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The Political Economy of Pork: Project Selection at The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John A. Hird
John A. Hird
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
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Abstract

In previous studies of distributive politics scholars have investigated legislative influence without accounting for the policies' independent merits. As a result, they have failed to include a plausible explanation of the counterfactual (i.e., which projects would have been funded in the absence of congressional committee influence), which has led to invalid inferences regarding legislative influence. The model of distributive politics is reformulated to account for an assumed efficient and/or equitable project allocation in the absence of legislative influence. Using data from proposed Army Corps of Engineers' projects and the funding recommendations of three institutions, the findings indicate that pork barrel politics indeed exists and imposes significant efficiency costs but that both equity and economic efficiency play prominent roles in the decision-making process as well. Cost-benefit analysis is seen to play a constructive role by improving the efficiency of project choice; and the corps's cost-benefit analysis guidelines are beneficial from the agency's organizational perspective, as well.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 85 , Issue 2 , June 1991 , pp. 429 - 456
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1991

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