¹ Unless otherwise indicated, numerical references are to the standard Stephanus pagination of Plato's Laws and other dialogues. All translations are my own. I have used the edition of Burnet, John, Platonis Opera, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907)Google Scholar.

² Avicenna goes so far as to say that the Laws is a work on prophecy: On the Divisions of the Rational Sciences, in Lerner, Ralph and Mahdi, Muhsin, eds., Medieval Political Philosophy, A Sourcebook (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963), p. 97Google Scholar.

³ I have tried to bring out the difference between Rousseau's treatment of “civil religion” in the Social Contract and Plato's in the Laws in “Politics and Religion in Plato's Laws: Some Preliminary Reflections,” in Essays in Arts and Science, III (1974), 19–28Google Scholar.

⁴ According to Vanhoutte, the peculiarity of the context is one convincing sign that Plato failed to revise properly this work: Vanhoutte, Maurice, La philosophie politique de Platon dans les “Lois” (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1954), p. 17Google Scholar.

⁵ See 865d, 870e, 871b, 872, 874, 880–1, 913d, 917a–d, 931e, 958d–959e; cf. Simon, Jules, Etude sur la theodicée de Platon et d'Aristote (Paris: Joubert, 1840), p. 269Google Scholar, and Martin, Victor, “Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des Lois,” Studia Philosophica II (1951), 105–6Google Scholar.

⁶ Cf. 636d, 886c, 941.

⁷ Compare 887e2–7, Apology of Socrates 26d, Cratylus 397d, Epinomis 987a; Cicero, , De Natura Deorum II iiGoogle Scholar; Aristophanes, , Peace 406Google Scholar; and above all Deuteronomy 4:19Google Scholar. See also England, Edwin Bourdieu, The Laws of Plato, 2 vols. (Manchester: University Press, 1921)Google Scholar, at 887e2. William Guthrie's discussion suffers from his failure to consider these passages in the Laws as well as the passage cited from the Apology: see The Greeks and Their Gods (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 211–14Google Scholar.

⁸ Space does not permit us to do more than note the absence in Klinias's proof of all sense of the uncanny, the mysterious, the holy — what Rudolph Otto called the “numinous.” This absence characterizes Book Ten as a whole. We must leave open the question whether the absence indicates a flaw in Plato's attempt to understand the “religious experience” and all that it implies for politics. An answer would require, among other things, coherent reflection on the contrast between “the holy” and what Plato's Socrates speaks of as the “daemonic” (cf. 885c3). The first steps in such reflection are prepared by Otto's discussion of Goethe's notion of the daemonic: The Idea of the Holy, trans. Harvey, John (London: Oxford University Press [1950], 1972), pp. 150ffGoogle Scholar. Consider here Scholem, Gershom, On The Kabbalah and Its Symbolism (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), pp. 88ff.Google Scholar; and Jonas, Hans, The Gnostic Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), chapter 10, especially pp. 250–5Google Scholar.

⁹ Consider here Plato Apology of Socrates as a whole and Strauss, Leo, What is Political Philosophy? (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 32–3Google Scholar. The note of Diès to this passage is charmingly naive: Platon, , Oeuvres complètes, vol. XII, ed. and trans. A. Diès, (Paris: Société d'edition “Les Belles Lettres,” 1956), p. 144Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Contrast 887b6 and c3, with 885e7, and see England's comment on the latter passage.

¹¹ Thumos and words of the same root occur five times in this speech (887c6, c7, 888a4, a5, a6), making it one of the more extensive references to thumos in Plato. Of the two most extensive references in the Republic, the first occurs just prior to the elaboration of the theology (Republic 375a–376c).

¹² Cf. James, William, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: New American Library, [1903] 1964), p. 341Google Scholar: “Pragmatically, the most important attribute of God is his punitive justice.”

