¹ “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,” this Review, 44 (09, 1950)Google Scholar.

² Two questions are of leading importance; first, the character of and reasons for party cohesion in the House of Commons and, second, the political and ideological relationships between the Parliamentary parties and their mass bases, particularly, at the constituency level. On the first question, the concept of party discipline has been shown to be multidimensional, and also somewhat overrated as a form of political management. The party whips serve primarily as an institutionalized communications vehicle linking the front and back bench. In this regard, see Dowse, Robert E. and Smith, Trevor, “Party Discipline in the House of Commons—A Comment,” Parliamentary Affairs, 16 (Spring, 1963), 159–164 Google Scholar; Jackson, Robert J., Rebels and Whips (New York: St. Martin's, 1968)Google Scholar; and Norman Hunt's interview with the former Conservative Chief Redmayne, Whip Martin in King, Anthony, ed., British Politics: People, Parties, and Parliament (Englewood Cliffs: D. C. Heath, 1966), pp. 142–147 Google Scholar. For additional discussion of the deficiencies of discipline in explaining party unity and the suggestion of ideology as a cohesive factor, see Epstein, Leon D., “Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties,” this Review, 50 (06, 1956), 360–377 Google Scholar and for the constituency party role in cohesion, see Epstein, , British Politics in the Suez Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1964)Google Scholar. An illuminating account of the process in a particular constituency may be found in Nicholson, Nigel, People and Parliament (London: Widenfeld and Nicolson, 1958)Google Scholar. Although, as a general rule, constituency organizations do not inquire closely into the political beliefs of prospective candidates, they do show a tendency to discipline M.P.'s who deviate toward policies associated with the opposing party. According to Ranney, Austin, Pathways to Parliament (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1965), p. 281 Google Scholar, “the national leaders do not need to control local candidate selection in order to maintain party cohesion in Parliament; the local activists do the job for them.” For additional material on parties at the constituency level, see Bealey, Frank, Blondel, Jean, and McCann, W. P., Constituency Politics: A Study of Newcastle-under-Lyme (London: Faber and Faber, 1965)Google Scholar; Holt, Robert T. and Turner, John E., Political Parties in Action: The Battle of Barons Court (New York: Free Press, 1968)Google Scholar; and Janosik, Edward G., Constituency Labor Parties in Britain (New York: Praeger, 1968)Google Scholar. A consideration of the ideological beliefs of constituency party members may be found in Rose, Richard, “The Political Ideas of English Party Activists,” this Review, 56 (06, 1962), 360–371 Google Scholar. For a consideration of the patterns of political attitudes in the electorate upon which the party structures exist, see Butler, David E. and Stokes, Donald, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (New York: St. Martin's, 1969)Google Scholar. Abrams, Mark, “Social Trends and Electoral Behavior,” British Journal of Sociology, 13 (09, 1962), 228–242 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Blondel, Jean, Voters, Parties and Leaders (Baltimore: Penguin, 1964)Google Scholar. Most observers agree that social class is the primary basis of cleavage in the British electorate. For a detailed analysis of the most important pattern of cross-class voting behavior—working—class Conservatism—see Nordlinger, Eric, The Working-Class Tories (Berkeley: University of California, 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See, also, McKenzie, Robert T. and Silver, Allan, Angels in Marble (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968)Google Scholar. For general cross-national comparisons, see Alford, Robert R., Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963)Google Scholar and Seymour Lipset, M. and Rokkan, Stein, ed., Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Comparisons (New York: Free Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

