¹ At the opening of the 52nd session of the Diet on December 24, 1926, the strength of parties in the House of Representatives was reported to be as follows: Kenseikai, 165; Seiyukai, 161; Seiyuhonto, 91; Shinsei Club, 26; Jitsugyo Doshikai, 9; independents, 12; total 464. Osaka Mainichi, English edition, Dec. 25, 1926, p. 1Google Scholar.

² Cf. Quigley, H. S., “The New Japanese Electoral Law,” in this Review, XX, pp. 392–395Google Scholar.

³ Said the Osaka Asahi, an independent paper of unusual literary and political merit: “In the last session, the Kato cabinet succeeded in carrying the manhood suffrage bill, and it is now manifestly its duty to see that a new House be organized by members returned in a general election conducted under the new law. It is therefore regrettable to note that what the cabinet is actually doing is just the opposite. Its sole desire seems to be to avoid a dissolution.” Quotations from other papers published in the vernacular are given in the Japan Weekly Chronicle, Jan. 7, 1926, p. 14.

⁴ At the height of the controversy occurred the well-known incident when a wooden coffin containing a dagger, suggesting hara-kiri, was carried to the official residence of the premier. Cf. Japan Advertiser, Nov. 10, 1926, p. 1Google Scholar. It was reported in the press that Wakatsuki's decision against resignation was taken on the advice of the Genro. Ibid., Nov. 26, 1926, p. 2.

⁵ Kwampo (Imperial Gazette), Jan. 21, 1927, p. 419Google Scholar.

⁶ Cf. leading articles from the vernacular press quoted in the Japan Chronicle, Jan. 20 and 27, 1927.

⁷ Kwampo gogai (Imperial Gazette, extra edition), Jan. 26, 1927, p. 80Google Scholar. Cf. Kwampo, Jan. 25, 1927, p. 503Google Scholar.

⁸ “We do not know with what words to express our despair of representative government in Japan. It is more than mysterious indeed that the two opposition parties, who on the very day of the secret conference with the premier had resolved to impeach the government in the most severe terms as utterly unfit to administer national affairs, should have suddenly changed their minds and agreed to make a political truce during the national mourning and the first year of the new emperor's reign. Common sense forbids us to believe in any shred of sincerity in the party leaders of this country.” Osaka Mainichi, Jan. 23, 1927, p. 4Google Scholar. Cf. leading articles from the vernacular press in the Japan Advertiser, Jan. 26, 1927, p. 7Google Scholar; and Japan Chronicle, Feb. 3, 1927, pp. 116–117Google Scholar. Independent members in the House of Representatives bitterly denounced the secret compromise among the leaders. Kwampo gogai, Jan. 26, 1927, pp. 82–87Google Scholar.

⁹ The explanation of the bills by the minister of finance can be found in the Japan Weekly Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1927, p. 152Google Scholar.

¹⁰ It was alleged that on this occasion Minister Kataoka gave the House of Peers information that he refused to the House of Representatives. Especially irritating to the Seiyukai was his flippant remark that the House could not keep secrets. The affair gave rise to two resolutions of censure and a stormy debate in which Hamada Kunimatsu declared that the minister's action was a defiance of the bicameral system, since, under the constitution, the lower house should have priority in all financial legislation. Kwampo gogai, Mar. 13, 1927, p. 612Google Scholar. Another member accused the government of “fawning upon the upper chamber, which represents the interests of the privileged classes.” The resolutions were defeated. Kwampo gogai, Mar. 13, 1927, p. 614Google Scholar; Mar. 20, 1927, p. 710. (The translations of quotations from the Kwampo and Japanese periodicals and books contained in this article were made by Mr. Sterling Takeuchi, of Evanston, Ill.)

¹¹ Kwampo gogai, Mar. 24, 1927, p. 341Google Scholar.

¹² Article 8 reads: “The emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, imperial ordinances in the place of law. Such imperial ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said ordinances, the government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.” In Article 70, the constitution further provides: “When the Imperial Diet cannot be convoked, owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for the maintenance of public safety, the government may take all necessary financial measures by means of an imperial ordinance. In the case mentioned in the preceding clause, the matter shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session, and its approbation shall be obtained thereto.”