¹³ See the discussions by Strauss, Leo, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 110–2, 129, 138Google Scholar; and Bloom, Allan, The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 968), pp. 353–8, 375–8, 436Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Cf. Republic 439d–440a, and especially 439e5. The strange example of Leontius should be considered together with the story of Cyrus in Xenophon's, Cyropaedeia I iv 24Google Scholar, as well as other similar war stories. See also Aristotle On the Soul 432a24ff.

¹⁵ Cf. Summa Theologiae Ia ques. 8 art. 2, ques. 81 art. 2, Ia IIae ques. 23 art. 2; Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul 803–6. For a proper understanding of the teaching about thumos in the Republic, it is necessary to consider the order of topics which forms the context of the first emergence of thumos in the city: (1) the “city of sows,” (2) frustrated desires, (3) war and thumos, (4) theology (Republic 369ff.). William James (pp. 210–11) devotes a paragraph to an unusually vivid and helpful sketch of what Plato would call thumos; his failure to link this insight with his general theme, however, is only one of many inadequacies in his discussion of the varieties of religious experience. Since James wrote, there does not seem to have been much progress in overcoming, let alone recognizing, the parochialism of his approach. See, e.g., Capps, Donald, “Contemporary Psychology of Religion,” Social Research 41 (Summer, 1974), 362–83Google Scholar; Scobie, Geoffrey E. W., Psychology of Religion (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), chap. 4Google Scholar.

¹⁶ This is perhaps the place to note more precisely the context of the theology: it interrupts the discussion of penal laws intended to protect property (884a, 913aff.). The differences between the theology of the Republic and the theology of the Laws are due in part to the very different status of property in the two works.

¹⁷ Consider, for example, Achilles' relation to the river in Iliad XXI 233ff.Google Scholar (cf. Republic 391b and Bloom, 356).

¹⁸ Aristotle (Rhetoric 1408a16–17) indicates the commonsense source of the two possible postures toward the gods when he discusses the appropriate language to be used to describe evils. The appropriate language for hubris is anger, while for impiety (asebeia), disgust is fitting. The former implies injury, the latter contempt.

¹⁹ Thomas brings out with impressive clarity the intimate psychological connection between anger (the “irascible faculty”) and hope: Summa Theologiae Ia ques. 82 art. 5, Ia IIae ques. 23 art. 2, 3, 4, ques. 25 art. 3; Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul 806.

²⁰ Cf. 890el where the Athenian again characterizes Klinias as “most eager-spirited.” Certainly Klinias will have to ponder this as well as other parts of Book Ten, using the notes he says he took during the conversation (Epinomis 980d).

²¹ The oaths in Book Ten are at 891c, 895d, 905d. The Athenian swears only six other times in the rest of the Laws (662c, 683e, 691b, 720c, 721a, 858c). Consider here also the Athenian's momentary sense of near shame (886a7). In contrast to the Athenian, Klinias never swears in Book Ten (he has five oaths in the rest of the Laws — 660b, 715d, 814b, 821c, 965e). This is a sign that Klinias is less passionate than usual, or that his thumos, while it has not disappeared, is more quenched than at other times.

²² Note that the passage we are about to investigate represents the only contemporary account of pre-Socratic philosophy which has come down to us in unfragmentary form. For the best discussion of the moral and political import of pre-Socratic philosophy, see Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 3Google Scholar. See also Strauss, , The City and Man, pp. 14–17Google Scholar.

²³ Something close to the four elements to which the atheists ascribe all the beings seem to be treated by the Athenian in the context of farming (water, earth, the sun, and wind — 845d); with regard to an interest in farming there may be more agreement between the Athenian stranger and the pre-Socratics than meets the eye. See 889d6 and Strauss, Leo, Xenophon's Socratic Discourse (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 195–6Google Scholar.

²⁴ Klinias seems at first puzzled by the connection between the dispute about the gods and the denial of a natural basis for law and politics: see his reaction at 889e2 and the Athenian's response, “O blessed” (i.e., for your ignorance — cf. 831c1 and 886a6).

