Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gxg78 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-04T03:15:34.808Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Toward Applicable Social Choice Theory: A Comparison of Social Choice Functions under Spatial Model Assumptions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John R. Chamberlin  and
Michael D. Cohen
John R. Chamberlin
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Michael D. Cohen
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article develops a formal framework to aid political designers in the comparison of social choice functions. It generalizes earlier assumptions of “impartial culture” so that we may begin to investigate the effect of politically interesting variations on the probability that different social choice functions will satisfy given performance criteria. As an application of the framework, a detailed Monte Carlo study compares the ability of four different social choice functions to select a Condorcet winner when voter preference orders have been generated from a spatial representation of ideal points and alternatives. We also investigate the potential of alternative methods of selecting winners in presidential primary elections.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 72 , Issue 4 , December 1978 , pp. 1341 - 1356
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Abrams, Robert (1976). “The Voter's Paradox and the Homogeneity of Individual Preference Orders.” Public Choice 26:19–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Achen, Christopher (1975). “Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response.” American Political Science Review 69:1218–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aldrich, John (1975). “Candidate Support Functions in the 1968 Election: An Empirical Application of the Spatial Model.” Public Choice 22:1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aldrich, John and McKelvey, Richard (1977). “A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections.” American Political Science Review 71:111–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Apter, David, ed. (1964). Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Black, Duncan (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Blydenburgh, John (1971). “The Closed Rule and the Paradox of Voting.” Journal of Politics 33:57–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bowen, Bruce (1972). “Toward an Estimate of the Frequency of Occurrence of the Paradox of Voting in U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes.” In Niemi, Richard and Weisberg, Herbert (eds.), Probability Models of Collective Decision Making. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill.Google Scholar
Campbell, Colin and Tullock, Gordon (1965). “A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities.” Economic Journal 75:853–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chamberlin, John and Cohen, Michael (1978). “A Linear Inequality Method of Establishing Certain Social Choice Conjectures.” Public Choice (forthcoming).Google Scholar
Claunch, John, ed. (1965). Mathematical Applications in Political Science. Dallas: Arnold Foundation of Southern Methodist University.Google Scholar
Converse, Philip (1964). “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In Apter, David (ed.), Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
Coombs, Clyde (1954). Theory of Data. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Cover, Albert (1977). “One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 21:523–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davis, Otto, Hinich, Melvin, and Ordeshook, Peter (1970). “An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process.” American Political Science Review 64:426–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
DeMeyer, Frank and Plott, Charles (1970). “The Probability of a Cyclical Majority.” Econometrica 38:345–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Doron, Gideon and Kronick, Richard (1977). “Single Transferable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function.” American Journal of Political Science 21:303–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Farquharson, Robin (1969). Theory of Voting. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, John (1977). “On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 71:166–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishburn, Peter (1971). “A Comparative Analysis of Group Decision Methods.” Behavioral Science 16:538–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishburn, Peter (1973). “Voter Concordance, Simple Majorities and Group Decision Methods.” Behavioral Science 18:364–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishburn, Peter (1974a). “Simple Voting Systems and Majority Rule.” Behavioral Science 19:166–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishburn, Peter (1974b). “Paradoxes of Voting.” American Political Science Review 68:537–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishburn, Peter (1974c). “Single-Peaked Preferences and Probabilities of Cyclical Majorities.” Behavioral Science 19:21–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fishburn, Peter and Gehrlein, William (1976). “An Analysis of Simple Two-Stage Voting Systems.” Behavioral Science 21:1–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garman, Mark and Kamien, Morton (1968). “The Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations.” Behavioral Science 13:306–16.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hinich, Melvin, Ledyard, John, and Ordeshook, Peter (1972). “The Existence of Equilibrium under Majority Rule.” Journal of Economic Theory 4:144–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hinich, Melvin, Ledyard, John and Ordeshook, Peter (1970). “Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation.” American Political Science Review 64:772–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jamison, Dean and Luce, Edward (1972). “Social Homogeneity and the Probability of Intransitive Majority Rule.” Journal of Economic Theory 5:79–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Joslyn, Richard (1976). “The Impact of Decision Rules in Multi-Candidate Campaigns: The Case of the 1972 Democratic Presidential Nomination.” Public Choice 25:1–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, Jerry (1974). “Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives.” Econometrica 42:239–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klahr, David (1966). “A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting.” American Political Science Review 60:384–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kuga, Kiyoshi and Nagatani, Kiroaki (1974). “Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting.” Econometrica 42:1045–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ludwin, William (1976). “Voting Methods: A Simulation.” Public Choice 25:19–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard (1975). “Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibria.” Econometrica 43: 815–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Niemi, Richard (1969). “Majority Decision Making with Partial Unidimensionality.” American Political Science Review 63:488–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Niemi, Richard (1970). “The Occurrence of the Paradox of Voting in University Elections.” Public Choice 8:91–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Niemi, Richard and Weisberg, Herbert (1968). “A Mathematical Solution for the Paradox of Voting.” Behavioral Science 13:317–23.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Niemi, Richard (1972). Probability Models of Collective Decision Making. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill.Google Scholar
Paris, David (1975). “Plurality Distortion and Majority Rule.” Behavioral Science 20:125–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rabinowitz, George (1973). Spatial Models of Electoral Choice. PhD. Dissertation, University of Michigan.Google Scholar
Ranney, Austin (1976). “‘The Divine Science’: Political Engineering in American Culture.” American Political Science Review 70:140–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Richelson, Jeffrey (1975). “A Comparative Analysis of Social Choice Functions.” Behavioral Science 20:331–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William (1958). “The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments.” American Political Science Review 52:349–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William (1965). “Arrow's Theorem and Some Examples of the Paradox of Voting.” In Claunch, John (ed.), Mathematical Applications in Political Science. Dallas: Arnold Foundation of Southern Methodist University.Google Scholar
Taylor, Michael (1968). “Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Social Choice.” Public Choice 4:35–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tufte, Edward (1974). Data Analysis for Politics and Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon and Campbell, Colin (1970). “Computer Simulation of a Small Voting System.” Economic Journal 80:97–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, H. P. (1974). “An Axiomatization of Borda's Rule.” Journal of Economic Theory 9:43–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.