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Military Power and Constitutional Development in China
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 September 2013
Extract
It is now nine years since the outbreak of the Chinese revolution. It is fifteen years since the Manchus attempted to maintain their control by introducing representative institutions into China. The development toward constitutional and representative government under the Manchus was checked in 1911 by the revolutionary movement. When the Chinese Republic was established as the successor to the alien Manchu Empire it was felt that the problem of modernizing China bade fair to be solved, and that in an orderly way her political institutions would be brought into harmony with western standards. Unfortunately that orderly progress has not come. Parliamentary government under the Nanking (provisional) Constitution was replaced by the dictatorship of Yuan Shih-kai under the arrangements of the so-called constitutional compact, which in turn was followed by the attempt to reëstablish the monarchy. The failure of the monarchy movement brought back parliamentary government, but before a permanent constitution could be adopted Parliament was again dissolved, and a government controlled by a military clique set up in its place. Since this military government was unacceptable to the southern provinces, the country became divided. So far it has not been possible for the country to reconcile its differences. Instead of an ordered constitutional progress, has come apparent failure in the effort to establish representative government. The name of a republic has been maintained, it is true, and the forms of constitutional government have been retained, but a permanent national government has not been set up, nor has popular government replaced the paternal despotism of the past.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © American Political Science Association 1921
References
1 Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire, pp. 48–49. See also Village Life in China, by Liang and Tao, pp. 46–47.
2 Williams, , Middle Kingdom, II, p. 606.Google Scholar
3 There was, it is true, the censorate, to keep the Emperor in touch with the provinces, but the censors represented the Emperor and not the people, and were interested in public opinion only as a reflection on the exercise of power by an imperial officer.
4 China Year Book, 1912, p. 355.
5 Bevan, , Constitution Building in China. Cited in China Year Book, 1912, p. 364.Google Scholar
6 China Year Book, 1912, pp. xi–xii.
7 At the central point of the Yangtze valley.
8 Up to this time the imperial government had dealt with Li Yuan-hung as the leader of the revolution.
9 These last were the “gentry” of the province, who were looked to as leaders in the absence of any official direction.
10 China Year Book, 1912, ch. 15. By an imperial edict of 1907 the viceroy was given control of the military administration in his jurisdiction. Ibid. p., 237.
11 Such as General Chang Hsun, the commander of the imperial forces at Nanking.
12 Li Yuan-hung was chosen vice-president. However, he remained at his post in central China.
13 One of the leaders in the reform movement of 1898.
14 Framed by a conference or council set up by the President.
15 The fact that power in the government was proportioned to the direct control of troops is well illustrated in the career of Li Yuan-hung. While he remained among his soldiery at Wuchang he was a power to be reckoned with, but when he left Wuchang to assume his vice-presidential office in Peking, at the request of the President, he became negligible as a factor in national and provincial politics until his accession to the presidency. He succeeded to that office because to have left the regular line of succession would have precipitated a struggle between contesting factions in the military party.
16 Chang Hsun had risen to position from the ranks. In 1911 he was commander-in-chief of the Kiangnan forces. When driven from Nanking by the revolutionists he retreated with his troops up the railroad toward Tientsin. After the abdication he was subsidized by the government to prevent his acting against it. Aside from this subsidy, he maintained himself on the loot taken from Nanking at the time of its evacuation, and by levying tribute on the country.
17 General Fêng recognized the danger to his power if he left his troops. For that reason he entered upon extended negotiations to safeguard himself before he would consent to come to Peking.
18 In October, 1920, the Kwangsi government returned to Peking allegiance, and the president announced the unification of the country. But renewed activity in the south by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen indicates that unity is not yet attained.
19 In fact the “student movement” was developed largely because of the reported selling out of the country to Japan. The movement took on the form of a propaganda among the lower classes and in the army for the purpose of enlightening the people as to the true state of affairs both internally and externally. Undoubtedly the student agitation and propaganda had something to do with the easy overthrow of the Anfu Club.
20 For summary of Tuan's, statement and request see Millard's Review, July 31, 1920, pp. 469–470.Google Scholar
21 For the text of the dismissal mandate see ibid.
22 A similar demand came from the students. General Wu became a national hero, because of his attitude. But his chief Tsao Kun, and General Chang seem to have refused to accept his proposals, and by himself he did not have sufficient power to demand action.
23 It may reasonably be argued that it was to the commander's interest to have the pay in arrears since that gave him an additional hold on his men. Of course he had to keep them fed and clothed, and see that they were partly paid in order to prevent a dangerous dissatisfaction.
24 One of the purposes to which the “reorganization loan” of 1913 was to be devoted was the disbandment of the troops. However the development of the struggle between Yuan and Parliament prevented the undertaking of the work.
25 As a matter of fact, order was maintained in the provinces under the control of the strong leaders.
26 See Miliard's Review for February 5 and 19, on the influence of the association of Chinese bankers in beginning a reform of governmental methods.
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