¹ Jeffrey G. Williamson has noted a curvilinear relationship between level of economic development and the existence of regional inequality: as a rule inequality is lowest when the levels of economic development are at the lower and higher ends of the continuum, while countries in an intermediate stage are typified by greater inequality. See Williamson, J. G., “Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development: A Description of the Patterns,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 13, No. 4, Part 2 (July, 1965), 3–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For confirmation of this pattern in the Canadian case, see Green, Alan G., “Regional Inequality, Structural Change, and Economic Growth in Canada—1890–1956,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 17 (July, 1969), 567–583CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A similar curvilinear pattern has been hypothesized and demonstrated to be true of income distributions (not necessarily strictly related to regional differentials): see Kuznets, Simon, Economic Growth and Structure: Selected Essays (New York: Norton, 1965), pp. 257–287Google Scholar; and Kravis, Irving B., “International Differences in the Distribution of Income,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 42 (November, 1960), 408–416CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Holubnychy, Vsevolod, “Some Economic Aspects of Relations Among the Soviet Republics,” in Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. Goldhagen, Erich (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 50–120Google Scholar.

³ Koropeckyj, I. S., “Equalization of Regional Development in Socialist Countries: An Empirical Analysis,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 21 (October, 1972), 68–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a similar argument, although not presenting empirical evidence, see Sheehy, Ann, “Some Aspects of Regional Development in Soviet Central Asia,” Slavic Review, 31 (September, 1972), 557–558CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Inkeles, Alex, “Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspective,” in Social Change in Soviet Russia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 262CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ As Koropeckyj notes, the shift in investment from the western to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union began in the late 1920's and 1930's, principally as a strategic measure. See Koropeckyj, I. S., Location Problems in Soviet Industry Before World War II: The Case of the Ukraine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), Part IGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Baibakov, N. K., ed., Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971–1975 gg. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1972), pp. 245–281Google Scholar. Note, however, that the projected rates of growth in industrial production are generally higher for the less advanced regions than for the more industrialized ones, so conceivably the goal of equalization is implicitly recognized.

⁷ Baibakov, N., “Ekonomika SSSR—Edinyi narod-nokhoziaistvennyi kompleks,” Kommunist, 1972, No. 16, p. 35Google Scholar. For a similar point, see the recent authoritative monograph on nationality relations: Fedoseev, P. N. et al. , eds., Lennizm i natsional'nyi vopros v sovremennykh usloviiakh (Moskva: Politizdat, 1972), p. 248Google Scholar.

⁸ Koropeckyj has observed that the goal of regional economic specialization may compete with that of equalization but he assumes, nevertheless, that the eventual development aim of Soviet doctrine is to achieve an equal amount of industrialization in all regions of the USSR (Koropeckyj, Location Problems in Soviet Industry, esp. chap. 4) . While this assumption may be essentially valid as an expression of official doctrine, one may question the validity of relying primarily on indices of “industrialization” as the principal indicators of regional equalization. Some alternative measures will be suggested below.

⁹ Stroitel'stvo kommunizma i razvitie obshchestvennykh otnoshenii (Moskva: “Nauka,” 1966), p. 256Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See Perevedentsev, V. I., “Contemporary Migration in the USSR,” Soviet Geography, 10 (April, 1969), 192–208CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Armstrong, John A., “The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union,” in Goldhagen, , Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, pp. 7–8Google Scholar; and Armstrong, John A., “Communist Political Systems as Vehicles for Modernization,” in Political Development in Changing Societies: An Analysis of Modernization, ed. Palmer, Monte and Stern, Larry (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1971), pp. 136–137Google Scholar. The typical pattern of migration in the early stages of development, from the less advanced to the more advanced regions, has been outlined by Williamson, , “Regional Inequality,” 5–6 and 8Google Scholar.

¹² See, for example, Shkaratan, O. I., “Etnosotsial'naia struktura gorodskogo naseleniia Tatarskoi ASSR (po materialam sotsiologicheskogo obsledovaniia),” Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1970, No. 3, p. 14Google Scholar; and Bromlei, Iu. V. and Kozlov, V. I., “Leninizm i osnovnye tendentsii etnicheskikh protsessov v SSSR,” Sovetskaia etnografiia, 1970, No. 1, p. 13Google Scholar. For discussions of conflict over staffing of administrative and party positions in the USSR, see Bilinsky, Yaroslav, “The Rulers and the Ruled,” Problems of Communism, 16 (Sept.-Oct., 1967), 16–26Google Scholar; and Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), esp. chap. 5Google Scholar.

