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Political Constructivism in Rawls's Political Liberalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

George Klosko
George Klosko*
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Abstract

In Political Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of “political constructivism” to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an “overlapping consensus.” Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's “political” philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The “method of convergence” would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 91 , Issue 3 , September 1997 , pp. 635 - 646
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1997

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