³ Beer, Samuel H., British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 387 Google Scholar. Also see Beer, Samuel H., “The Comparative Method and the Study of Biitish Politics,” Comparative Politics, 1 (October 1968), 19–36 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ McKenzie, Robert T., British Political Parties (New York: Praeger, 1964)Google Scholar. Also see Mackenzie, W. J. M., “Mr. McKenzie on the British Parties,” Political Studies, 3 (06, 1955), 157–159 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rose, Saul, “Policy Decision in Opposition,” Political Studies, 4 (06, 1956), 128–138 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and McKenzie, Robert T., “Policy Decision in Opposition: A Rejoinder,” Political Studies, 5 (06, 1957), 176–182 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Additionally, the McKenzie assumptions that are considered in this article were discussed with him by one of the authors in London, February 1969. Finally, it might be noted that a dialogue between Beer and McKenzie on British Broadcasting Corporation radio on February 11, 1966, was printed in Parliamentary Affairs, 19 (Summer, 1966), 373–384 Google Scholar.

An alternative explanation for the narrowing of policy positions between British parties, as well as those in other Western democracies, may be inferred from the writing of the “end of ideology” social theorists who believe that ideological conflicts in Western societies, including Britain, have tended to become increasingly muted as these societies have reached certain levels of economic and social development. The theory appears to have first been postulated by Raymond Aron. See his “Fin de l'âge idéologique” in Adorno, T. W. and Dirks, W., ed., Sociologica (Frankfurt, 1955)Google Scholar and Aron's, Raymond, The Opium of the Intellectuals (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1957)Google Scholar. The theory has also been posited or taken up by American sociologists such as Parsons, Talcott, “An Approach to the Sociology of Knowledge,” Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology (Milan and Stresa: International Sociological Association, 1959)Google Scholar; Shils, Edward, “The End of Ideology?” Encounter, 5 (November 1955), 52–58 Google Scholar; Bell, Daniel, The End of Ideology (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960)Google Scholar; Lipset, Seymour M., Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 403–417 Google Scholar. For a trenchant criticism of the theory, see LaPalombara, Joseph, “Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation,” this Review, 60 (03, 1966), 5–16 Google Scholar. Also see Lipset, Seymour M., “Some Further Comments on ‘The End of Ideology’,” this Review, 60 (03, 1963, 17–18 Google Scholar and LaPalombara, Joseph, “A Reply to ‘Some Further Comments on the End of Ideology’,” this Review, 60 (03, 1966), 110–111 Google Scholar. Interestingly, as Michael Harrington points out in his review of Birnbaum, Norman, The Crisis of Industrial Society, Commentary, 49 (02, 1970), 84–85 Google Scholar, this belief about the structural tendencies in Western societies (that the working-classes no less than the new technical managerial classes have now been integrated into the political system because they share in the enormous increases in goods produced) is held not only by “consensus” theorists such as Bell and Lipset and by “reformists” such as Moynihan, but also by the archetypal “new leftist,” Herbert Marcuse.

⁵ Rather than try to send questionnaires to a sample of M.P.'s, a decision was made to send them to all members of the two major parties, excluding the Whips. The return rate for Labour leaders was 27 percent (n = 23); for backbenchers it was 71 percent (n = 174); and for the party as a whole it was 59 percent. The Conservative response rate was: leaders, 39 percent (n = 12); backbenchers, 53 percent (n = 114); and for the party as a whole it was 51 percent.

The response rate for this study compares favorably with those in other studies of the House of Commons that have employed mailed questionnaires. For example, the Alexander and Hobbs inquiry into personal characteristics of Labour M.P.s had a return of 40 percent; see Alexander, K. J. W. and Hobbs, Alexander, “What Influences Labour M.P.s,” New Society, (December 13, 1962)Google Scholar. Dowse's study of M.P.'s “surgeries” (meetings for constituent complaints) had a return rate of 69 percent; see Dowse, Robert E., “The M.P. and His Surgery,” Political Studies, 11 (10, 1963), 333–341 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The Klein survey of M.P.s' working conditions had a return of 28 percent; see Klein, Rudolf, “What M.P.s Think of Their Jobs,” Observer, (March 27, 1963)Google Scholar. Finally, the Cohen and Cooper study seeking general background information had a return rate of 88 percent; see Cohen, John and Cooper, Peter, “The 1959 House of Commons,” Occupational Psychology, 35 (10, 1961), 181–212 Google Scholar.