¹³ See Perevedentsev, V. I., Migratsiia naseleniia i trudovye problemy Sibiri (Novosibirsk: “Nauka,” 1966), chap. 4Google Scholar, translated in Soviet Sociology, 9 (Winter, 1970–1971), 456–458Google Scholar.

¹⁴ This is the commonly proposed solution to rural overpopulation and urban manpower shortages in some of the national areas. See, for example, the recent account of this problem in Tadzhikistan, in “The Tadzhik Republic's Labor Problem,” Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 25, No. 4 (February 21, 1973), 11–12Google Scholar.

¹⁵ See, for example, the criticisms of the inadequate amount and quality of Russian-language instruction in Azerbaidzhan, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), 24, No. 43 (November 22, 1972), 23Google Scholar, and CDSP, 24, No. 51 (January 17, 1973), 23–24; as well as the criticisms of such instruction in Estonia and Turkmenia, in CDSP, 24, No. 51 (January 17, 1973), 23.

¹⁶ For a useful brief analysis of the relevant literature, see Banks, Olive, The Sociology of Education (London: B. T. Batsford, 1971), chap. 10Google Scholar. For discussion of the development and structure of the Soviet educational system, see Pennar, Jaan, Bakalo, Ivan I., and Bereday, George Z. F., Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education: with Special Reference to Nationality Groups (New York: Praeger, 1971)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ The variety of options is actually greater than revealed here, because a person who enters full-time employment may still enroll in evening or correspondence courses, and a person who eventually graduates from a specialized secondary educational institution (or tekhnikum) may later enroll in a regular secondary school. Furthermore, a graduate of a regular secondary school may also enroll in a tekhnikum. For a useful brief outline of the structure of the Soviet school system, see Goodman, Ann S. and Feshbach, Murray, Estimates and Projections of Educational Attainment in the USSR: 1950–1985, U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Population Reports, Series P-91, No. 16 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ This argument is based on the assumption that urban work forces absorb greater proportions of highly skilled manpower than rural work forces. Consequently, if Republic A has a larger proportion of specialists than Republic B, this may be because A is more urbanized than B even though within the urban and rural sectors taken separately Republic A and Republic B may have identical proportions of skilled manpower.

¹⁹ For discussion of the link between the breakup of the extended family and the growth of equality between the sexes, see Goode, William J., World Revolution and Family Patterns (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 20–22Google Scholar. For an interesting empirical analysis of the relationship between level of education and intra-family equality in the USSR, see Pimenova, A. L., “Novyi byt i stanovlenie vnutrisemeinogo ravenstva,” in Sotsial'nye issledovaniia, vyp. 7: Metodologicheskie problemy issledovaniia byta (Moskva: “Nauka,” 1971), pp. 34–45Google Scholar.

²⁰ For further discussion of the relationship between modernization and changing family role structure, see Schnaiberg, Allan, “Measuring Modernism: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations,” American Journal of Sociology, 76 (November, 1970), 399–425CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Schnaiberg, Allan, “The Modernizing Impact of Urbanization: A Causal Analysis,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 20 (October, 1971), 80–104CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Mazur, D. Peter, “Fertility Among Ethnic Groups in the USSR,” Demography, 4, No. 1 (1967), 172–195CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

²² For a review of relevant literature and an analysis of some trends contrary to this generalization in recent years (within industrialized countries), see Dixon, Ruth B., “Explaining Cross-Cultural Variations in Age at Marriage and Proportions Never Marrying,” Population Studies, 25 (July, 1971), 215–233CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and Goode, , World Revolution and Family Patterns, pp. 40–48Google Scholar.