²⁵ This shows why the theoretical position of the atheists can with some justice be equated with the view that the good is bodily pleasure: 886a9, 888a3, 908c2.

²⁶ It is possible that with a view to war, the citizens as a whole form an alliance of selfish interests set over against the rest of men. This was the interpretation of Sparta and Crete held originally by Klinias (625e–626a). But as the Athenian showed, this understanding does not give adequate support to the city's claim about the common good. Such an alliance only holds as long as it is not to the advantage of groups or individuals to desert; the alliance does not support the city's claim to have the right to sacrifice the goods and lives of citizens. And it quite fails to provide a basis for the sense of sanctity of the city: nothing makes this group, “our” group, intrinsically better than any other group (626–30).

²⁷ I owe this observation and part of what follows to David Bolotin.

²⁸ Especially the poet Pindar, who seems to have taught the Athenian that by nature strength gives a right to rule (690b–c, 714b–715a). Cf. England on 890a5.

²⁹ See Strauss, , What Is Political Philosophy?, pp. 31–2Google Scholar. Cf. Voegelin, Eric, Order and History, 6 vols. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956) III, 240–1Google Scholar.

³⁰ A full understanding of Book Ten would require further consideration of Megillus's role. Throughout the Laws his importance is out of all proportion to the number and length of his “laconic” utterances; but in Book Ten he takes on a special importance. This is shown by the mild apology the Athenian makes to him here (891b2–6) as well as by the fact that the Athenian addresses him relatively frequently in Book Ten (he addresses “Megillus and Klinias” at 888d and 899c; Megillus alone here at 891b; and “Klinias and Megillus” at 900c. I believe he addresses the two together about thirteen times in the rest of the Laws and Megillus alone about six other times). Megillus rather than Klinias has shown the capacity to keep the Athenian from straying away from human affairs toward the truly divine things (803b–804b); he is closer to the human type which will constitute the ruling majority, the “regime” of the new city. By making the discussion of the gods acceptable if not comprehensible to Megillus, the Athenian assures that the theology is acceptable to the multitude of the citizens.

³¹ Certainly, according to the Athenian, soul is not the only thing that causes changes in bodies: after all, do not bodies cause changes in bodies?

³² Compare Hackforth, R., Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 76Google Scholar: “It is significant that the two dialogues in which the moving function of soul is prominent — Phaedrus and Laws — are the only two in which the passions (emotions) and desires are clearly attributed to discarnate soul.”

³³ For the replacement of the term “first things” (prõta) by the terms “older things” or “oldest things” (presbutera or presbutata) see 892bl, c6, 895b5, 896b3, c6–7, and above all Epinomis 980d.

³⁴ To put it another way, the question “What is soul?” is never really asked, and is replaced by the question “How does soul come into being?” The Athenian cannot, however, completely avoid the word eidos: 894a8, 895c5. Victor Brochard decisively refuted Lutoslawski's claim that the ideas are omitted in Book Ten because they are missing from the Laws as a whole (hence indicating a radical change in Plato's thought). But Brochard failed to explain sufficiently why the ideas, mentioned or discussed elsewhere (especially 965b, 967d), are never referred to in Book Ten. See Brochard, , “Les Lois de Platon et la théorie des idées,” in Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne (Paris; J. Vrin, [1912] 1954), pp. 151–68Google Scholar, and especially pp. 163–4.

³⁵ Clouds 94. See also the quotations from comic poetry in the explicit discussion of philosophy in Book Twelve: 967c5–d1.

³⁶ The Greek word for motion, kinēsis, also means change, and this should be borne in mind throughout.

³⁷ In this he joins the Platonic and Xenophontic Socrates against the pre-Socratics: see Xenophon, Memorabilia I i 14Google Scholar and Plato, Theaetetus 180dGoogle Scholar (where Socrates says his is the view of the cobblers).

