¹ Since 1905 it has borne the seal of the department of state.

² The French text reads:

Article 8. Le président de la République négocie et ratifie les traités. Il en donne connaissance aux Chambres aussitôt que l'intérêt et la sûreté de l'Etat le permettent.

Les traités de paix, de commerce, les traités qui engagent les finances de l'Etat, ceux qui sont relatifs à l'état des personnes et au droit de propriété des Français à l'étranger, ne sont définitifs qu'après avoir été votés par les deux Chambres. Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire ne peutavoir lieu qu'en vertu d'une loi.

Article 9. Le président de la République ne peut déclarer la guerre sans l'assentiment préalable des deux Chambres.

³ The French text reads:

Article 6. Les ministres sont solidairement responsables devant les Chambres de la politique générale du gouvernement, et individuellement de leurs actes personnels.

Le président de la République n'est responsable que dans le cas de haute trahison.

⁴ Louis Michon, Les traités internationaux devant les Chambres, passim; Chailley, Joseph, De l'Autorité gouvernmentale compétente pour passer les traités internationaux, (Auxerre, 1882), 138–342Google Scholar; Barisien, Pierre, Le Parlement & les traités—Étude sur le fonctionnement pratique de la loi du 18 juillet 1875 (Art. 8), (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1913).Google Scholar

⁵ A legislature, it is true, often reaches decisions involving very delicate distinctions, but these are not in the domain of pure reasoning. They are possible because of the representation of numerous physical interests, all of which being heard equally, a delicate resultant of forces emerges in the decisions.

⁶ Ebreu, Henri, Le Droit de traiter dans ses rapports avec la forme de l'État et avec la forme du gouvernement (Valence, 1900).Google Scholar

⁷ Cited by John Bassett Moore in A Brief Sketch of the Life of Francis Wharton prefixed to Wharton's, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, I, xv.Google Scholar

⁸ Sovereignty is in this case internal sovereignty, not the external sovereignty of international law. For our purpose the theoretical origin of sovereignty in the people is not so important as what organ of the government actually and effectively represents the people as their sovereign agent. Very useful discussions of the subject are “The Limits of Sovereignty” in Essays on Government by A. Lawrence Lowell and the “Nature of Sovereignty” in Studies in History and Jurisprudence by James Bryce.

⁹ Turkey cannot be called exactly in a transitional stage, for it is not certain that popular government will develop normally in that state. Nor can the sultan be considered as entirely sovereign since he is subordinate both to the Koran and the Sheri, or sacred law, which fetwas can only interpret, not alter.

¹⁰ London Times, weekly edition, 1905, page 533.

¹¹ Treatment of International Questions by Parliaments, etc., British Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, No. 5 (1912), page 21. Evidences of radical changes in the Russian constitutional system soon to take place are furnished by the recent crises and revolutionary overturn.

¹² A theory not yet put forward so far as I know and worthy of consideration is that the sovereignty of the German Empire resides in the praesidium, which forms the subject of Part IV, Articles 11–19, of the constitution. This theory would place the sovereignty jointly in the president of the confederation and the chancellor.

¹³ Lowell, A. Lawrence, Government and Parties in Continental Europe, I, 288–292.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Details are mostly taken from Treatment of International Questions by Parliaments, Parl. Papers, loc. cit.

¹⁵ The constitution of Prussia provides:

Article 43. The person of the king ia inviolable.

Article 44. The king's ministers are responsible. All government acts (documentary) of the king require for their validity the approval of a minister, who thereby assumes responsibility for them.

Article 45. The king alone is invested with executive power. He appoints and dismisses ministers. He orders the promulgation of laws, and issues the necessary ordinances for their execution.

Article 48. The king has the right to declare war and make peace, and to conclude other treaties with foreign governments. The latter require for their validity the assent of the chambers in so far as they are commercial treaties or impose burdens on the state, or obligations on its individual subjects.