¹³ McLaren, W. W., Japanese Government Documents (Tokyo, 1914), p. 128Google Scholar. The Japanese ordinance power is not copied after the British. It is evidently based on the Saxon constitution of 1831. Cf. Nakano, , Ordinance Power of the Japanese Emperor, p. 188Google Scholar; Shimizu, , Teikoku Kenpo, p. 37Google Scholar; Ichimura, , Kenpo Yoron, p. 517Google Scholar.

¹⁴ “When an emergency ordinance is to be issued or a state of siege is to be declared, or when some extraordinary financial measure is deemed necessary to be taken, the opinion of the privy council is to be sought before the measure is carried out, thereby giving weight to the measures of the administration in the matter. In this way, the privy council is the palladium of the constitution and of the law. Such being the importance attached to the functions of the privy council, it is the established rule that every imperial ordinance, on which the advice of the privy council has been asked, shall contain a statement of that fact in the preamble to it. The privy council is to hold deliberations only when its opinion has been asked for by the emperor; and it is entirely for him to accept or reject any opinion given” Commentaries, trans, by Ito, Miyoji (Tokyo, 1889), pp. 98–99Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Full accounts of this debate are in the Tokyo Asahi, Osaka Mainichi, Japan Advertiser, April 18, 1927.

¹⁶ The Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, an independent paper, commented: “The Wakatsuki government has at last been overthrown. It has been ruined by one single blow of the privy council, which has been jeered at by the public as a prehistoric relic no better than an old curio. Not infrequently disputes have arisen between governments and the privy council, but we know of no ministry which suffered such ignominious reverse.” Japan Advertiser, April 19, 1927.

¹⁷ The Tokyo Asahi declared: “It is extraordinary that a privy councillor accused the premier in the presence of His Majesty of his blunders. The question put before the privy council to examine was the measure for an emergency imperial ordinance connected with the relief for the Bank of Taiwan, but the council daringly referred to China policy and discussed the responsibility of ministers. This is evidently in contradiction to the guiding principles of the imperial constitution.” Japan Advertiser, April 20, 1927, p. 7Google Scholar. On the other hand, the Jiji Shimpo, the leading conservative independent paper, in commenting on the proposed ordinance, said: “The government deserves harsh accusation for the attempted abuse of the imperial constitution because its course is interpreted as defying the authority of the legislative body and the right of the people. The reckless measure was rejected by the privy council, and as a consequence the cabinet was compelled to resign. This incident will remain an undesirable precedent, for which the Kenseikai ministry will be answerable.” Ibid., April 19, 1927, p. 6.

¹⁸ The Jiji Shimpo said: “Who will be recommended to the Throne as suitable successor? We are convinced that the adviser will honestly and honorably observe the genuine principles of parliamentary government in submitting his counsel to the Throne. As long as fundamental principles be adhered to, the appearance of an intermediate government is unlikely.” Japan Advertiser, April 19, 1927, p. 6Google Scholar.

¹⁹ The press stated that after hearing the report from Prince Saionji, the emperor conferred with Count Makino, the lord keeper of the seal, and Dr. Kitokuro Ichiki, minister of imperial household. Japan Advertiser, April 20, 1927, p. 2Google Scholar; Japan Chronicle, April 20, 1927, p. 1Google Scholar. In 1924 the former of these officials, together with Count Hirata, the then lord keeper of the seal, was severely criticized as an “associate genro” and responsible for the appointment of the super-party government of Kiyoura. Cf. the press dispatch in the Osaka Mainichi, Jan. 9, 1924, p. 1Google Scholar; also leading articles of the Tokyo Yorodzu, Kohumin, Chun, and Yomiuri quoted in the Japan Advertiser, Jan. 11, 12, 15, and 16, 1924, p. 5Google Scholar.

