Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
The “People's Government” at Peking, which has been functioning since October, 1949, under the sponsorship of the Chinese Communist Party, includes a system of disciplinary surveillance over government personnel that in several aspects is reminiscent of one of the world's most remarkable institutions. This is the Chinese Censorate, traditionally a highly systematized organ of administrative and political control that was an integral, and usually a prominent, part of China's governmental structure for more than two thousand years.
The new control system in China bears only a partial resemblance to the old. It is even possible that China's censorial heritage may not have had any part in shaping its development. However, since that heritage may conceivably channel its future development in directions that would be unforeseeable and unexplainable in any other context, it would appear to be desirable to take a fresh look at this long-lived institution. Aside from prospects of future influence, the Censorate, as a unique and, in its setting, a durable solution to the universal and ever-present problem of control in government, has intrinsic significance for students of political science.
1 Brief summaries of the history of the Censorate appear in Wist, Hans, Das Chinesische Zensorat (Hamburg, 1932)Google Scholar, and in Walker, Richard L., “The Control System of the Chinese Government”, Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 7, pp. 2–21 (Nov., 1947)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A most useful short history in Chinese is I-han, Kao, Chung-kuo yü-shih chih-tu ti yen-ho [Evolution of the Chinese Censorial System] (Shanghai, 1934)Google Scholar.
2 A discussion of the theoretical basis of government in imperial China can be found in Chao, Hsieh Pao, The Government of China, 1644–1911 (Baltimore, 1925), pp. 1–23Google Scholar. Also see Latourette, Kenneth Scott, The Chinese, Their History and Culture (New York, 1946), pp. 513–551Google Scholar.
3 See Creel, H. G., Confucius, The Man and the Myth (New York, 1949), pp. 142–172Google Scholar; and Legge, James, The Chinese Classics (Oxford, 1893–1895), Vol. 1, pp. 245, 269, 285Google Scholar [Analects of Confucius, Ch. 11, Sec. 23; Ch. 13, Sec. 15; Ch. 14, Sec. 23], Vol. 2, pp. 161, 219, 319 [Mencius Bk. 1, Pt. 2, Ch. 4, Sec. 10; Bk. 2, Pt. 2, Ch. 5; Bk. 4, Pt. 2, Ch. 3].
4 The following discussion of censorial practices under the Ming dynasty is derived essentially from the present writer's The Chinese Censorate of the Ming Dynasty, Including an Analysis of Its Activities during the Decade 1424–1434 (unpublished ms., 1950), which is obtainable on microfilm from The University of Chicago Library. This work is based primarily on standard Chinese historical sources: Ming-shih [History of the Ming Dynasty], Chs. 72–76; Ta Ming hui-tien [Collected Institutes of the Ming Dynasty], Chs. 209–211; and the sections of the Ming shih lu [True Records of the Ming Dynasty] that pertain to the reigns of the Emperors Jen Tsung (1424–1425) and Hsüan Tsung (1424–1435).
5 Kao I-han, op. cit., p. 43.
6 After Nanking was made auxiliary capital in 1420, a second Censorate was set up there. It had a smaller staff than the Peking Censorate, nominally including thirty Investigating Censors, and had jurisdiction only over the city and its immediate environs.
7 Ming-shih, Ch. 94, pp. 10b ff.
8 Ibid., Ch. 74, pp. 11a–13a.
9 Ibid., Ch. 75, pp. 13b–15b.
10 Ibid., Ch. 73, p. 4b.
11 Ch'eng-tae, Sun, Ch'un-ming meng-yü lu (blockprint pocket ed., n.d.), Ch. 48, pp. 6a–7aGoogle Scholar.
12 Ming-shih, Ch. 73, p. 2b.
13 Yüan-shih [History of the Yuan Dynasty], Ch. 6, p. 15b.
14 This was Liu Kuan, who held office from 1415 to 1428. See his biography in Ming-shih, Ch. 151, pp. 11a–12b.
15 Mai, Hung, Jung-chai sui-pi (Ssŭ-pu ts'ung-k'an ed.; Shanghai, 1935), Pt. 4, Ch. 11, p. 8aGoogle Scholar.
16 Ming-shih, Ch. 164, pp. 4a–5b; Ming shih-lu, Tsung, Jen, Ch. 7B, p. 2a, Ch. 8A, pp. 4b–5bGoogle Scholar.
17 For numerous examples, see Yutang, Lin, A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China (Chicago, 1936), pp. 58–73Google Scholar.
18 Idem.
19 Yüan-shih, Ch. 148, p. 8b.
20 See Hsiung-fei, Li, Les Censeurs sous la Dynastie Mandchoue (1616–1911) en Chine (Paris, 1936)Google Scholar; Tang, Edgar Cha, “The Censorial Institution in China, 1644–1911”, in Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and SciencesGoogle Scholar, Summaries of Theses … 1932 (Cambridge, 1933), pp. 155–158Google Scholar; Hsieh Pao Chao, op. cit., pp. 87–98; Mayers, William Frederick, The Chinese Government (Shanghai, 1897), pp. 23–24Google Scholar; Brunnert, H. S. and Hagelstrom, V. V., Present Day Political Organization of China, trans, by Beltchenko, A. and Moran, E. E. (Shanghai, 1912), pp. 75–79Google Scholar; and Hans Wist, op. cit., pp. 36–45.
