¹ The distinction between “disarmament” and “arms control” is significant. Neither England nor Mexico, for example, is a domestically disarmed nation. Rather, as a consequence of the processes to be examined with this theory, each nation—as others that are politically integrated—has established a monopoly of its major means of internal violence. Domestic peace, that is, the cessation of internal wars, seems to be associated with conditions of arms control (involving decisional currency exchanges) rather than disarmament.

“Political development” and “political integration” are also troublesome terms that should not delay us long. Since World War II, the rubric “political development” has tended to be employed mainly to describe comparative studies of national modernization, particularly with respect to the growth of economic organization and governmental bureaucracies. Overviews of current usage are reported in Huntington, Samuel P., “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, 17 (04, 1965), 386–430 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Riggs, Fred W., “The Theory of Political Development,” in Charlesworth, J. C. (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press 1967), pp. 317–349 Google Scholar; Holt, Robert T. and Turner, John E., The Political Basis of Economic Development (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1966)Google Scholar. The approach described in this report is “developmental” simply in its search for recurring tendencies.

² Interview in Newsweek, 08 2, 1965, p. 21 Google Scholar.

³ Current interest in political economy is surveyed by Mitchell, William C. in “The Shape of Political Theory to Come; From Political Sociology to Political Economy,” American Behavioral Scientist, 11 (11, 1967), 8–37 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and in “The New Political Economy,” Social Research, 35 (Spring, 1968), 76–110 Google Scholar. See also, Curry, R. L. Jr., A Theory of Political Exchange (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969)Google Scholar. Particular impetus has been provided by such works as Dahl, Robert A. and Lindblom, Charles E., Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper, 1953)Google Scholar, Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957)Google Scholar, and Buchanan, James M. and Tullock, Gordon, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962)Google Scholar.

⁴ Some theoretical difficulties of the case study method of political inquiry are described in Stein, Harold (ed.), Public Administration and Policy Development; A Case Book (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1952), pp. xx–xxx Google Scholar; also, Berelson, Bernard and Steiner, G. A., Human Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 27 Google Scholar, The logical and empirical pitfalls of ex post facto research are succinctly stated in Kerlinger, Fred N., Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 360 ff.Google Scholar, whereas the more general requirements of scientific historiography are discussed in Nagel, Ernest, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), Chap. 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hempel, Carl G., “The Functions of General Laws in History,” in Feigl, Herbert and Sellars, Wilfred (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 459–471 Google Scholar; and Gardiner, Patrick, The Nature of Historical Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952)Google Scholar. To cope with some of the limitations of ex post facto tests of hypotheses, this project anticipates developing a simulation experiment which will presumably permit measurement of player behavior as related to currency transactions, attitudes of trust and suspicion, and other variables of the present theory. For an important attempt to replicate historical events through an experimental simulation, see Hermann, Charles F. and Hermann, Margaret G., “An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I,” this Review, 61 (06, 1967), 400–416 Google Scholar.

⁵ Plato's Republic, Book Two; Barker, Ernest, The Politics of Aristotle (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 116–137 Google Scholar.

⁶ Locke, John, Second Treatise on Civil Government (1689)Google Scholar; James Madison's Federalist Papers, Number 10; Burke, Edmund, Speech on the Conciliation of the Colonies (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1896), pp. 67–68 Google Scholar.

⁷ Popular Government (New York: Holt, 1886), p. 30 Google Scholar.

⁸ Lowell, A. Lawrence, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green, 1913), pp. 61–62 Google Scholar; Bentley, Arthur F., The Process of Government (Evanston, Illinois: Principia Press, 1949 re-issue)Google Scholar; Lasswell, Harold D., Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936)Google Scholar; Dahl and Lindblom, op. cit., Downs, op. cit., and Buchanan and Tullock, op. cit.

⁹ One of the best behavioral formulations is found in Kuhn, Alfred, The Study of Society (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin-Dorsey Press, 1963)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms (Boston: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961)Google Scholar.

¹¹ Blau, Peter M., The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.)Google Scholar

¹² Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 319–20, Chap. 17 ff.