³⁸ Some light is thrown on this very dark sentence by the commentaries gathered together and summarized in England, ad loc. See also Aristotle's partial elucidation in On the Soul 404b18ff. as well as Moreau, Joseph, L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens (Paris: Société d'edition ”Les Belles Lettres,” 1939), p. 61Google Scholar; Skemp, J. B., The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1942), p. 104Google Scholar; Kucharski, Paul, Étude sur la doctrine Pythagoricienne de la tetrade (Paris: Société d'edition “Les belles lettres,” 1952), pp. 71–4Google Scholar.

³⁹ Cf. Theaetetus 181cff., Parmenides 138c, and Aristotle, Physics VII iiGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ Could the accounts before and after the Athenian's invocation of his “friends” bear the same relation to one another as the accounts before and after his identical interruption of his presentation of the atheists' views (cf. p. 1068 above)?

⁴¹ The Greek word psychē, lacking of course all specifically Christian connotations, can more easily be applied to nonhuman life than can our modern word “soul.” The Athenian fully exploits the breadth or ambiguity of the Greek word.

⁴² Cf. 631d5. The Greek may have been written “… divine in the true sense of the word …,” but on the major textual difficulty I follow the manuscripts and Burnet against all the emendations. For this use of orthõs, see Phaedo 67b4, 82c2–3, Apology of Socrates 40a3; Euripides, Alcestis 637Google Scholar, Hippolytus 1169–70, Andromache 377–8, and see Burnet, John, Plato's Phaedo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963)Google Scholar, commenting on 67b4. Stallbaum's discussion and proposed emendation are, however, cogent and attractive.

⁴³ Contrast the other responses of the Athenian to Klinias's contributions, especially 894d5, 898c9.

⁴⁴ This is why there are for the Platonic Socrates no ideas of individual numbers (or of geometric entities), although there are ideas of odd and even. See Republic 510c–511a; Aristotle Metaphysics 987b14ff.; Klein, Jacob, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Algebra (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), pp. 56–7, 69ff.Google Scholar It appears that mathematics can be misleading as well as illuminating for the study of nature; the false mathematical physics goes with the neglect of the ideas.

⁴⁵ When the Athenian asks the crucial question, “Can we say the definition of soul is anything other than the motion with the power to move itself?” Klinias responds by repeating the question, as if he couldn't quite believe his ears (“Are you saying that … ?”) —to which the Athenian replies hastily, “I say so, at least (phēmi ge), and if this is so, then …” (895e10–896a5).

⁴⁶ See the very just criticism by More, Paul Elmer in The Religion of Plato (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921), p. 115Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Compare Aristotle's comment in On the Soul 407a22–24: “If the circular movement is unending, there must be something which mind is always thinking — what can this be? For all practical thought has an end; it all goes on for the sake of something outside the process of thought.”

⁴⁸ The Athenian shifts from saying that the gods “care for” the cosmos to saying that they merely “order” it: 897e7, 898c3–4, 898b8. See also Solmsen, Friedrich, Plato's Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942), pp. 149–50, 162–3Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ In order to see what the Athenian's presentation of the heavens omits, compare Critias, fragment 25, in Diels, Hermann, ed., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 2 vols. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1922)Google Scholar: “… and then when the laws forbade them to commit open crimes of violence but they did them in secret, at that time it seems to me some clever and wise man invented fear of the gods for mortals in order that there would be terror for the wicked, even if they act or speak or think in secret … and he said that the gods dwelt in the place where, in speaking of it, he could most frighten man: the place from whence he knew that fears exist for mortals and rewards for a hard life, in the upper region, where men saw lightning and heard the dreaded thunder … and so with terror he surrounded mankind …” (my translation). Compare Solmsen, p. 35. The Athenian himself has not long before spoken of the fact that the gods kill men with lightning as a punishment: 873e. Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia IV iii 14Google Scholar and Goldschmidt, Victor, La Religion de Platon (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949), pp. 123ff.Google Scholar