Generally speaking, Labour M.P.'s affiliated with trade unions, especially those elected for the first time before 1964, as well as Conservative M.P.'s of the “company director” variety were the most reluctant to return their questionnaires. Frontbench respondents for the most part were junior ministers and under-secretaries in the case of the Labour Government and their counterparts in the case of the Conservative Shadow Cabinet. Of course, the lower rate of frontbench response is not unexpected. First, the frontbenchers, because of their positions, are extremely busy men. Second, they are reluctant to express opinions “for the record” that may be construed as committing their parties to particular positions. In the case of Government members, they naturally hesitate to take what they regard as public positions that are different from those of their Cabinet colleagues. The latter attitude is illustrated by the comment of a senior Labour Cabinet Minister, who, declining to answer the questions, told one of the authors, “I am afraid it would not be at all the right thing for a Cabinet Minister to make comments on whether he agrees or disagrees with government policy.”

It is hard to assess the effect of our difficulty in securing returns from senior Cabinet officials and members of the Shadow Cabinet But, if a bias has been introduced, it may be in the direction of widening differences between leaders. Although we obviously would not claim that our returns would constitute a completely representative sample of opinions, in our view the respondents are sufficiently representative of the populations of which they are a part to make the analyses that follow worth undertaking. As for the size of the leadership samples, we naturally would have preferred that they be larger. However, they are large enough, as will be indicated, to undertake the multiple discriminate function analysis that was employed.

It also should be noted that we asked a question regarding the nationalization and denationalization of industry. The responses to this question, however, could not be scaled in a manner similar to the responses to the other questions and therefore have been excluded from the analyses that follow. Undoubtedly, this paper would have benefited from the inclusion of M.P.s' responses to this important question and to other policy questions as well; there are many attitudinal areas and behavioral aspects that require study and ideally we very much would have liked to investigate them. Unfortunately, the pragmatic necessity of securing a reasonably high return rate required that we be extremely parsimonious in our selection of issues. Thus, although we feel that our choice of questions is appropriate, we recognize that many others also could profitably have been included in the instrument.

⁶ Converse, Philip E., “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Apter, David, ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261 Google Scholar.

⁷ Converse, op. cit., p. 207.

⁸ Converse, op. cit., p. 212.

⁹ Individual matrices of the correlations (Pearsonian product-moment) among positions taken on each of the ten issues were generated for Labour and Conservative M.P.'s. For the former these correlations range in magnitude from .018 to .667, whereas for the latter they range from .023 to .783.

¹⁰ It is, of course, much more hazardous to posit such an assumption for the members of the British mass public. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., make clear that the world of politics in which British M.P.'s are immersed is a very remote one for the average British citizen. He is woefully lacking in political information; he is neither aware of nor interested in many political issues; he does not feel particularly strongly about some of the issues of which be is aware; and, like his counterpart in the American public, he cannot even utilize or give meaning to the concept of Left-Right. Still, his response to politics is far from one of total incomprehension. He is capable of acting in a purposeful way to achieve goals and conditions he values and he does see political parties as controlling the outputs of government and, thus, as instruments that can affect his personal welfare, the economy, and many other things as well. Further, he views the parties as differentially able and willing to pursue specific goals and policies that may benefit him and others like him and thereby disadvantage others. In this way, political parties come to be linked by him with the interests of particular social classes and, in turn, his class and other associational ties become the basis for affiliating with a party and for structuring his images of parties. In effect, the British parties link him to his government and provide a structure that permits him to give meaning and ideological content (albeit of a very limited, concrete, “group interest” variety) to politics—a fact that has important consequences for the operation of the British parliamentary system.

