition with lowest abstention itself “noncontroversial” by the definitions used here.

⁹ For a discussion of some of these points, see also Key, V. O. Jr. and Crouch, Winston W., The Initiative, and Referendum in California (Berkeley: University of California, 1939), pp. 531–532 Google Scholar. Incidentally, the correlation between trend and abstention does not affect the interpretation of the “mood” equation: neither variable is significant even when the other is excluded.

¹⁰ For a contrary argument, see Lee, Eugene C., California Votes 1988–1960 (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1963), Chapter 1Google Scholar. The correlation of turnout with the year in California in general elections for the 1912–1968 period is .48. The regression co-efficient suggests an average increase of turnout of about one percentage point every four years. Regression analysis using the year as an independent variable as well as a dummy variable for on- or off-year elections generates a highly significant equation and a multiple R² of .66:

¹¹ The abstention rate on the vote for state supreme court justices did drop noticeably in 1966 as a result of an unprecedented (and unsuccessful) campaign against the justices for their declaration that 1964's propostion 14 was unconstitutional.

¹² These data are generally consonant with James Rosenau's argument that the size of the attentive public has been increasing. See his “The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy” (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 03, 1968)Google Scholar.

¹³ See Levin, Murray B., The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston (New York: Holt, 1962), pp. 70–71 Google Scholar; Keniston, Kenneth, “Alienation and the Decline of Utopia,” 29 American Scholar 179–180 (Spring 1960)Google Scholar; and Riesman, David, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday-Anchor, 1955), pp. 196–199 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ A facsimile of much of the 1964 ballot, including all of the statewide propositions can be be found in Jacobs, Clyde E. and Gallagher, John F., California Government: One Among Fifty (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 53 Google Scholar.

¹⁵ The ease with which these bonds passed is typical. Of the 31 bond issues referred by the California legislature to the electorate at general elections since 1910, only three have failed to pass. One of these was the school bond measure on the 1968 ballot, a reaction in large measure to student disorders. The most recent previous bond failure occurred in 1922.

¹⁶ A crude, but provocative, estimate of the extent of the role sheer caprice can play in the vote on the propositions can be gained by cross-tabulating the votes on propositions 13 and 16 as in the table below. A consistent pro-lottery vote would require a “yes” vote on 16 and a “no” on 13 while consistent anti-lottery people voted against 16 and for 13. Those 14 to 17 percent of the ballots marked favorably for both measures largely defy rational explanation for by approving proposition 13 these voters were moving to nullify their affirmative vote on 16. Most likely, they genuinely favored the well-publicized lottery measure but, uninformed and uninstructed, they also voted for proposition 13 without seeing the logical connection. Another 8 percent of the absentees and 12 percent in the precinct voted for the lottery and abstained on proposition 13. Since the latter measure was designed to nullify the lottery vote, these lottery proponents who let others decide on it can hardly be said to be fully aware of their own best interests in this matter. Together these two groups make up one quarter of the ballots. In addition the rationale for voting negatively on both propositions is a bit feeble. Furthermore, if those who voted affirmatively on both were voting randomly on proposition 13 it is to be expected many citizens voted consistently only because they “guessed right” on the proposition. A similar argument could be made for those who voted against both measures. If the “worst” assumptions are made in each case, the number of ballots marked capriciously for at least one of these measures is about 60 percent. This is an outside limit under these considerations and the argument is a bit strained, but the exercise should serve to suggest orders of magnitude. It would appear that the vote on these measures was itself the result a kind of lottery.

¹⁷ See also Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Greenstein, Fred I., “The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting,” this Review, 62 (09 1968), 753–769 Google Scholar; and Hahn, Harlan, “Northern Referenda on Fair Housing: The Response of White Voters,” 21 Western Political Quarterly, 483–495 (09 1968.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁸ Both propositions 14 and 15, passed by the state electorate at this election, were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the courts.

¹⁹ The similarity between precinct and absentees found in the cross-tabulations in note 16 above is quite typical.

