¹ Some writers do not speak of intentions, but of desires (e.g., Tawney, R. H., Equality [London: Unwin Books, 1964], p. 159)Google Scholar, or of the will (e.g., Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Ed. by Parsons, Talcott, Trans, by Henderson, A. M. & Parsons, Talcott, [New York: The Free Press, 1964], p. 152)Google Scholar. Cf. Hobbes: “The power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means, to obtain some future apparent good”; Leviathan, Ch. 10.

² Russell, Bertrand, Power: A New Social Analysis, (London: Unwin Books, 1967), p. 25 Google Scholar; cf. Wrong, Dennis H., “Some Problems in Defining Social Power,” in The American Journal of Sociology, 73 (May '68), p. 676 Google Scholar; de Crespigny, Anthony, “Power and its Forms,” in Political Studies, 16 (June 1968), pp. 192–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ “Some Notes on the Concept of Power” in Political Studies, 11 (June 1963), p. 114 Google Scholar.

⁴ In Oppenheim, Felix E., Dimensions of Freedom (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), p. 92 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ But see R. A. Dahl's comments on the point that “the concept of negative power, and M as a measure, are both independent of the intent of A,” in his “The Concept of Power,” reprinted in Bell, Roderick, Edwards, David V., and Wagner, R. Harrison, eds., Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 83 Google Scholar.

⁶ The assumption of those who speak of desires is that the issue is whether a desire must be compiled with; and so on.

⁷ I assume that “unintended effects” is meant to refer to effects that are not intended, and not simply to effects which it is intended shall not occur.

⁸ B's point of view is sometimes ignored: I mention these possibilities as suggesting that it might be not without significance in a full discussion of power. See also Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Decisions and Non-decisions: an Analytical Framework,” in Bell, Edwards, and Wagner, op. cit., p. 101; Anthony de Crespigny, op. cit., p. 195; and Felix E. Oppenheim, op. cit., pp. 94f.

⁹ I would not be held to the view that no politicians are wholly ratiocinative. There may be some who try to think everything out scientifically and to rely exclusively on the conclusions that they draw: and of those who think they succeed in this enterprise, some may not deceive themselves.

¹⁰ In the ensuing discussion, I begin with mostly general remarks about cases involving such feelings and then turn more specifically to the case of the P.M. expelling the envoy.

¹¹ The question of whether power can be exercised “overall” may be raised here. To the extent that the results of political decisions tend to run in the same direction it perhaps makes sense to talk in such terms. And there sometimes is “a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.” But it is difficult to see how to take the issue any further.

¹² This assumption would be rebutted if the P.M. was unpatriotic and would like to see his country invaded. In this unlikely eventuality he would not be said to have exercised power over the other country. Of course other aspects of the case also obtrude when one considers whether or not power has been exercised; e.g., the fact that the effect is of great moment, that there would be conflict between the parties, and that the effect is relatively direct in time and in sequence. Although these matters are not directly relevant here, to overlook them completely would be to acquiesce in an undesirable artificiality.

¹³ He might act on the basis of the criteria that have traditionally been used in his society, not because he favors them or thinks them the best, but because they are what he has been taught, or because they are the only ones he knows. Another possible case of a person who, while holding high political office, has no interest in what eventuates would be a high-ranking civil servant who, either de jure or de facto, makes important decisions. Such a man will doubtless have many ground rules laid down for him, and he might apply them simply because it is his job to do so. Even when he must make judgments, he might make purely rational judgments based on the relevant ground rules.

¹⁴ If he deliberately put from his mind all thoughts about the electorate, it would make good sense to say that he had abstained from any attempt to exercise power.

¹⁵ Sometimes, of course, opportunities are engineered, in which case the whole matter is somewhat planned. It is also true that opportunities are more important for some people than for others. The only hope for a politician who has not risen may be that an opportunity will come his way. In other days a battlefield could provide opportunities, but these days an opportunity usually calls for a verbal performance. However Mr. Khrushchev's shoe hammering on the conference table was hardly verbal, and Mr. Macmillan's astrakhan hat in Russia seemed to have some impact. To what extent each of these moves was calculated, nobody really knows—if indeed it makes sense to talk of degrees of calculation. And it is most unlikely that they were calculated to achieve anything very precise.

¹⁶ It would doubtless be difficult to establish the causal links in any actual case. But empirical studies, if they would avoid superficiality, must confront such difficulties. My assumption in this hypothetical case is that definite causal links exist, in the rough sense that the desegregation would not have occurred as and when it did if the speech had not been made.

¹⁷ From an empirical point of view, the problem might be that he does not remember being aware of any hopes, etc. As soon as questions are raised about whether effects accord with a certain state of mind, very considerable empirical problems arise. Even when intended effects are in question, one might not know whether to take a man's word for it that he intended a particular effect.

¹⁸ If race relations were in the wind; and if this virtually required the P.M. to refer to them; and if his line was determined by his institutional place in the political structure: then it would be appropriate to say that he was the agent of impersonal power.

¹⁹ Cf. the case discussed above—i.e., the P.M.'s expelling of the envoy without conscious rational intent.

²⁰ A general intention need not have been deliberately formulated. It is possible that when a minister first confronted a standard problem, he was informed of the standard decision, and that he went along with it on the spot and ever after.

²¹ In such circumstances there may be more to be said. If he does not have any real option but to make the standard decision—he may, for example, have a directive from the Prime Minister that no special cases are to be made—then he may act without thought, knowing what will ensue, but not being happy about it. This kind of possibility raises a general problem as to how one should treat cases in which a minister makes a decision which he really has no option but to make, e.g., because there has been a cabinet resolution on the matter. If there was nothing that the minister could do about the cabinet's stand, we would be inclined to say that he is the agent of impersonal power. However, cabinet decisions are collective ones, there are procedures for resignation, and the minister is in a sense personally responsible for what he does. One might therefore be reluctant to accept the view that he does not exercise personal power because he says he does not favor the effects he produces, and that he makes the relevant decision only because he is bound to do so. There is a problem of theory and practice here. If the theory of ministerial responsibility is in fact a dead letter we should say that he is the agent of impersonal power. If practice accords with the theory, he has exercised personal power. If the relationship between practice and theory is uneasy and uncertain it will not be clear what we should say.

²² Even here, circumstances may have changed over the years, and he might be unaware of the effects that actually ensue, effects whose nature he could easily ascertain if he gave any thought to the matter.

²³ Such a claim need not be insincere. He might have felt so convinced that he would get his way that he did not entertain the possibility of having to exact the penalty. And when confronted with this need, he might realize for the first time just what he had let himself in for, and just how unacceptable it was.

²⁴ At least two other matters would have to be considered in a full discussion of power in connection with socialization: (1) Other people besides the mother would also have played some part in producing the effects in question. Two brief comments are apposite: first, several people may each exercise personal power in relation to a given matter; second, both personal and impersonal power (e.g. via the educational system) may be exercised in connection with a given matter. (2) If one wants to say that power is exercised in connection with socialization, one might ask who or what is the subject of the power. For one is not talking about a formed person and saying that power is exercised over him, one is talking about the formation of the person. It would be necessary to speak circumspectly in this connection.

²⁵ A mother who is unsuccessful will have failed to exercise power, even though she may never have thought in terms of power. The question of whether or not power can be exercised from the grave might be raised in this connection. As the tone of my discussion suggests, the possibility that it can be should not be ruled out a priori.

²⁶ See example (iv) above.