¹⁶ The colonial law amendment is of particular interest at present because the Reichstag would have to assent to any cession of colonial territory as a result of war. It is interesting to note that Alsace-Lorraine and Heligoland are neither included in the constitutional Bundesgebiet nor within the definition of protectorate.

¹⁷ The words in parentheses were added by an amendment promulgated in the Imperial Gazette, March 3, 1873.

¹⁸ Clause 13 is given as amended on December 20, 1873. The original phraseology was:

“Common legislation regarding the law of obligations, criminal law, commercial law, and the law relating to bills of exchange; likewise judicial proceedings.”

¹⁹ London Times, weekly edition, November 20, 1908, p. 739.

²⁰ The texts of the interpellations are published in Verhandlungen des Reichstags, XII. Legislaturperiode, I. Session. Band 248: Anlagen zu den Stenographischen Berichten, Nr. 986 bis 1021.

The wording of the texts so aptly reflects the attitude of the interpellators that I append transcripts of the exact language:

Bassermann, National Liberal, (No. 1003, op. cit., p. 5694): “Ist der Herr Reichskanzler bereit für die Veröffentlichung einer Reihe von Gesprächen Seiner Majestät des Kaisers im Daily Telegraph und für die in denselben mitgeteilten Tatsachen die verfassungsmässige Verantwortung zu übernehmen?”

Ablass, deutsche freisinnige Volkspartei, (No. 1006, op. cit., p. 5694): “Durch die Veröffentlichung von Aüsserungen des Deutschen Kaisers im Daily Telegraph und durch die von Reichskanzler veranlasste Mitteilung des Sachverhalts in der Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung sind Tatsachen bekannt geworden, die schwere Mängel in der Behandlung auswärtiger Angelegenheiten bekunden und geeignet sind, auf die Beziehungen des Deutschen Reichs zu anderen Mächten ungünstig einzuwirken.

“Was gedenkt der Herr Reichskanzler zu tun, um Abhilfe zu schaffen und die ihm durch die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs zugewiesene Verantwortlichkeit im vollen Umfange zur Geltung zu bringen?”

Albrecht, Sozialdemokrat, (No. 1007, op. cit., p. 5695): “Was gedenkt der Herr Reichskanzler zu tun, um Vorgänge zu verhindern, wie sie durch die Mitteilungen des Daily Telegraph über Handlungen und Aüsserungen des Deutschen Kaisers bekannt geworden sind?”

Normann, Konservative, (No. 1011, op. cit., p. 5696): “Ist der Herr Reichskanzler bereit, nähere Auskunft zu geben über die Umstände, die zur Veröffentlichung von Gesprächen Seiner Majestät des Kaisers in der englischen Presse geführt haben?”

Von Hatzfeldt, von Camp-Massaunen, Reichspartei, (No. 1016, op. cit., p. 5701): “Ist der Herr Reichskanzler gewillt, Vorsorge zu treffen, dass sich ähnliche Vorkommnisse, wie sie durch die Veröffentlichung des Daily Telegraph zu Tage getreten sind, nicht widerholen?”

²¹ The full reports are in Verhandlungen des Reichstags, XII. Legislaturperiode, I. Session. Band 233: Stenographische Berichte, 153 Sitzung bis 181. Sitzung, 5373–5405. The original of the passage quoted is at page 5396C and reads:

“Die Einsicht, dass die Veröffentlichung dieser Gespräche in England die von Seiner Majestät dem Kaiser gewellte Wirkung nicht hervorgerufen, in unserem Lande aber tiefe Erregung und schmerzliches Bedauern verursacht hat, wird—diese feste Überzeugung habe ich in diesen schweren Tagen gewonnen—Seine Majestät den Kaiser dahin führen, fernerhin auch in Privatgesprächen jene Zurückhaltung zu beobachten die im Interesse einer einheitlichen Politik und für die Autorität der Krone gleich unentbehrlich ist. Wäre dem nicht so, so könnte weder ich noch einer meiner Nachfolger die Verantwortung tragen.”