²⁰ The Osaka Mainichi (May 3, 1927, p. 1)Google Scholar gave the party alignments as follows: Kenseikai, 164; Seiyukai, 159; Seiyuhonto, 67; Shinsei Club, 26; independents, 19; Showa Club, 14; Jitsugyo Doshikai, 9; and 6 vacant seats; total, 464. The opposition could depend on about 242 votes coming from the Kenseikai, Seiyuhonto, and part of the Shinsei Club.

²¹ The younger members of the Kenseikai and the Seiyuhonto at first demanded a petition from the House to the Throne. Osaka Mainichi, May 8, 1927, p. 1Google Scholar. This would have been permissable under Art. 49 of the constitution, which reads: “Both houses of the Imperial Diet may respectively present addresses to the Emperor.” In a few days, cooler counsel prevailed, the attempt to drag the emperor into the affair was abandoned, and the dangai-an was accepted as a compromise. The text of this resolution read: “Whereas the former cabinet prepared an emergency imperial ordinance to prevent financial disturbances and maintain public order, and whereas the privy council advised the emperor contrary to the cabinet's draft proposal and thus precipitated a great financial panic, be it resolved that this House disapproves the action of the privy council as unprecedented.” Kwampo gogai, May 8, 1927, p. 65Google Scholar.

²² Kwampo gogai, Mar. 8, 1927, p. 65Google Scholar.

²³ Kwampo gogai, Mar. 8, 1927, pp. 69–70Google Scholar.

²⁴ For the resolution, 210; against, 194; making a total of 404. Kwampo gogai, May 8, 1927, p. 77Google Scholar.

²⁵ The press, in general, supported the impeachment resolution. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi branded the act of the privy council as a menace to democracy and supported the impeachment as a demand for a limit to the influence of the council over practical politics (Japan Advertiser, May 7, 1927, p. 5Google Scholar). The Hochi Shimbun, a paper friendly to the Kenseikai, at first favored the resolution as a vindication of responsible government, but later charged the resolution to party tactics, while blaming the Wakatsuki government for resigning instead of asking the emperor to dismiss the privy councillors (Ibid., May 5, 10 and 11, 1927, p. 5). The conservative Jiji Shimpo opposed the impeachment and condemned the Wakatsuki ministry for not asking the emperor to dismiss the privy councillor in question (Ibid., May 7, 1927, p. 5). The Chugai Shogyo, a paper influential in commercial circles, held that the council is the supreme advisory board attached to the Throne and constitutionally independent of the legislature. Hence the House of Representatives is not in a position to indict it, and such action was nothing less than disloyalty. It admitted, however, the danger of the council to parliamentary government, and proposed that its organization be reformed (Ibid., May 8, 1927, p. 8). The Miyako approved the resolutions but condemned any appeal to the Throne as tending to drag the emperor into politics. Reorganization of the council was urged (Ibid., May 8, 1927, p. 8). The Osaka Mainichi, in its issue of May 11, condemned the resolution as useless and scored the Wakatsuki government for resigning without an appeal to the emperor and thus missing an opportunity to establish a precedent against the interference of the council.

²⁶ For this reason the Kenseikai have been particularly antagonistic to the council. In 1926, when commenting on Wakatsuki's nomination of Dr. Kuratomi and Dr. Hiranuma as president and vice-president of the council, the press congratulated the premier for nominating men of deep learning who would be least liable to interfere with responsible government. Cf. leading articles quoted in the Japan Weekly Chronicle, April 22, 1926, p. 469Google Scholar.

²⁷ In the press it was reported that Baron Kuratomi, president of the council, on the evening of April 15, called at the official residence of Premier Wakatsuki and urged him to abandon the imperial ordinance and to summon the Diet. The premier, after consulting the cabinet, refused to recede, and the cabinet at the same time decided to resign if blocked by the council. Japan Advertiser, April 16, 1927, p. 1Google Scholar; and Japan Times, April 16, 1927, p. 1Google Scholar.

²⁸ Essays by both jurists appeared in the Chuo Koron (“Central Review”), No. 473, June, 1927, pp. 55–63 and 103–117Google Scholar. Sakuzo Yoshino resigned from the faculty of the Imperial Tokyo University in 1924; he was for a time in the service of the Chinese government, and is now political contributor to the Tokyo Asahi, and one of the founders of the Shakai Minshuto. Ryutaro Nagai is a professor in Waseda University, parliamentary counsellor of the Foreign Office, a member of the House of Representatives from Kanazawa, and a member of the Kenseikai.

