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Parties, Pivots, and Policy: The Status Quo Test

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 March 2011

JESSE RICHMAN
JESSE RICHMAN*
Affiliation:
Old Dominion University
*
Jesse Richman is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Old Dominion University, BAL 7000, Norfolk VA 23529 ([email protected]).
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Abstract

Identifying policy status quo locations is a precondition for testing key predictions of many spatial models of legislative politics, but such measures have proved to be extremely difficult to construct. This study applies a novel technique that measures policy locations in relation to legislators’ preferences. The resulting status quo estimates allow for a direct test of the policy consequences predicted by pivotal politics and party cartel theories of legislative politics. The empirical tests indicate that parties interact with pivotal politics to contribute to policy gridlock and shape policy change. By bringing pressure to bear on pivotal politics “pivots” and by blocking policy changes that would “roll” the party, parties increase the range of policies subject to gridlock in the American political system.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 105 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 151 - 165
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2011

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