²⁰ A brief analysis of absentee voting from several California elections as well as of the limited literature on the subject suggests that the vote of the absentees does not usually differ greatly from the precinct vote. Absentees tend to be better off economically than the average and, as seen in Table 2, somewhat more likely to favor bond issues. Also, as often noted, absentees are likely to vote a few percentage points more Republican than other voters. The advantage for the Republicans, however, varies from election to election and from race to race and does not appear to depend on whether the Republican candidate is a moderate or a conservative. There is also some tendency for the Republican gain among the absentees to diminish as income increases; in poor areas the absentees are distinctly Republican while in wealthy areas they differ little from other voters. See Mueller, John E., “Reason and Caprice: Ballot Patterns in California,” unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965, chapter 3Google Scholar. See also Pollock, James K., “Absent Voting with Particular Reference to Ohio's Experience,” 15 National Municipal Review 282–292 (05 1926)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Merriam, Charles E. and Gosnell, Harold F., Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1924), pp. 63–72 Google Scholar; Harris, Joseph P., Election Administration in the United Stales (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1934) pp. 283–301 Google Scholar; Brice, Belmont Jr., “Absentee Voting and the Character of the Electorate,” BGR Observer, 06 1961 (Los Angeles: Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California)Google Scholar.

²¹ Banfield, Edward C. and Wilson, James Q., City Politics (New York: Vintage, 1963), p. 324 Google Scholar.

²² Loc. cit.

²³ Gregg, James E., “Newspaper Editorial Endorsement: Their Influence on California Elections,” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1964) p. 266 Google Scholar. See also Brinton, James E., Bush, Chilton R. and Newell, Thomas M., The Newspaper and Its Public (Stanford: Institute for Communication Research, Department of Communication and Journalism, Stanford University, 1959), p. 63 Google Scholar.

²⁴ Most of the research in the area of newspaper influence on issues and referendum voting suggests that the impact of the press is low at best. See Lundberg, George A., “The Newspaper and Public Opinion,” 4 Social Forces 709–715 (06, 1926)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gosnell, Harold F. and Schmidt, Margaret J., “Relation of the Press to Voting in Chicago,” 13 Journalism Quarterly 129–147 (06, 1936)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brinton, James E. and McKown, Norman, “Effects of Newspaper Reading on Knowledge and Attitude,” 38 Journalism Quarterly 187–195 (Spring, 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Boskoff, Alvin and Zeigler, Harmon, Voting Patterns in a Local Election (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), ch. 4Google Scholar. Impressions on the California case are given by Cottrell, Erwin A., “Twenty-five Years of Direct Legislation in California,” 3 Public Opinion Quarterly 39–41 (01, 1939)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Studies which argue that the newspapers do have influence include Gregg, op cit., his “Newspaper Editorial Endorsements and California Elections, 1948–62,” 42 Journalism Quarterly 532–538 (Autumn, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and his “Newspaper Endorsements and Local Elections in California,” (Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California, Davis, 05 1966)Google Scholar. For a critique of Gregg's approach, see Mueller, op. cit., pp. 183–185.

²⁵ The importance of active party endorsement of referendum issues is also noted in Wolfinger and Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 760–764 and Thomas, Norman C., “The Electorate and State Constitutional Revision: An Analysis of Four Michigan Referenda,” 12 Midwest Journal of Political Science 115–129 (02 1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The studies also suggest that class voting differences can be overwhelmed by the influence of party endorsement.

²⁶ See also Wolfinger and Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 762–764.

²⁷ Interviewing in a California city shortly after the 1958 election in which there were eighteen state propositions on the ballot, over 700 married couples were asked, “As far as you remember, did you both vote the same way on all the state propositions?” Fully 72 percent of those who had voted in the election stated that they had voted the same way. The radically conflicting ballot data from the precinct indicate that one cannot rely on self-report in a survey situation to substitute for the actual examination of ballots. Data derived from Table 5.7 in Carter, Richard F., “Voters and Their Schools,” (Technical Report, Institute for Communication Research, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 06, 1960), p. 173 Google Scholar. Additional information from a personal communication from Mr. Carter.

²⁸ See Bain, Henry M. and Hecock, Donald S., Ballot Position and Voters Choice (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957)Google Scholar; and White, Howard, “Voters Plump for First on List,” 39 National Municipal Review 110–111 (02, 1950)Google Scholar.

