¹ Some leaders of PNI and NU, however, especially at the center, were and are ready to cooperate with PKI, and to keep criticism of PKI in check. This is because they see PKI as an ally in their struggle against Masjumi and PSI (until those parties were banned in August 1960), and also as an ally against the encroachments by both Sukarno and the army against the role and freedom of the parties and parliament.

² To give but two illustrations: in December 1957 all Dutch enterprises were seized, resulting in a drastic decline in production and efficiency so that they are now a financial liability; and since 1960 huge sums have been spent on modernizing and enlarging the armed forces in order to force the Dutch from West Irian. Inflation has accelerated, and severe shortages have occurred of basic commodities.

³ The army officers placed in charge of the former Dutch enterprises were later required to relinquish formally their positions in the army. However they still retain their army titles and maintain close contact with the army.

⁴ For PKI's public explanation of how it was forced by political circumstances to agree to the restoration of the 1945 constitution, see Sakirman, , “Apa arti sokongan PKI kepada UUD 1945 dan Demokrasi terpimpin,” Part II, Bintang Merah, July–August 1960, pp. 320–28Google Scholar.

⁵ The membership claims of the main communist mass organizations in the latter half of 1957 were: Sobsi (trade union federation), 2.7 millions; BTI (peasants' association), 3.0 millions; Pemuda Rakjat (youth), 800,000; Gerwani (women), 671,000; and PPDI (village officials), 350,000.

⁶ PKI, founded on May 23, 1920, is the oldest communist party in Asia. Dutch repression, which became severe after the communist rebellion of 1926–1927, prevented it from gaining wide support among the increasing group of politically conscious Indonesians. From 1927 to the end of World War II, PKI virtually ceased to exist. During the Indonesian revolution, which broke out in August 1945, PKI did succeed in attracting the support of a small section of the political elite and the revolutionary armed forces. But due to the mis-timed communist rebellion at Madiun in September 1948, many of the more prominent communists were shot, most of the pro-communist elements in the armed forces were weeded out, and PKI for several years suffered from an anti-patriotic stigma.

⁷ Only through mass support could PKI build a large body of competent cadres, win a significant position in parliament (with the possibilities for political maneuver that this would bring), or develop a power basis capable of ousting the ruling groups if they opposed PKI by force.

⁸ For a study of the formulation and implementation of this strategy see Hindley, Donald, “The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1961: a decade of the Aidit leadership,” Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1961 Google Scholar.

⁹ Pantjasila, or the five principles, are the guiding principles of the Indonesian nation enunciated by Sukarno in June 1945. They are humanism, nationalism, democracy, social justice, and belief in God the Almighty.

¹⁰ In 1961, Sukarno also forced the merger of all scout and pioneer associations, including PKI's, into a national association with himself as chief scout.

¹¹ All political activity was banned from June 4 to August 1, 1959, and from September 13 to December 1, 1960. In the last ten days of August 1960, temporary bans on all activities of PKI and its mass organizations were imposed by the regional army commanders in South Borneo, South Sumatra/Djambi, and South Celebes. Due to direct intervention by Sukarno the bans in the last two regions were lifted on December 1, 1960, but that in South Borneo was lifted only on August 28, 1961.

¹² These seven were: Bintang Merah (the monthly ideological journal), Kehidupan Partai (a monthly with practical information for cadres), Ilmu Marxis (containing news of scientific and cultural developments in the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc), Mimbar Komunis (an Indonesian version of World Marxist Review), PKI dan Perwakilan (a quarterly containing news of PKI activities in parliament and the local and regional councils), Ekonomi dan Masjarakat (a quarterly with articles on economic and financial matters), and Review of Indonesia (an English-language monthly of news on the whole “progressive” movement in Indonesia).

¹³ A typical incident occurred in Malang on July 4, 1961, when communist-led workers seized control of the Belgian Faroka cigarette factory in protest against alleged Belgian intervention in the Congo. The army immediately arrested the ring-leaders, and put them on trial. In North Sumatra the army commander threatened severe action against anyone attempting to disrupt production on the Belgian-owned estates.

¹⁴ Typically, as a result of the incident in Kediri, the government suspended the activities of all major Communist mass organizations throughout the entire Residency of Kediri from November 21, 1961 to September 11, 1962. Prominent cadres were arrested and placed on trial, including the BTI secretary for East Java.

¹⁵ In Java alone there are 4 province-level councils, and 99 city and kabupaten councils. There are usually about 75 members in the provincial councils, and 35 in the lower councils.

¹⁶ PKI requires that any member who receives a remunerated position because of his membership in the Party must give the Party his wages and in return receive an honorarium. But, in general, communist members of parliament and councils, as well as cadres holding important positions in the Party and the mass organizations, are readily distinguishable from their colleagues by the better quality of their clothes and the expensive brands of their cigarettes.

¹⁷ On March 9, 1962, Sukarno even appointed the top two PKI leaders, Aidit and Lukman as cabinet ministers. However, they have been given positions not only without power, but ones which identify them with the government in the field of activity in which the government is least successful and least popular, namely, economic affairs.

¹⁸ So long as the West Irian liberation campaign was the center of government and national attention, the government found a ready “cause” for economic disorganization, and criticism of the economic situation necessarily smacked of antipatriotism.

¹⁹ The proposition that PKI might come to power peacefully, “called to power, as it were, by acclamation,” is argued in Pauker, Guy J., “Current Communist Tactics in Indonesia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 1 (May 1961), pp. 26–35 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ See, for example, Sakirman, op. cit., pp. 328–40, 348; for indication of unrest, see D. N. Aidit, political report to the third PKI central committee plenum, Harian Rakjat, January 2, 1962; and Samikidin, Muhammad, “Diatas segala-galanja: Persatuan!”, Madjalah PKI Surabaja, February 1962, p. 12 Google Scholar.