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The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Calvin J. Mouw  and
Michael B. MacKuen
Calvin J. Mouw
Affiliation:
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Michael B. MacKuen
Affiliation:
University of Missouri, St. Louis
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Abstract

We examine the politics of the strategic agenda. Abstracting a politics on the liberal-conservative dimension, we analyze Key Vote roll call data from the U.S. House of Representatives during the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations. The data suggest that politicians set the policy agenda in a strategic fashion. Because they consider such factors as long-term political goals, the changing institutional setting, and plebiscitary presidential politics, agenda-setters propose legislation that only imperfectly reflects their and the membership's wishes on the issue at hand. Thus, as the final stage in the political process, the strategic selection of an agenda provides a means by which factors other than policy preferences affect policy outcomes. The analyses affirm the strategic agenda as a core element in political life.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 86 , Issue 1 , March 1992 , pp. 87 - 105
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1992 

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