²⁹ The names of the candidates in the presidential contest were also rotated. It is noteworthy that order had no effect on this high visibility race.

³⁰ Campbell and Miller have noted that when tickets are split, such splitting usually occurs at the state and local level: “The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting,” this Review, 51 (06 1957), 293–312 Google Scholar. At least part of this splitting may be done by voters who become embarrassed, one might say, by the fact that they have voted a straight party line on the national offices. Thus they are inclined to break with the party on the less visible local races simply because of a semi-capricious urge to mix up their vote pattern. Perhaps this somewhat tenuous line of reasoning could be used to explain in part why some cities with Democratic registration majorities elect Republicans to positions of local leadership.

³¹ For other discussions of order effects on proposition voting see Key and Crouch, op. cit., pp. 536–538; LaPalombara, Joseph G., The Initiative and Referendum in Oregon: 1938–1948 (Corvallis: Oregon State College, Studies in Political Science, No. 1, 1950), pp. 95–97 Google Scholar; and Pollock, James K., The Initiative and Referendum in Michigan (Ann Arbor: Michigan Governmental Studies No. 6, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan, 1940), pp. 45–49 Google Scholar.

³² Horton and Thompson, op. cit., Thompson, Wayne E. and Horton, John E., “Political Alienation as a Force in Political Action,” 38 Social Forces 190–195 (03, 1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gamson, William A., “The Fluoridation Dialogue: Is It an Ideological Conflict?” 25 Public Opinion Quarterly 527–537 (Winter, 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Simmel, Arnold, “A Signpost for Research on Fluoridation Conflicts: The Concept of Relative Deprivation,” 17 Journal of Social Issues 26–36 (no. 4, 1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McDill, Edward L. and Ridley, Jeanne C., “Status, Anomia, Political Alienation and Political Participation,” 63 American Journal of Sociology 205–213 (09, 1962)Google Scholar; and Mason, Gene L. and Jaros, Dean, “Alienation and Support for Demogogues,” 1 Polity 479–500 (Summer 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³³ See Levin, op. cit., p. 58.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 61.

³⁵ On the basis of an “unstructured questionnaire” one would expect far more pure negativism than this. See Berg, I. A. and Rappaport, G. M., “Response Bias in an Unstructured Questionnaire,” 37 Journal of Psychology 475–481 (10, 1954)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Historical evidence, incidentally, suggests that the amount of negative voting on these judicial races may be a fairly good indicator of electoral discontent. Much larger, though still far from dominant, portions of the electorate voted against the judges during the depression than have so since that time—except for the campaign of 1966 noted above. (See note 11.)

³⁶ An antifluoridation voter quoted in Attwood, William, “Fluoridation: Why All the Controversy?” Look (06 24, 1958), p. 23 Google Scholar. See also Anderson, Dewey, California State Government (Stanford University, 1942), p. 205 Google Scholar. For a discussion and some analysis, see Schumacher, Waldo, “Thirty Years of People's Rule in Oregon: An Analysis,” 47 Political Science Quarterly 251 (06 1932)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gosnell, Harold F. and Schmidt, Margaret J., “Popular Law Making in the United States, 1924–1936,” in Problems Relating to Legislative Organization and Powers, Volume VII in a series published by the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee (Albany, 1938), p. 317 Google Scholar; Key and Crouch, op. cit., p. 536; and Pollock, , The Initiative …, p. 50 Google Scholar.

³⁷ “Participation of the People in Their Government,” 7 Transactions of the Commonwealth Club of California 450–451 (No. 11, 03 3, 1931)Google Scholar.

³⁸ At least for the middle class. Poorer voters may express greater blanket negativism, but a brief analysis of precinct results suggests that voting on noncontroversial propositions in lower class neighborhoods shows more abstention (as the analysis in Section II above would predict), but no more negativism.

