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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Richard G. Niemi  and
Herbert F. Weisberg
Richard G. Niemi
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
Herbert F. Weisberg
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
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Abstract

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Type
Communications to the Editor
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 61 , Issue 3 , September 1967 , pp. 761
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1967 

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References

1 This Review, 60 (1966), 684–685.

2 “Les Théories de l'Interét Général et le Problème Logique de l'Agrégation,” Economie Appliquee, 5 (1952), 501–584.

3 Op. cit., p. 685.

4 Klahr, David, “A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting,” this Review, 60 (1966), 384–390.Google Scholar

5 Campbell, Colin D. and Tullock, Gordon, “A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities,” The Economic Journal, 75 (1965), 853–857.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Guilbaud's formula for this limit—1-[3/π] [Arc cos(1/√3)]—can be derived from our general solution, which is given in our “A Mathematical Solution for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting,” unpublished paper, October, 1966.

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