²⁹ Chuo Koron, No. 473, p. 62.

³⁰ Chuo Koron, No. 473, p. 111. It should be noted that the standard treatises on constitutional law are agreed that the emperor should consult the privy council regarding ordinances, but that there is no obligation to follow its advice. Cf. Uyesugi, , Teikoku Kenpo, p. 341Google Scholar; Shimizu, , Kenpo Hen, p. 551Google Scholar; Ichimura, , Kenpo Yoron, p. 521Google Scholar.

³¹ At the opening of the 52nd session of the Diet the party alignment in the Peers was as follows: Imperial princes, who belong to no party, 18; Kenkyukai, 154; Koseikai, 67; Koyu Club, 42; Doseikai, 29; Sawakai, 27; Mushozoku (Independents), 26; Jun Mushozuku (Pure Independents), 43; total 406. Japan Weekly Chronicle, Dec. 30, 1926, p. 781Google Scholar. Cf. Osaka Mainichi, Dec. 25, 1926, p. 1Google Scholar.

³² The Tokyo Nichi Nichi branded the coalition as “treason to the cause of parliamentary principles” (Japan Advertiser, June 4, 1926, p. 8Google Scholar). The Osaka Asahi said: “The liaison of the Kenseikai with a bloc in the House of Peers for the purpose of prolonging the cabinet's existence is contrary to the principles of parliamentary government” (Ibid., June 5, 1926, p. 7). Even the conservative Jiji Shimpo referred to the habit of the Kenkyukai to share in the spoils of office while evading responsibility (Ibid., June 16, 1926, p. 7).

³³ Japan Advertiser, April 21, 1927, p. 1Google Scholar. There is evidence that the price of the Kenkyukai support was a promise by the Tanaka government to aid the Fifteenth Bank independently of other banks in difficulty (Japan Weekly Chronicle, commercial sup., July 14, 1927, p. 10Google Scholar; Japan Advertiser, Aug. 12, 1927, pp. 1–2Google Scholar). The failure of this bank, commonly called the Peers' Bank, would have ruined numerous members of the upper house who would have been compelled to pay up their unpaid shares.

³⁴ Particularly noteworthy were the speeches of Dr.Onodzuka, Kiheiji, Dr.Fujisawa, Rikitaro, and Hayashi, Count Hirotaro. Kwampo gogai, Mar. 25, 1927, pp. 391–403Google Scholar.

³⁵ In the 52nd Diet Mr. Yamaguchi Giichi (Seiyukai) used the following rather extreme language: “The people demand not a mere revision of the Diet law but a revision of the constitution itself in order to affect a complete reform of the House of Peers. They deplore the power that the Peers now exercise. Under the present arrangement even the manhood suffrage act will not give the people much participation in government. I believe we must have a radical reform of the upper house before we can secure a government truly based on public opinion—a really representative government.” Kwampo gogai, Feb. 20, 1927, p. 281Google Scholar.

³⁶ Cf. the constitution of the Shakai Minshuto, the new Social Democratic Party. Japan Weekly Chronicle, Dec. 2, 1926, p. 664Google Scholar.

³⁷ Japan Weekly Chronicle, May 19, 1927, p. 551Google Scholar; June 9, 1927, p. 631.

³⁸ The end of the 52nd session of the Diet witnessed one of the most violent scenes in the history of the House. Dr. Kiyose, a member of the Shinsei Club, attempted to bring up again the investigation of the alleged misappropriation of the military funds by General Tanaka, the leadei of the Seiyukai. Members of the Seiyukai sprang upon the rostrum, beat and nearly strangled Dr. Kiyose, and tore up the stenographic notes of the proceedings. Cf. Kwampo gogai, Mar. 25, 1927, pp. 859–865Google Scholar; Tokyo Asahi, Mar. 25, 1927, p. 1Google Scholar; Japan Weekly Chronicle, Mar. 31, 1927, p. 367Google Scholar.