³⁹ See Couch, Arthur and Keniston, Kenneth, “Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing Response Set as a Personality Variable,” 60 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 151–174 (03 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bass, Bernard M., “Development and Evaluation of a Scale for Measuring Social Acquiescence,” 53 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 296–99 (11 1956)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and Cronbach, Lee J., “Further Evidence on Response Sets and Test Design,” 10 Educational and Psychological Measurement 3–31 (Spring 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ This conclusion fits well with Cronbach's observation with respect to educational testing that “Response sets become most influential as items become difficult or ambiguous.” Op. cit., p. 3. It was noted above that there were also on the ballot two contested judicial races where the order in which the candidates were listed was rotated from district to district. There was little tendency for yeasayers to select the candidates listed first. Therefore for the most part yeasayers seem to pick the “yes” option not because it is listed first, but rather because they really are favorable in some sense toward the ballot item. A similar finding occurs in a study of response sets where the choice of the “yes” and “agree” responses were not particularly affected by the order in which the response options were presented. Berg and Rappaport, op. cit.

⁴¹ These considerations, of course, are by no means exhaustive. Among the many factors left unconsidered, for example, is the effect on the vote of the way the proposition is worded on the ballot. One survey found that attitude on an important bond measure (not just an obscure technical proposition) apparently was sharply altered when confusion about its intent was cleared up. See Marvick, Dwaine, “Electoral Opinion in the 59th Assembly District, Los Angeles, June 1962,” (Falk Foundation Program of Political Training and Research, University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science, 1962)Google Scholar.

It also seems likely that the voters booklet, which is sent out to all voters several weeks before the election, can be quite important in influencing opinion, at least on the noncontroversial propositions. Fragmentary evidence to support this conclusion was found in the present study. At one point twenty-two judges were asked to select from proposition 6 through 12 the measures which they felt would appear to the “average voter” to be most unobjectionable. While their ratings generally reflected the statewide vote on these propositions, on propositions 11 and 12 the fit is quite poor. Proposition 12, which authorized the giving of tax relief in disaster areas proclaimed by the governor, is found by the judges to be easily the most unobjectionable of all—after all who could be in favor of disaster? Yet this proposition did less well in the state (66 percent favorable) than three other of the noncontroversial propositions. (As seen in Table 2 the proposition did somewhat better in Los Angeles county as it did in other areas which had recently undergone disasters—thus suggesting a certain amount of rationality in the vote.) Proposition 11, which did very well (73 percent favorable) despite a low unobjectionableness score, reads very poorly on the ballot. It sought to delete the requirement that the city electorate must approve when it is proposed that municipal functions be carried out by county officers; thus it appears to take power away from the voters.

It seems very likely that this anomaly in which a highly unobjectionable proposition does worse than a far more objectionable one can be explained by reference to the voters' booklet. There the lone favorable argument for proposition 11 points out that such city-county arrangements have been carried out hundreds of times without voter approval in the past and thus passage of the proposition would only recognize and legalize an efficient arrangement that is already in effect.

This fact is not mentioned in any way in the ballot wording. The opposing argument to proposition 12 in the booklet also stresses an implication which is not at all obvious from the ballot wording: disaster tax relief would only go to those who suffer in an officially proclaimed disaster area and thus the measure discriminates against those who lose in small, nonsensational disasters. (If it is the case that the absentee is more likely than the voter in the precincts to become separated from his copy of the voters booklet, these considerations might also explain why the absentees differ with other voters on these two propositions as seen in Table 2.)

It is noteworthy in this regard that the propositions without opposing arguments in the voters booklet, 6, 9, and 11, tend to correlate with one another among the ballot data at somewhat higher levels than do other pairs of noncontroversial propositions. The three also correlate comparatively well with proposition 13. This linkage is interesting for the arguments on proposition 13 in the booklet are rather unusual: specifically, the argument which purports to be against the measure has little to do with the subject of the proposition but rather is a tirade against the lottery as presented in proposition 16! Thus 13 is rather like 6, 9, and 11 in essentially having no negative argument in the booklet.

For assessments of the value of the voters booklet in informing and influencing opinion, see La Palombara, op. cit., p. 119; Key and Crouch, op. cit., p. 532; Mueller, John E., “The Politics of Fluoridation in Seven California Cities,” 19 Western Political Quarterly 62–63 (03 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and especially Kelley, Stanley Jr., Political Campaigning: Problems in Creating an Informed Electorate (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1960), pp. 41ffGoogle Scholar.