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Missing the Archimedean Point: Liberalism's Institutional Presuppositions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert Grafstein
Robert Grafstein*
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
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Abstract

Though liberalism has been widely criticized for its attempt to frame a detached judgment of society based on an asocial conception of individuals, insufficient attention has been paid to the particular social and political relationships this search for an Archimedean point presupposes. Using collective choice theory, I show that liberalism has adopted two distinct kinds of Archimedean points reflecting different and unjustified presuppositions about the true institutional relation between politics and society. Liberalism's Archimedean search is not merely unsuccessful but biased in a way that is significant even for positions critical of liberalism. It is possible, I argue, to have a normative political theory that avoids an asocial conception of individuals without falling victim to liberalism's specific biases concerning institutional relations. The implications for both Rawlsian- or Nozickian-style liberalism are discussed, including the possibility of a political philosophy that avoids their “analytical extremism.“

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Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 177 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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