¹¹ Cooley, W. W. and Lohnes, P. R., Multivariate Procedures for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Wiley, 1962)Google Scholar, and Anderson, Harry E., “Regression, Discriminant Analysis, and a Standard Notation for Basic Statistics” in Cattell, R. B., ed., Handbook of Multivariate Experimental Psychology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966)Google Scholar.

¹² See, however, Allan Kornberg and Mary Lee Brehm, “Ideology, Institutional Identification, and Student Activism,” Social Forces (forthcoming).

¹³ This particular finding strikingly confirms an observation made by Beers in 1955. At that time, Beer noted the divisive potential of the issue of Comprehensive Schools. After pointing out the convergence of the parties' policy positions in a number of areas, Beer added, “Outside the realm of economic reform and income distribution lies what might prove to be the most explosive issue of all: Labour's commitment to comprehensive schools. [The attempt to set up these schools] would constitute a great structural reform and would excite the bitterest party and class feelings.” See Beer, , “The Future of British Politics: An American View,” Political Quarterly, 26 (January-03, 1955), 37 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In 1965, the Labour Minister of Education, Anthony Crosland, directed all local authorities to present plans for the setting up of Comprehensive Schools. The Conservatives reacted sharply to this proposal, despite the efforts of Crosland's Shadow counterpart, Sir Edward Boyle, to maintain a modicum of moderation on the issue. In 1969, the harassed Boyle announced that he was leaving political life. He did not stand for re-election in the 1970 election.

¹⁴ Although there are only 12 members in the Conservative leadership group, the multiple discriminant function program still operates effectively. The program only requires that the size of any group be one more than the number of potentially discriminating variables being employed in the analysis.

¹⁵ Had Labour been returned to office in the recent national election, the East of Suez issue would probably have become entirely academic. Since the Conservative Government appears determined to maintain at least some British forces in the area beyond 1971, the question should continue to generate controversy.

¹⁶ In contrast, see McClosky, Herbert, Hoffmann, Paul J., and O'Hara, Rosemary, “Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers,” this Review, 54 (06, 1960), 406–427 Google Scholar. McClosky et al, found the differences on issues between party leaders to be far greater than those between their followers. The populations on which they were focussing, however, are different from those considered here. Thus, the backbench M.P.'s whom we have termed “followers” would have been included in their leadership cadre.

¹⁷ For this view, see Finer, S. E., Berrington, H. B., and Bartholomew, D. J., Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1955–1959 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1961)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See Mackintosh, John, “Failure of a Reform: M.P.s' Special Committees,” New Society, November 28, 1968 Google Scholar, and see also Crick, Bernard, The Reform of Parliament (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ In our view, it is more accurate to conceive of each party as having a tripartite division. Thus, within the Conservative party there is a small but visible “Left” consisting of approximately 10 percent of the members; a larger and much more amorphous “Right” that, on certain issues, may include up to 40 percent of the party; and a broad “Center” bloc whose strength normally numbers over half the current Conservative M.P.'s.

In the Labour party the Left Wing includes about 15 percent of the party; a “fringe” Left includes another 15 percent. The remaining Center M.P.'s (or Right, depending on one's perspective) support the frontbench on virtually every issue. By far the most organized and most obvious factional group in Parlia- ment is the “Tribune” bloc, whose 27 M.P.'s form the core of the Labour Left. These M.P.s meet regularly each week under the nominal leadership of Ian Mikardo, the “Commander-in-Chief,” according to the rather sarcastic comment of one of his colleagues. The Tribune Group is organized to the degree that it even possesses its own whipping system. For the obvious limitations in using Left/Right terminology in the British political context, see Brittan, Samuel, Left/or/Right: The Bogus Dilemma (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1968)Google Scholar.

²⁰ It might be argued that opposition to the Common Market could have been used as grounds for admission to “our” Tory Right; however, the Right-wing is by no means united on that point, with prominent figures such as Duncan Sandys and Julian Amery being staunch advocates of British entry.