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The Stability of Coalitions on Roll Calls in the House of Representatives*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

William H. Riker  and
Donald Niemi
William H. Riker
Affiliation:
Lawrence College
Donald Niemi
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Extract

In some recent discussions of roll calls in Congress a model of interacting blocs has often been adopted and to a considerable degree verified. This model assumes the existence of several fairly cohesive blocs along with, perhaps, some unattached members. Furthermore, it is assumed that some of these blocs are fairly consistently opposed on roll calls, while others ally now with one side, now with the other. This model is attractive, not only because it accords with the usage of journalists, but also because it seems to provide a rational explanation of what sometimes appears to be the almost random confusion of Congressional voting behavior. As the evidence here presented suggests, however, this model is somewhat too neat and requires modification to account for shifting alliances over (often relatively short periods of) time. In a trial, reasoning from the assumptions of this model, we attempted to pick out those blocs and members who shifted from side to side. We were, however, unable to do so except in a few instances, largely, we believe, because the model as heretofore developed is static.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 56 , Issue 1 , March 1962 , pp. 58 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1962

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References

1 See, for example, Truman, David B., The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York, 1959)Google Scholar.

2 Shapley, L. S. and Shubik, Martin, “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System,” this Review, Vol. 48 (1954), pp. 787–792Google Scholar.

3 Crane, Wilder, “A Caveat on Roll Call Studies of Party Voting,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (1960), pp. 237–249CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 It is difficult to make a precise empirical observation that will strengthen one's confidence in the appropriateness of this assumption. See Riker, William H., “A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 120–131CrossRefGoogle Scholar, where it is shown that it is not clear whether or not the “power” of the index corresponds to the participants' notion of what “power” is. For a related investigation of a related definition see MacRae, Duncan Jr., and Price, Hugh D., “Scale Positions and ‘Power’ in the Senate,” Behavioral Science, Vol. 4 (1959), pp. 212–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 The technique of calculation of s and some a priori arguments justifying its use as a measure are set forth in Riker, William H., “A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls in Votng Bodies” in Wahlke, John C. and Eulau, Heinz, eds., Legislative Behavior (Glencoe, 1959), pp. 377–383Google Scholar.

6 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 17 (#49, 4 12 1959), p. 1519 ff.Google Scholar

7 See MacRae, Duncan Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958)Google Scholar. Since we were attempting to predict rather than interpret, we constructed no Guttman-type scales, which are more useful for post-hoc interpretation than for day-to-day prediction. An effort to use our index for interpretation, however, might be especially informative if scalability and consistency of indices over time were found to be associated.

8 This calculation was done on an IBM 650 at the Numerical Analysis Laboratory of the University of Wisconsin. The work was programmed by Mr. Stephen Robinson under the direction of Mr. George Struble. We are indebted to both of them for a clever program and the sharpening of the interpretation of the index. In addition to the power index, two closely related indices were calculated. One was an eligibility index, that is, the Pi for each member for that part of each set of roll calls in which the member was eligible to vote. The other was a voting index, that is, the Pi for each member for that part of each set of roll calls on which the member actually voted. These latter indices varied only slightly from the empirical power index for most members. They did help to distinguish, however, between members whose power index was low because they genuinely occupied a disadvantageous position and those whose index was low because of adventitious circumstances. In general, only the empirical power index is used in the subsequent interpretation.

9 An index of zero was only obtained by those who never voted, such as Speaker Rayburn. (Part of the difficulty with the name of the index is underscored by this curious result: that the man often considered the most powerful had an “empirical power index” of zero.) The lowest index for a member who participated fully and who also had the lowest voting index was .001022.

10 Throughout this essay “Southern Democrat” (or “SD”) means Democrats from the 11 states of the old confederacy; “Border Democrat” (or “BD”) means Democrats from Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Oklahoma; while “Northern Democrat” (or “ND”) means Democrats from all the remaining states.

11 This reason for our failure to predict turns out to suggest an interesting and possibly valuable use of the empirical power index. Since it is temporally oriented and since (unlike other techniques of studying roll calls such as scalograms or bloc anatysis) it is computed wholly by a machine once the roll calls are recorded and does not therefore require the judgment of a skilled observer in computation, it could be used to detect in week-by-week analysis just such changes in tone and coalitions as they occur.

12 Bailey, Stephen, Congress Makes a Law, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1950)Google Scholar and Young, Roland, This is Congress, (New York, 2d ed., 1946)Google Scholar.

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