¹³ A may of course be willing to exchange X for B's Y in order to facilitate getting C's Z later, but this is an elaboration of the basic model rather than a new model.

¹⁴ “… Evolution of trust goes through phases brought on by a time-dependent cognitive reappraisal of the relationship,” in the words of Pilisuk, Marc, Skolnick, Paul, Thomas, Kenneth, and Chapman, Reuben, “Boredom vs. Cognitive Reappraisal in the Development of Cooperative Strategy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9 (03, 1967), p. 116 Google Scholar. Cf. processes taking place during “critical transition” in the present theory.

¹⁵ Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley, 1964)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Political scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the central importance of trust attitudes in political and social relations. Most of the work, however, continues to be done by sociologists and psychologists. The trust-suspicion factor is expounded and experimented with by the following: Gamson, William A., Power and Discontent (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968), Chap. 3Google Scholar; Deutsch, M., “Trust and Suspicion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2 (12, 1958), 265–279 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Some Considerations Relevant to National Policy,” Journal of Social Issues, 17 (1961), 57–68 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Deutsch, M. and Krauss, R. M., “Studies in Interpersonal Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6 (03, 1962), 52–76 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Garfinkel, Harold, “A conception of, and Experiments with, ‘Trust’ as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions,” in Harvey, O. J. (ed.), Motivation and Social Interaction (New York: Ronald Press, 1963), pp. 187–238 Google Scholar; Hoedemaker, E. D., “Distrust and Aggression: An Interpersonal-International Analogy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 (03, 1968), 69–81 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lieberman, B., “i-Trust: A Notion of Trust in Three-Person Games and International Affairs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 8 (09, 1964), 271–280 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pilisuk, Marc et al., “Honesty, Deceit, and Timing in the Display of Intentions,” Behavioral Science, 12 (05, 1967), 205–215 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Shure, G. H. and Meeker, R. J., “A Personality/Attitude Schedule for Use in Experimental Studies,” Journal of Psychology, 65 (1967), 233–252 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Ake, Claude, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 8–11 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ An excellent empirical study of political integration, employing a content analysis of the American colonial press, is Merritt's, Richard L. Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966)Google Scholar. For an outstanding attempt to cope with the logical and empirical issues of defining “integration,” see Galtung, Johan, “A Structural Theory of Integration,” Journal of Peace Research (1968), No. 4, pp. 375–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar. According to Galtung, integration is “the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor.”

¹⁹ For development of these definitions, Truman, David B., The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951)Google Scholar; Barnard, Chester, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938)Google Scholar; March, James G. and Simon, Herbert A., Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958)Google Scholar; and Gross, Bertram M., The Managing of Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1964)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Defined in this author's “A Theory of Conflict Processes and Organizational Offices,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (09, 1966), 331–334 Google Scholar.

²¹ Buchanan and Tullock, op. cit.

²² See cited Final Technical Report entitled “A Transactional Theory of Political Integration and Arms Control” (11 1968)Google Scholar, Office of Naval Research Project NR 177258, Contral Nonr-4722 (00).

²³ This Review, 26 (April, 1932), 223–240.

²⁴ The mathematical and logical problems of measurement in such a time-series may be considered in the light of the excellent discussion by Coleman, James S., “The Mathematical Study of Change,” in Blalock, Hubert M. Jr., and Blalock, Ann B. (eds.), Methodology in Social Research (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), Chap. 11Google Scholar.

²⁵ Final Technical Report, ONR Project NR 177258, op. cit.

²⁶ For further pertinent comment, Holsti, Ole R. and North, Robert C., “History as a ‘Laboratory of Conflict’,” in McNeil, Elton B. (ed.), Social Science and Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1955)Google Scholar.

²⁷ Rosenberg, Milton J., in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967)Google Scholar, for example, attempts to build new ways to reduce distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union from approaches suggested by validated psychological theories. One suggestion is to rely upon systematic “cross-trading,” wherein the advantage in one interest conflict is given to one side, while the advantage in another conflict is given to the other side. Thus, adversary leaders may be conditioned away from the view that their relationship is an extended zero-sum game, and attitudes of distrust toward one another may be modified by overt transactional successes.