¹ See Charles R. Adrian, “The Adoption of a Nonpartisan Legislature in Minnesota,” in a forthcoming issue of Minnesota History. For the spread of nonpartisanship on the state level, see Young, C. C., The Legislature of California: Its Membership, Procedure a Work (San Francisco, 1943), pp. 129–130Google Scholar.

² Legislative nonpartisanship has been urged by various persons and groups in more than a dozen states, including especially California, Michigan, New York, and North Dakota. See Adrian, Charles R., “The Nonpartisan Legislature in Minnesota,” unpubl. Ph.D. thesis (Minneapolis, 1950)Google Scholar, Ch. 6. Later citations are to this work by this author.

³ See Adrian's dissertation and the sources cited therein.

⁴ A wealth of material is available on the Nebraska legislature, dealing more with unicameralism than with nonpartisanship, however. Much of it has appeared over the years in the National Municipal Review. See Adrian, esp. pp. 331–353 and the bibliography.

⁵ Personal observations by the author supplied this data. There is no comprehensive study of the Minneapolis council.

⁶ See Ramsey, Maurice M., “Some Aspects of Non-Partisan Government in Detroit, 1918–1940,” unpubl. Ph.D. thesis (Ann Arbor, 1944)Google Scholar. The author also was again in a position to make personal observations.

⁷ For an extreme example, see Lederle, John W., “Political Party Organization in Detroit, 1920–1934,” unpubl. M.A. thesis (Ann Arbor, 1934)Google Scholar, and also Pound, Arthur, Detroit; Dynamic City (New York, 1940)Google Scholar. It should be noted, however, that party organization in Michigan has never been very strong; see Millspaugh, Arthur C., Party Organization and Machinery in Michigan Since 1890 (Baltimore, 1917)Google Scholar.

⁸ The rigidity of structure in a city with a high degree of political organization may delay the weakening effect, especially where nonpartisanship is grafted onto a “machine-governed” city, as was the case in Boston and in the city council in Chicago. In recent years party organizations have been weakened in both cities. The degree to which this has been caused by the long-range effect of nonpartisanship as against possible other causes, including the decline of the factors that made the nineteenth-century political boss possible, this writer is not prepared to say. Recent developments in Boston, in particular, would appear to support the general hypotheses expressed in this paper.

⁹ Adrian, p. 17.

¹⁰ Ibid., Ch. 7 and passim. Today, some members of the conservative faction of the Republican Party, for special reasons, appear to be satisfied with the present arrangement (ibid., pp. 377–378).

¹¹ Ramsey, p. 161.

¹² See Green, Charles D., “Nebraska Launches Unicameral,” State Government, Vol. 10 pp. 3–5 (Jan., 1937)Google Scholar; Robert L. Cochran, “Nebraska's Unicameral Adjourns,” ibid., p. 131 (July, 1937); and William E. Johnson, “Unicameralism Works,” ibid., Vol. 12, pp. 198, 207 (Nov., 1939).

¹³ Fergus Falls Daily Journal, 10 19, 1914, p. 2Google Scholar.

¹⁴ It should be added that his effort was made after his popularity in Detroit had waned somewhat.

¹⁵ For an elaboration on this point, see Adrian, pp. 397–404. These pages compare the situation in Minnesota just before and just after the establishment of nonpartisanship. The change in the political future of the Speaker of the House of Representatives is especially significant.

¹⁶ Ramsey, pp. 58–59.

¹⁷ In addition, Mayor James Couzens was appointed to fill a vacancy in the United States Senate in 1922; but he was not, and had not been, a Republican party regular, and he remained almost continuously at odds with party leaders (ibid., p. 57).

¹⁸ To discourage direct party activities, Michigan law prohibits overt participation by parties in nonpartisan elections and forbids both party endorsements previous to election and the spending of party money on behalf of nonpartisan candidates. The law is so drawn as to be easily circumvented, but little evasion appears to take place. Minnesota, in contrast, has no such legal restrictions.

¹⁹ In this connection, see the quotation above (referred to by n. 13) from the Fergus Falls Daily Journal.

²⁰ This conclusion is based largely upon personal observations of the author. See also the comments of Kelsey, W. K. in the Detroit News, 09 14, 1951, p. 30Google Scholar.

²¹ In the not untypical 1951 election for the Detroit council, perhaps two of the eighteen finalists in the run-off could be said to have campaigned energetically and clearly upon several major issues of the day. A few others made fairly definite positions known on one or two issues. Most candidates preferred ambiguity, generality, or silence upon these matters. One incumbent campaigned for “the perpetuation of our way of life,” while another stood largely on the implicit platform that he had been an able shortstop on the Detroit Tigers' baseball club. A similar type of campaign regularly takes place in Minneapolis. For many illustrations from Minnesota legislative campaigns, see Adrian, pp. 187–235.

²² For a detailed description of a vicious use of extraneous associations in a municipal nonpartisan campaign, see Smith, Carl O. and Sarasohn, Stephen B.. “Hate Propaganda in Detroit,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 10, pp. 24–52 (Spring, 1946)Google Scholar.

²³ Michigan Legislative Handbook, 1931–1933.

²⁴ Lipson, Leslie, The American Governor; From Figurehead to Leader (Chicago, 1939), p. 28Google Scholar.

²⁵ See Adrian, pp. 116–123.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 320–330, Table 13. Also see Naftalin, Arthur, “The Failure of the Farmer-Labor Party to Capture Control of the Minnesota Legislature,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 38, pp. 71–78 (02, 1944)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁷ In the six elections for the House preceding the establishment of nonpartisanship, the percentage of holdovers averaged 36.8. In the six elections following, the holdovers averaged 50.9 per cent and the trend continued, reaching an all-time high of 77.9 per cent in the election of 1944. Senate elections followed a similar development. For complete data, see Adrian, pp. 236–243 and Table 13.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 345–346, Table 18. In the six elections for the House preceding the establishment of nonpartisanship, the percentage of holdovers averaged 41.6; for the Senate, 46.9. In the six elections following, holdovers amounted to 56.2 per cent. The percentage followed an uninterrupted upward trend, reaching 62.7 per cent in the 1948 election. In each election since 1944, the percentage of holdovers has been higher than it ever was in any election under the partisan system. (Figures for 1950 are not available.)

²⁹ Ramsey, pp. 86–92, 107, cites statistics demonstrating that “the public showed a marked preference for incumbents and lengthy tenure was frequent.”

³⁰ See Hyneman, Charles S., “Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel,” Annals, Vol. 195, pp. 21–31 (01, 1938)Google Scholar.

³¹ For the difficulties experienced by Floyd B. Olson owing to this phenomenon, see Adrian, pp. 273–289.

³² Ibid., pp. 337–338, 350–352, and the sources there cited.

³³ Ibid., Ch. 5.

³⁴ See Spencer, Richard C., “Nebraska Idea Fifteen Years Old,” National Municipal Review, Vol. 39, p. 86 (02, 1950)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.