¹ This view was presented especially by Staaff, at that time the leader of the Liberal party. After his death (1915) was published his great work, Det demokraticka statsskicket (Democratic Government), 2 vols., Stockholm, 1917, dealing particularly with the constitutions of England, the United States, France, and Switzerland.

² Wallengren, , Förstakammar frågan inför svenska riksdagen efter 1866 (The Question of the Upper House in the Swedish Riksdag after 1866), Lund, 1916.Google Scholar

³ At elections for the Lower House, a few names may also appear under the party designation (in accordance with a change adopted this year), labeled either as “minority” or as “factional” candidates. The purpose of this is to facilitate cooperation at elections between groups and parties that are closely in sympathy, but that still do not care to give up their independent position. For the sake of simplicity, the regulations concerning this matter will be disregarded in this paper, and the party designation will be assumed to be changed finally.

⁴ The regulations governing this so-called d'Hondt plan were worked out by the Swedish mathematician, Phragmén. They are found in the laws concerning elections to the Riksdag, sec. 19. Cf. Proportionsvalssakkunnigas betänkende, II (Stockholm, 1921), which is the basis for the rules now in force. For the manner in which these regulations work, see especially Von Heidenstam, , Några iakttagelser från 1931 års riksdagsmannaval (Some Observations on the Election of Members of the Riksdag in 1921), Stockholm, 1922.Google Scholar

⁵ In the case of minority or factional designations, the result is that these “factionals” in their contests with other “factionals,” become important because of their united strength, regardless of the final results within these factional lists.

⁶ For example, if the Conservatives cast 10,000 votes, the Agrarians 8,000, the Independents 4,000, and the Social Democrats 21,000, with 7 seats to be distributed, the result would be as follows:

(1) Social Democrats (comparative vote = 21,000)

(2) Social Democrats (comparative vote = 10,500)

(3) Conservatives (comparative vote = 10,000)

(4) Agrarians (comparative vote = 8,000)

(5) Social Democrats (comparative vote = 7,000)

(6) Social Democrats (comparative vote = 5,250)

(7) Conservatives (comparative vote = 5,000)

⁷ The members of the Swedish Riksdag have, on the whole, a very high reputation.

⁸ Cf. especially Proportionsvalssakkunigas, op. cit., note 4.

⁹ It was not until 1921 that the “absolute numerical order” was introduced. Before that time a dominant group might, without intending it, completely overturn the expectations of the party leadership, and bring about a meaningless election result. There was, therefore, a strong tendency to avoid such dominance.

¹⁰ The election districts were smaller before 1921. For the general elections in Sweden from 1911 to 1921, see a comprehensive statistical study by Grönlund, , in Statsvetenskaplig tidsskrift, 1924, pp. 214–257.Google Scholar

¹¹ Fahlbeck, , Sveriges författning och den moderna Parlamentarismen (Sweden's Constitution and Modern Parliamentarism), Lund, 1904Google Scholar; Rexius, , Presidentmaktens renässans i Förenta Staterna (The Renaissance of the Presidency in the United States), Uppsala, 1916.Google Scholar

¹² Kihlberg, , Den svenska ministären under ståndsriksdag och tvåkammarsystem (Swedish Ministries under the Class-Riksdag and under the Two-House System), Uppsala, 1922.Google Scholar

¹³ Before 1918, while the Upper House was still based upon the “census”, and the Lower House was thus numerically the most representative of the popular will, the Left parties maintained the principle of “Lower House Parliamentarism.” Since both houses are now about equally democratic, it is generally acknowledged that the Upper House should be completely equal in authority to the Lower.

¹⁴ Translated by Fred Berquist, of the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government, and Clarence A. Berdahl, of the University of Illinois.