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Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2008

BEAR F. BRAUMOELLER
BEAR F. BRAUMOELLER*
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University
*
Bear F. Braumoeller is Assistant Professor, The Ohio State University, 2168 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373 ([email protected]).
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Abstract

Systemic theories of international politics rarely predict conflict short of cataclysmic systemic wars, and dyadic theories of conflict lack systemic perspective. This article attempts to bridge the gap by introducing a two-step theory of conflict among Great Powers. In the first stage, states engage in a dynamic, ongoing process of managing the international system, which inevitably produces tensions among them. In the second stage, relative levels of security-related activity determine how and when those tensions erupt into disputes. A test of the theory on Great Power conflicts from the nineteenth century supports the argument and, moreover, favors the deterrence model over the spiral model as a proximate explanation of conflict in the second stage.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 102 , Issue 1 , February 2008 , pp. 77 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2008

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