³⁹ In commenting on the attack on Dr. Kiyose in the House, the Osaka Asahi blamed the parties for protecting and screening their members who commit such outrages, and went on to say: “The existing parties are merely private factions, manufactured by a few leaders who are in possession of large election funds, so that the leaders and members of the party are in the same relations as the lord and vassals in feudal ages. Men who are at the beck and call of the leaders, and have certain amounts of election funds, are allotted to various constituencies, and on their being returned they are made use of for the purpose of carrying out the plans and schemes of the leaders, with the result that superior men are ashamed to rank with them and the parties tend to become, in an increasing degree, a rabble of mean and despicable men. Hence, such a scene as was enacted in the House of Representatives on the 24th ultimo, in which the very life of a member was in danger. Will the nation, patient as it is, put up with such a Diet as this much longer? It is to be feared that nothing but the new election law, in which manhood suffrage is embodied, will save the constitutional system from the crisis in which it is now placed” (Quoted in Japan Weekly Chronicle, April 7, 1927, p. 392Google Scholar). The Osaka Mainichi said: “By approving of lynching in the House, the Seiyukai is undermining the foundations of the Diet and, in consequence, the system of parliamentary government itself” (Ibid.). The Hochi Shimbun declared: “The secret proceedings of the three party leaders have left a legacy of interminable political unrest, and the action of a certain party which put down speech by violence has lowered the credit of the Diet, as a traitor to parliamentary government could only do. The political intelligence of the nation cannot endure much longer such a Diet and such a state of affairs. The situation can be improved only by the enforcement of universal manhood suffrage” (Ibid.).

⁴⁰ The last general election occurred on May 10, 1924. The House had been dissolved on January 31.

⁴¹ An excellent account of the inauguration of the party under the presidency of Sujiyama Motojiro was published in the Tokyo Asahi, Mar. 6, 1926.

⁴² The struggle between the right and left wings of the new parties—the same struggle that split the Second and Third International and has parted the ranks of workers in many countries—promises to divide the new voters of Japan for some time. It began in April, 1926, when the executive committee of the Rodo Nominto voted that the door should not be closed to communists. Thereupon the conservatives in the Peasants' Union withdrew and formed the Nippon Nominto, or Japan Peasants' party. On October 24 following, the Federation of Labor withdrew from the Rodo Nominto, leaving it in control of the radical labor unions and the rump of the Peasants' Union. The Federation, under the leadership of the veteran Bunji Suzuki, then joined with the intellectuals to form the Shakai Minshuto, which was formally inaugurated on November 20. At the same time a less conservative group of the Federation, under the leadership of Mr. Asabu, established the Nihon Ronoto, or Japanese Labor and Peasant party. Cf. the account by Bunji Suzuki, in the Jiji Shimpo, translated in the Japan Weekly Chronicle, Dec. 16, 1926, pp. 721–722Google Scholar; also a series of articles on “The Split in the Labor and Peasant Party” in the Chuo Koron, No. 467, Dec. 1926, pp. 105–135Google Scholar, and a similar symposium in the Kaizo (“Reconstruction”) for the same date.

⁴³ For the platform of the party see Japan Weekly Chronicle, Dec. 2, 1926, p. 664Google Scholar; Dec. 16, 1926, p. 723. Professor Abe, for nearly thirty years a professor at Waseda University, is better known to Americans as the promoter of baseball among Japanese students. With Katayama Sen, he is one of the pioneers of socialism in Japan. In 1924 he founded the Japan Fabian Society.

⁴⁴ The important Tokyo Asaki welcomed the appearance of the Rodo Nominto with enthusiasm (Japan Advertiser, Mar. 7, 1926, p. 8Google Scholar). The Miyako Shimbun declared that the old parties were the venal puppets of the Kenkyukai, and added: “They must know that the newly enfranchised public, numbering more than ten millions, are rising to influence. They had better make friends of this great mass. Its influence will overpower the privileged classes. Its victory is fast approaching” (Ibid., Oct. 19, 1926, p. 7). The Osaka Mainichi, after decrying the corruption of the old parties, praised Professor Abe's party as moderate, sane, and sound (Ibid., Nov. 11, 1926, p. 7).

