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Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2022

JACK PAINE Open the ORCID record for JACK PAINE [Opens in a new window]
JACK PAINE*
Affiliation:
University of Rochester, United States
*
Jack Paine, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, United States, [email protected].
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Abstract

Dictators confront a guardianship dilemma: military agents are needed to defeat mass outsider movements, but these agents can overthrow the ruler from within. In existing theories, rulers prioritize coup-proofing measures unless they anticipate strong outsider threats. Then dictators prioritize military competence. I reframe the guardianship dilemma around the central idea that militaries can choose between dual disloyalty options. In addition to staging a coup, militaries can defect by not fending off popular uprisings or rebellions. Dictators fear competent militaries not primarily because of their coup threat but instead because they often survive intact following a regime transition. Low motivation for competent militaries to save the ruler undermines their rationale of guarding against outsider threats, even if they pose a low coup threat. Consequently, rulers prioritize competence under narrow circumstances. Only radically oriented outsider movements that pose an existential threat to all regime elites induce loyalty from a competent military.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 116 , Issue 4 , November 2022 , pp. 1425 - 1442
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

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