¹ Two notable prewar exceptions were Professor Raymond Leslie Buell and Dr. Ralph J. Bunche.

² As an excellent example of the application of the insights of anthropology to the problems of political development in this area, see Bascom, William R., “West and Central Africa”, in Most of the World, ed. Linton, Ralph (New York, 1949), pp. 331–405Google Scholar. For a historian's appraisal, see McKay, Vernon, “Nationalism in British West Africa”, Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. 24, pp. 2–11 (March 15, 1948)Google Scholar.

³ African Political Systems, eds. Fortes, M. and Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (New York, 1940), pp. 4 ffGoogle Scholar. Insofar as traditional concepts and methods are concerned, ethnocentrism has been freely confessed by political scientists in recent self-criticism. See Easton, David, The Political System (New York, 1953), pp. 33 ff.Google Scholar; also Report of the Inter-University Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, this Review, Vol. 47, pp. 641–57, at pp. 642–43 (Sept., 1953). Amongst the modernists in political science one finds the argument that the political scientist should not be rejected too readily since he has developed skills and acquired insights that might well shed new light on the political process and pattern of government of pre-literate societies after the anthropologist has exhausted his resources. Another argument, rather different, is that such societies might profitably be regarded as microcosms in which the political scientist can discern with greater clarity the essentials of government that might be obscured in the more complex Western systems. A final argument might be found in the recent psychocultural studies, especially in terms of their implications for policy formulation. See Pool, Ithiel de Sola, “Who Gets Power and Why”, World Politics, Vol. 2, pp. 120–34 (Oct., 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Toynbee, Arnold, The World and the West (New York, 1953), pp. 71 ff.Google Scholar It is difficult to accept without qualification Professor Toynbee's argument that the “national state” was a “spontaneous native growth” in Europe. One could argue that the centrally-minded, nation-building elites of emergent Asia and Africa are but the present-day counterparts of the centralizing monarchs of early modern Europe.

⁵ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism (London, 1939), pp. 1–7Google Scholar; Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication (New York, 1953), pp. 1–14Google Scholar.

⁶ Nativism is here used in its broad and universal sense, as denned by the late Professor Ralph Linton: “Any conscious, organized attempt on the part of a society's members to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of its culture.” See his “Nativistic Movements”, American Anthropologist, Vol. 45, pp. 230–40, at p. 230 (April–June, 1943)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The concept thus includes traditionalist movements in either the European or non-European world. This point is stressed because of the understandable sensitivity of many educated Africans to the root word “native,” which as a result of the colonial experience tends to carry with it the connotation of inferiority. See also LeGrip, A., “Aspects Actuels de L'Islam en A.O.F.”, L'Afrique et l'Asie, pp. 6–20 (No. 24, 1953)Google Scholar; Schlosser, Katesa, Propheten in Afrika (Albert Limbach Verlag, 1949)Google Scholar.

⁷ Thwaite, Daniel, The Seething African Pot (London, 1926), pp. 1–70Google Scholar; Shepperson, George, “Ethiopianism and African Nationalism”, Phylon, Vol. 14, pp. 9–18 (1st Quarter, 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kuper, Hilda, “The Swazi Reaction to Missions”, African Studies, Vol. 5, pp. 177–88 (Sept., 1946)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Kenyatta, Jomo, Facing Mount Kenya (London, 1953), pp. 269–79Google Scholar.

⁸ Coleman, James S., “The Role of Tribal Associations in Nigeria”, Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan, Nigeria, April, 1952Google Scholar. See also East Africa and Rhodesia, October 5, 1951, p. 106Google Scholar: “Nairobi is the happy hunting ground for the organizers of tribal associations, as there are to be found in the city representatives of practically every tribe in East and Central Africa.” Also Busia, K. A., Report on a Social Survey of Takoradi-Sekondi (Accra, Government Printer, 1950)Google Scholar.

⁹ Most advanced amongst the Yoruba, Ibo, Ibibio, Ewe, Buganda, and Kikuyu peoples.

