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Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Marie Hojnacki  and
David C. Kimball
Marie Hojnacki
Affiliation:
Pennsylvania State University
David C. Kimball
Affiliation:
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
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Abstract

In a departure from previous research, we focus on the dyadic relationship between lobbyists and committee members in the House of Representatives in order to test hypotheses about what factors shape the decisions of individual groups to lobby individual committee members. Our primary assumption is that organized interests seek to expand their supportive coalitions and affect the content and fate of bills referred to committees. In order to accomplish these goals, they give highest priority to lobbying their legislative allies in committee; allies may lobby other members of Congress on a group's behalf and shape legislation to conform with a group's preferences. But organizations with access to a strong resource base can move beyond their allies and work directly to expand support among undecided committee members and legislative opponents. Our empirical analysis provides evidence to support our expectations.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 92 , Issue 4 , December 1998 , pp. 775 - 790
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1998

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