21 See Tuan-sheng, Ch'ien, The Government and Politics of China (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 262–277Google Scholar; Linebarger, Paul M. A., The China of Chiang K'ai-Shek; A Political Study (Boston, 1941), pp. 313–324Google Scholar; Chih-fang, Wu, Chinese Government and Politics (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 211–217Google Scholar; Tsao, W. Y., The Constitutional Structure of Modern China (Melbourne, 1947), pp. 188–203Google Scholar; Qui, Siu, Le Pouvoir de Controle en Chine (Nancy, 1937)Google Scholar; and Richard L. Walker, op. cit. (above, n. 1), pp. 15–19.
22 Yat-sen, Sun, San Min Chu I, the Three Principles of the People, trans, by Price, Frank W. (Shanghai, 1929), pp. 356–358Google Scholar.
23 Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, op. cit., p. 269.
24 China Handbook 1950 (New York, 1950), p. 163Google Scholar.
25 See Chih-mai, Chen, “Impeachments of the Control Yüan; A Preliminary Survey”, Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 331–366 (Oct., 1935)Google Scholar; No. 4, pp. 515–542 (Jan., 1936); and Siu Qui, op. cit., p. 88. For some more recent impeachments, see New York Times, Feb. 14, 1950, p. 17Google Scholar, and Jan. 15, 1951, p. 3.
26 A translation of the organic law appears in Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, op. cit., pp. 477–481. The original Chinese text occurs in 1950 Jen-min shou-ts'e [1950 People's Handbook] (Shanghai, 1950), sec. i, pp. 28–31Google Scholar.
27 Any procuratorial system, of course, is to some extent suggestive of the traditional Chinese censorial system, since censors exercised the authority of public prosecutors. However, the new system lacks the characteristic core of the censorial concept, which is disciplinary surveillance over government personnel. Specifically, the new Chinese procuratorial system is directly adapted from that of Soviet Russia. Cf. Ch'i-yu, Ch'en, Hsin Chung-kuo chien-ch'a chih-tu kai-lun [A summary of the New China Procuratorial System] (Peking, 1950)Google Scholar, and Towster, Julian, Political Power in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1947 (New York, 1948), pp. 305–310Google Scholar. Procurators have a long history in Russia, although the modern Soviet system seems markedly different from the original imperial one. The original, in fact, may have had far more in common with the traditional Chinese Censorate than does the Soviet system. As the office was set up by Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century, the original Procurator General was in charge of a hierarchy of public accusers or “fiscals,” who were charged with investigating and denouncing persons employed in the public service. Considering that Chinese censors were traditionally designated “the ears and eyes of the emperor,” it is of especial interest that Peter referred to the Procurator General as “the all-seeing eye of the czar.” Cf. Kovalevsky, Maxime, Russian Political Institutions (Chicago, 1902), pp. 109 ff.Google Scholar, and Kluchevsky, V. O., A History of Russia, trans, by Hogarth, C. J., Vol. 4 (London, 1926), pp. 170–173, 183–187Google Scholar. However, the possibility that this old control system of imperial Russia had indirect connections, through France or Sweden, with the Chinese censorial system cannot be explored here.
28 In the final paragraph of its first official Report, the Committee of People's Supervision announced that it saw the need to study further the theory and practice of the supervisory system of the Soviet Union. See Hsin-hua yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Vol. 2, pp. 994–995 (Sept., 1950)Google Scholar. The prototype indicated is the Soviet Union's Ministry of State Control, which is expected “to establish strictest control over accounting and expenditure of state funds and material values, and over execution of governmental decisions.” (Julian Towster, op. cit., p. 173).
29 Art. 18; Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, op. cit., p. 480.
30 1960 Jen-min shou-ts'e, sec. ping, p. 3.
31 Survey of China Mainland Press (Hong Kong, American Consulate General), No. 33, p. 5 (Dec., 19, 1950)Google Scholar.
32 Actually, the Committee of People's Supervision is the direct descendent of a socalled “Control Yüan,” identical in designation to that of the National Government, that existed under the North China People's Government, the immediate predecessor of the Peking government. One of the first tasks of the new Committee was to take over pending cases from this North China People's Control Yüan. See the Committee's Report in Hsin-yua hüeh-pao, loc. cit.
33 A subsequent Report covering the months of September, October, and November, 1950, is briefly summarized in translation in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 33, p. 5 (Dec., 19, 1950). A full translation of a five-month Report by the Committee of People's Supervision of the Central-South administrative area appears in Current Background (Hong Kong, American Consulate General), No. 39, pp. 43–47 (Dec. 9, 1950)Google Scholar.
34 Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 33, pp. 5–6 (Dec. 19, 1950.)Google Scholar
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