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Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Kaare Strom
Kaare Strom*
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Abstract

From assumptions of parties as rational actors, this study develops four measures of government performance: duration, mode of resignation, subsequent alternation, and electoral success. These measures are used in a test of competing hypotheses concerning minority government performance in parliamentary democracies. Minority governments are conventionally portrayed as poor performers, but tests of this proposition have been seriously limited. An alternative hypothesis depicts minority governments as rational cabinet solutions without significant performance liabilities. These hypotheses are tested against an extensive cross-national data set including 323 postwar governments in 15 parliamentary democracies. The conventional wisdom about minority governments is not supported by the evidence. In some respects, minority governments are clearly superior to majority coalitions. Moreover, minority government formation may enhance systemic responsiveness and accountability. The findings support the explanation of minority governments as rational cabinet solutions.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 79 , Issue 3 , September 1985 , pp. 738 - 754
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1985

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