⁴⁵ In the first election under the manhood suffrage law in Nishisugamomachi, a suburb of Tokyo, three proletarian candidates were elected to the town assembly composed of thirty members (Japan Advertiser, Dec. 22, 1926, p. 1Google Scholar). In five municipal elections in Hokkaido the various parties won the following seats in the assemblies: Kenseikai, 78; Seiyukai, 33; Seiyuhonto, 4; Rodo Nominto, 4; and independents, 32 (Japan Weekly Chronicle, Oct. 14, 1926, p. 456Google Scholar).

⁴⁶ In a speech on the bill to limit campaign expenses. Kwampo gogai, Feb. 2, 1927, p. 160Google Scholar. Cf. the platform of the new Kakushinto sponsored by Ozaki, . Japan Weekly Chronicle, May 19, 1927, p. 551Google Scholar. See also a speech by Hidejiro Nagata in the House of Peers. Kwampo gogai, Jan. 29, 1927, p. 63Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ “From a political point of view the rivalry of two great parties is our ideal” (Osaka Mainichi, Dec. 11, 1926, p. 4)Google Scholar. “Two powerful parties are particularly important for the political life of present Japan. Once that system be established on a solid basis, government will be assumed alternately and the political world will be permanently stable” (Tokyo Nichi Nichi, quoted in Japan Advertiser, April 27, 1927, p. 5Google Scholar). “Contests between numerous yet powerless parties is a constant menace to political peace. The worst result is frequent ministerial changes, causing political unrest to prevail. We have an instance in France in spite of her adoption of the English system. The two-party system is advisable for the national purpose of Japan” (Jiji Shimpo, quoted in Ibid., June 3, 1927, p. 7). Similar sentiments are frequently expressed in the Diet. For instance, in the 52nd session, Dr. Fujisawa, in the House of Peers, said: “In the early years our parliamentary system tended to follow the two-party régime of England.…. The essence of a successful parliamentary government is to have one strong opposition party which will be prepared to take over the control of administration, thereby avoiding the present system of intrigue and secret compromise. This will eventually be accomplished in Japan by a sound constitutional development” (Kwampo gogai, Mar. 26, 1927, p. 391Google Scholar).

⁴⁸ The fall of his ministry in April, 1927, cost Wakatsuki the leadership of the new party. Mr. Tokonami, the leader of the Seiyuhonto, was likewise unavailable, inasmuch as it was discreet to give the amalgamation the appearance of a really new party unhampered by the old intriguing leaders. For a time, Baron Shidehara was the favorite candidate because his connection with the rich Mitsubishi promised a source of party funds (Japan Weekly Chronicle, May 19, 1927, p. 551Google Scholar). But eventually leadership went to Yuko Hamaguchi, a former finance minister and rival of Wakatsuki in the Kenseikai.

⁴⁹ Concerning alleged inducements in money offered by the Seiyukai to discontented members of the Seiyuhonto and Kenseikai, see Japan Weekly Chronicle, May 12, 1927, p. 552Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ For the platform of the Bikken Minseito, see Japan Advertiser, June 2, 1927, p. 1Google Scholar.

⁵¹ The press almost unanimously stigmatized the gubernatorial changes as a piece of exceptional partisanship devised to afford employment for the ronin and to give the Seiyukai control over the prefectural elections in September and the general election next year (Cf. leading articles from the vernacular press in the Japan Advertiser, May 19 and 20, 1927). The independent Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun pointed out that the Hara cabinet had heretofore held the odious record for the greatest number of dismissals, but its removals had totaled only thirteen (Japan Weekly Chronicle, May 26, 1927, p. 577Google Scholar). The Osaka Asahi urged popular election of the governors as a preventive in the future; but the Jiji Shimpo pointed out the dangers of a reform which went only so far as the election of governors, while leaving these officials under the supervision of the home minister. Indeed, this conservative paper demanded the more far-reaching reform of complete decentralization (Ibid., p. 578).