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A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the Constitutional Convention

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2006

KEITH L. DOUGHERTY  and
JAC C. HECKELMAN
KEITH L. DOUGHERTY
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
JAC C. HECKELMAN
Affiliation:
Wake Forest University
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Abstract

Robertson (2005) and Rakove (1996) argue that Roger Sherman was surprisingly influential at the Constitutional Convention. Using empirically estimated ideal points, we show that Sherman was a pivotal voter from a pivotal state. We also demonstrate that if the votes were tallied by individual delegates, rather than being grouped by the home state, then Sherman would have been less pivotal. This suggests that the voting procedures adopted at the Constitutional Convention may have affected Sherman's ability to get his interests enacted. Such institutions might have been more responsible than his legislative ability for making Sherman effective.

Type
FORUM
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 100 , Issue 2 , May 2006 , pp. 297 - 302
Copyright
© 2006 by the American Political Science Association

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