¹⁰ The difference between the goal orientations of the two categories of movements is partly the result of the objectives of differing colonial policies (i.e., the British policy of self-government and differentiation versus the French, Portuguese, and in a qualified sense the Belgian policies of assimilation and identity) and in part the result of the presence or absence of a settled white population. Confronted with the overwhelming obstacles to the full realization of African self-government, African leaders in the second category tend towards the extreme either of accommodation (Union of South Africa) or of violence (Kenya). In the territories of the Central African Federation the leaders of the African Congress have tended not to define their ultimate objectives, preferring to act empirically. The strength and persistence of the autonomic drive is reflected, however, in their reported attraction to the original Gore-Brown partition plan adopted by the European Confederate party. See Cole, David, “How Strong is the African National Congress”, New Commonwealth, Vol. 27, pp. 5–10, at p. 9 (Jan. 4, 1954)Google Scholar.

¹¹ For a variety of reasons these movements have thus far apparently accomplished little more than to dramatize their existence at infrequent ad hoc conferences. Until recently the initiative tended to be taken by Americans or West Indians of African descent (e.g., Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. DuBois, and George Padmore), although in the early 1920's there was a National Congress of British West Africa organized by the late Casely Hayford of the Gold Coast. Also, M. Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese, was President of the first Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919. For recent pan-African nationalist activity in British West Africa see West Africa, Dec. 12, 1953, p. 1165Google Scholar; and for British Central Africa see Cole, op. cit., p. 9.

¹² See Cunnison, Ian, “The Watchtower Assembly in Central Africa”, International Review of Missions, Vol. 40, pp. 456–69 (Oct., 1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ SirLugard, F. D., The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, 1923), pp. 83 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Renascent Africa (Lagos, 1937)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ See Pool, Rosey E., “African Renaissance”, Phylon, Vol. 14, pp. 5–8 (First Quarter, 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maurice, Albert, “Union Africaine des Arts et des Lettres”, African Affairs, Vol. 50, pp. 233–41 (July, 1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Diop, Alioune, “Niam n'goura”, Présence Africaine (Nov.–Dec., 1947), pp. 1–3Google Scholar. The cultural revival is the product of four forces: (1) reflection and introspection on the part of educated Africans, frequently those confronted with thestimulating contrasts of a foreign environment while abroad; (2) the American Negro renaissance which commenced in the 1920's; (3) encouragement and sponsorship of European governments and unofficial organizations such as the International African Institute; and (4) support of missionary societies such as the United Society for Christian Literature in the United Kingdom.

¹⁶ Mair, L. P., “The Growth of Economic Individualism in African Society”, Journal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 33, pp. 261–73 (July, 1934)Google Scholar; McPhee, Allan, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa (London, 1926)Google Scholar; Wilson, G., An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia, Part I (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1941)Google Scholar. Cf. Polanyi, Karl, Origins of Our Time (London, 1946)Google Scholar; Lloyd, P. C., “New Economic Classes in Western Nigeria”, African Affairs, Vol. 52, pp. 327–34 (Oct., 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Jones, J. D. Rheinallt, “The Effects of Urbanization in South and Central Africa”, African Affairs, Vol. 52, pp. 37–44 (Jan., 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Bascom, William, “African Culture and the Missionary”, Civilisations, Vol. 3, pp. 491–501 (No. 4, 1953)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Forde, Daryll, “The Conditions of Social Development in West Africa”, Civilisations, Vol. 3, pp. 471–85 (No. 4, 1953)Google Scholar.

²⁰ See Church, R. J. Harrison, Modern Colonization (London, 1951), pp. 104 ff.Google Scholar; Montagne, Robert, “The ‘Modern State’ in Africa and Asia”, The Cambridge Journal, Vol. 5, pp. 583–602 (July, 1952)Google Scholar.

²¹ Regarding Belgian policy, see Wigny, Pierre, “Methods of Government in the Belgian Congo”, African Affairs, Vol. 50, pp. 310–17 (Oct., 1951)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wigny remarks (p. 311) that “… Belgians are reluctant to define their colonial policy. They are proud of their first realisations, and sure of the Tightness of their intentions.” Since this was written, there have been some very dramatic changes in Belgian policy, especially regarding the educated elite, the potential nationalists. The great debate in Belgian colonial circles on “le statut des Congolais civilisés” was terminated by four decrees of May 17, 1952 according to which educated Congolese are assimilated to Europeans in civil law. Regarding Portuguese policy, see Caetano, Marcelo, Colonizing Traditions, Principles and Methods of the Portuguese (Lisbon, 1951)Google Scholar. The keynote of the policy is the “spiritual assimilation” of the Africans to a “Portuguese nation dwelling in European, African, Asiatic and Indonesian Provinces.” The African civilisado is thus a citizen of Portugal.