²³ Kozlov, V. I., Dinamika chislennosti narodov: metodologiia issledovaniia i osnovnye faktory (Moskva: “Nauka,” 1969), p. 120Google Scholar. For longitudinal figures on age at first marriage and the relationship between marriage age and birthrates, see Sifman, R. I. and Darskii, L. E., “Pokazateli brachnosti i plodovitosti zhenshchin,” Vestnik statistiki, 1967, No. 8, pp. 87–95Google Scholar, translated as “Indices of Rate of Marriage and Fertility in Women,” in Soviet Sociology, 8 (Summer, 1969), 94–109Google Scholar.

²⁴ For discussion of the links between economic development, family structure, and fertility, see especially Davis, Kingsley and Blake, Judith, “Social Structure and Fertility: An Analytic Framework,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 4 (April, 1956), 211–235CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ This is the procedure adopted by Mazur, “Fertility Among Ethnic Groups,” and Kozlov, Dinamika chislennosti narodov.

²⁶ For brief descriptions of the cultural and political backgrounds of Soviet nationalities, see the dated but still indispensable source: Lorimer, Frank, The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 50–65Google Scholar. For more recent classifications and descriptions of the political and social characteristics of the nationalities, see especially Armstrong, “The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union,” and Aspaturian, Vernon V., “The Non-Russian Nationalities,” in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed. Kassof, Allen (New York: Praeger, 1968), 143–198Google Scholar.

²⁷ For further discussion of this statistic, see Blalock, Hubert M. Jr.,, Social Statistics, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 88Google Scholar. The computational formula is:

where

V = coefficient of variation,

σ = standard deviation,

= mean score of all groups,

X_i, = score of the i'th group, and

N = number of cases.

Williamson and Koropeckyj rely upon a formula that weights the individual cases by population size. This is justified in that the data-reporting units (usually administrative units) are often somewhat arbitrary divisions that do not correspond to theoretically or empirically meaningful regional divisions of the country. In the present study, however, we have relied on unweighted scores because the boundaries of nationality areas and of the actual ethnic populations under study do demarcate meaningful analytic units. It is precisely the gaps among nationalities, and among nationality regions (republics) taken as units, with which we are concerned. Moreover, using weighted scores tends to obscure more “general” trends because of the inordinate population sizes of the two largest regions: the RSFSR, with 130 million inhabitants (in 1970), and the Ukrainian SSR, with 47 million, represent approximately 73 per cent of the population of the fifteen republics in our sample. Finally, and most importantly, from the standpoint of official doctrine, there is no theoretical reason to treat the scores of some nationalities as more important than any others, especially since our study is restricted to the fifteen nationalities accorded the highest official political status.

²⁸ This summary is based on calculations not shown here. In this fifteen-case sample, the interquartile range is calculated as the absolute difference between the scores of the 4th highest and 12th highest cases for each age cohort.

²⁹ The category “specialists” includes all employed persons who have diplomas from higher educational institutions or specialized secondary educational institutions regardless of their field of study or the type of work currently engaged in. For highly useful discussions of Soviet manpower statistics, see Feshbach, Murray, The Soviet Statistical System: Labor Force Recordkeeping and Reporting Since 1957, U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 17 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962)Google Scholar; and Goodman, Ann S., Estimates and Projections of Specialized Manpower in the USSR: 1950–1975, U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Population Reports, Series P-91, No. 21 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970)Google Scholar.

³⁰ The category “scientific workers” partially overlaps with that of “specialists” and includes every employed person to whom the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education has granted a degree and/or an academic title, plus persons lacking such a degree or title if they are employed in certain occupations or organizations (such as scientific research institutions or higher educational institutions). For further discussion, see Feshbach, pp. 29–31.

³¹ Bilinsky overlooks these factors when examining the apparent limitations on the training and use of specialized Ukrainian manpower, while Aspaturian says that Stalin deliberately restricted Ukrainian access to higher education (a policy that Aspaturian says was reversed by Stalin's successors). Although there may be some evidence to support Bilinsky's and Aspaturian's views, certainly one cannot automatically attribute all deviations from strict proportionality in access to education to deliberate intentions of the Soviet leadership without first considering other factors that might account (or partially account) for such deviations. See Bilinsky, Yaroslav, “Assimilation and Ethnic Assertiveness Among Ukrainians of the Soviet Union,” in Goldhagen, , Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, pp. 147–184Google Scholar; and Aspaturian, , “The Non-Russian Nationalities,” pp. 178–179Google Scholar.

³² The term “employee” (sluzhashchie) as used in the present analysis roughly denotes persons employed in nonmanual occupations. Sometimes the term is used in a more restrictive sense to refer to low- and middle-level administrative, supervisorial, or office personnel, as distinguished from the “intelligentsia” of specialists with higher education or of persons in high administrative positions.

³³ When speaking of the relative “numbers” of women and men who have attained literacy, I shall for convenience assume that the proportions of men and women in the population are identical. But note that because the ratio is calculated as a ratio between the proportions of women and men who have attained literacy (education), the ratio is not actually distorted by the unequal numbers of men and women in the population.

³⁴ For detailed empirical analyses of female status and birthrate differentials among (former) Muslim groups, see Bondarskaia, G. A., “Rol' etnicheskogo faktora v formirovanii territoriial'nykh razlichii rozhdaemosti,” in Voprosy demografii (Issledovaniia, problemy, metody), ed. Volkov, A. G. et al. (Moskva: “Statistika,” 1970), pp. 160–175Google Scholar; and the various articles in Karakhanov, M. K., ed., Problemy narodonaseleniia (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1970)Google Scholar.

³⁵ Matossian, Mary K., The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), p. 5Google Scholar.

³⁶ At least as far as one can judge from regional indicators, the crude birthrates of all the nationalities considered here dropped off markedly in the 1960s. See Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 godu (Moskva: “Statistika,” 1971), pp. 50–51Google Scholar. For more detailed analysis of longitudinal trends in fertility in the USSR, see Berent, Jerzy, “Causes of Fertility Decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,” Population Studies, 24, No. 1 (March, 1970), 35–58Google ScholarPubMed, and No. 2 (July, 1970), 247–292. Extensive discussion and analysis of fertility declines in general and within the USSR in particular is found also in Kozlov, , Dinamika chislennosti narodov, pp. 162–175 and 233–249Google Scholar; and Bondarskaia, G. A., “Vliianie etnicheskogo faktora na uroven' rozhdaemosti v SSSR i v nekotorye sotsialisticheskikh stranakh evropy,” in Faktory rozhdaemosti, ed. Volkov, A. G. (Moskva: “Statistika,” 1971), pp. 52–62Google Scholar.

³⁷ Actually, the relationship between birthrates and female employment may be reciprocal, with increased employment leading to lower birthrates. For a recent analysis, however, that questions whether any causal linkage exists between birthrates and economic independence of women in the Soviet Union, see Mazur, D. Peter, “Fertility and Economic Dependency of Soviet Women,” Demography, 10 (February, 1973), 37–51CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

³⁸ For a discussion of the legislative aspect, see Massell, Gregory J., “Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia,” Law and Society Review, 2 (February, 1968), 179–228CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ Karakhanov, M. K., “Dmamika narodonaselenna srednei azii,” Karakhanov, Problemy narodonaseleniia, p. 23Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ This conclusion applies not only to Muslim nationalities but also to Christians, especially the Armenians. Although as a group the Armenians are among the three or four most highly educated nationalities in the USSR, they lag behind all other union republic Christian groups in decreasing early marriage and child-woman ratios, and they lag well behind the other in the employment of wome out-side the household. On the last point, see Isupov, A. A., Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR (po itogam perepisi 1959 g.) (Moskva: “Statistika,” 1964), p. 46Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Armenia constitutes a major exception because it has so saturated its own specialized work force with Armenians (92 per cent of the higher specialists in Armenia are Armenians) that almost 50 per cent of all Armenian specialists with higher education must seek employment outside the Armenian Republic.

⁴² A similar pattern may be discerned in the measures of specialized manpower in Tables 3 and 4. If one calculates the interquartile range, the absolute difference between the 4th highest and 12th highest scores increased over time, while the relative differences among nationalities tended to decline. One would expect both the absolute and relative differences on these measures to decline eventually, thereby conforming to the inverted “U” pattern observed with incomplete secondary education.

⁴³ Noren, James H. and Whitehouse, E. Douglas, “Soviet Industry in the 1971–1975 Plan,” in Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 223–224Google Scholar.