²² Partly in response to nationalist pressures, the French Government has recently initiated certain measures of financial devolution to French West Africa. See Gayet, G., “Autonomies financières Française”, Civilisations, Vol. 3, pp. 343–47 (No. 3, 1953)Google Scholar. These measures may enhance the powers of the territorial assemblies to the point that the latter might ultimately become the foci for territorial nationalisms.

²³ The stringent police measures adopted recently in Kenya and Nyasaland, the special press laws which have long been in effect in British East and Central Africa, and the obstacles to nationalist activity which have existed in the Muslim areas of Northern Nigeria, do not necessarily invalidate this comparative historical generalization.

²⁴ The thesis here is that there are at least four ingredients in the psychology of colonial nationalism, and that British policy in Africa has come closest towards inculcating or providing them: (a) an awareness of the existence or possibility of alternatives to the status quo, a state of mind produced by Western education and particularly by study and travel abroad; (b) an intense desire to change the status quo; (c) a system within which the major alternative to the status quo—self-government—has the status of legitimacy; and (d) an area of relative freedom in which that legitimate alternative may be pursued.

²⁵ The Belgian policy of stabilization of labor in the urban centers of the Congo, in which 83% of the men have their families with them, is one of the several factors which may help to explain this.

²⁶ World Christian Handbook (London, 1949)Google Scholar.

²⁷ United Nations, Non-Self-Governing Territories. Vol. IIIGoogle Scholar: Special Study on Education. New York, Document ST/TRI/SER.A./5/Add. 2, January, 1951Google Scholar.

²⁸ By decree of April 16, 1950, the Institut des Hautes Études was established at Dakar; and on January 1, 1952, there were 1,640 scholarship holders in continental France, of whom 572 were pursuing higher education. Civilisations, Vol. 3, pp. 575–83 (No. 4, 1953)Google Scholar. On British educational policy in tropical Africa see African Education (Oxford: The Nuffield Foundation and the Colonial Office, 1953)Google Scholar. The Belgians within the past few years have dramatically reoriented their policy regarding higher education for the Congolese. Since 1952 Congo students have been admitted to the Albert I College at Leopoldville; the first Negro University of the Congo is scheduled for opening in 1954; and recently the Belgian press has drawn attention to the admission to Louvain University of a Negro student from the Congo. Civilisations, Vol. 3, pp. 599–602 (No. 4, 1953)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Compare with the number of African-owned-and-edited dailies and weeklies (combined total) in the following territories: British Africa: Gold Coast (17), Uganda (8), Sierra Leone (7), Gambia (3); French West Africa (10); and none, insofar as is known, in Belgian, Portuguese, or Spanish Africa; or in Kenya, the territories of the Central African Federation, or in the Union of South Africa.

³⁰ On the other hand, there appears to be no newspaper in British West Africa comparable with the European-owned-and-edited journal of French West Africa entitled Les Echos de l'A.O.F., which “week after week passionately attacks the administration ….” See Hodgkin, Thomas, “The Metropolitan Axis”, West Africa, January 9, 1954, at p. 6Google Scholar.

³¹ Brinton, Crane, From Many One (Cambridge, Mass., 1948)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² “The Growth of Nations”, World Politics, Vol. 5, pp. 168–96 (Jan., 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³³ Ibid. See also Deutsch's, Nationalism and Social Communication (cited in note 5), pp. 81 ff.Google Scholar

³⁴ West Africa, January 30, 1954, p. 87Google Scholar.

³⁵ For several of the concepts used here the author is indebted to the works of Professor Karl W. Deutsch, previously cited. See especially his Nationalism and Social Communication, pp. 15–45.

³⁶ It could be argued, for example, that apart from historical and cultural factors, the difference in the per capita income of the three regions of Nigeria (£26 for the Western Region, £16 for the Northern Region, and £23 for the Eastern Region) is of no little significance in the recent and current drive for greater regional autonomy. See Prest, A. R. and Stewart, I. G., The National Income of Nigeria, abridged ed. (Lagos: Government Printer, 1954), pp. 14–16Google Scholar.

³⁷ Given suitable conditions, including a politically favorable milieu and the proper techniques, there would seem to be no reason why subjective factors such as loyalties, attitudes, and attachments to national or “sub-national” symbols, could not to some extent be measured.