²² London Times, weekly edition, November 20, 1908, p. 739.

²³ London Times, weekly edition, August 31, 1917, page 710. See also article, “German and Prussian Constitutional Reform” by George Saunders, The Neto Europe, Vol. Ill, 205.

²⁴ See Earl of Halsbury, Laws of England, VIGoogle Scholar, for a complete discussion of the crown.

²⁵ Constitutional History of England, 424.

²⁶ Compare Lowell's summary in The Government of England, I, 40–52.

²⁷ Howell, T. B., A Complete Collection of State Trials, VI, 502–503.Google Scholar

²⁸ Earl of Halsbury, The Laws of England, VI, sec. 679.Google Scholar

²⁹ Earl of Halsbury, op. cit., VII, 86.

³⁰ Howell, op. cit., XI, 621–624.

³¹ Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CXIX, 90.Google Scholar

³² Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CXIX, 92–103.Google Scholar

³³ Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CCVI, 1833Google Scholar; cf. Vol. CXIX, 105.

³⁴ London Times, weekly edition, January 26, 1912, page 71.

³⁵ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth series, Vol. XXIV, 540.

The house of lords is on record as refusing to demand full reports of foreign affairs. A motion of the Marquess of Normanby to this effect was made on April 23, 1860, and was negatived. The motion read:

“That while this house fully recognizes the necessity of a private correspondence between the secretary of state and her majesty's representatives abroad, it is of opinion that all facts of international importance ought to be made matter of official correspondence, and as such to remain on record for the use not only of the government of the day but of their successors in office, to be produced to or withheld from parliament by the ministers of the crown on their own responsibility:

“That the absence of any such record, more especially if such private correspondence is referred to in public dispatches, is injurious to the public service, unjust alike to the foreign minister who made the communication and to official colleagues at home, and calculated to withhold important matter from the full and free control of parliament.” (Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CLVII, 2112Google Scholar; vote, ibid., 2140.)

³⁶ Spalding, Thomas Alfred, Federation and Empire, 79. (London: H. Henry and Company, 1896.)Google Scholar

³⁷ Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series Vol. CCCIII, 1386–1421.Google Scholar The motion was lost 108 to 104.

³⁸ Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CCCIII, 1404.Google Scholar

³⁹ 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2, 1701.

⁴⁰ Howell, T. B., A Complete Collection of State Trials, VI, 397.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CLXXXVII, 1916.Google Scholar

⁴² The question of foreign office alteration of the territory of the British Isles proper has never arisen.

⁴³ British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas, 2–4.

⁴⁴ Sir Henry, who as Parliamentary counsel from 1869 to 1899 was the official draftsman of legislation, here cites the debates on the cession of Heligoland and the Anglo-German Agreement Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict., c. 20) as a precedent.

⁴⁵ See Jenkyns' note for citations of acts respecting New South Wales, Victoria and Canada.

⁴⁶ Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CCCIII, 1402.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Hansard's, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Vol. CCCIII, 1406.Google Scholar The debate in the House of Commons occurred February 26–March 3, 1857 (op. cit., Vol. CXLIV, 1391–1485, 1495–1585, 1589–1694 and 1726–1850) and resulted in a vote of 263 ayes and 247 noes on this motion:

“That this House has heard with concern of the conflicts which have occurred between the British and Chinese authorities in the Canton river; and, without expressing an opinion as to the extent to which the Government of China may have afforded this country cause of complaint respecting the nonfulfilment of the treaty of 1842, this House considers that the papers which have been laid upon the table fail to establish satisfactory grounds for the violent measures resorted to at Canton in the late affair of the Arrow.”

The debate in the Lords occurred February 24–26, 1857 (op. cit., 1155–1245 and 1310–1388) and resulted in a negative vote.

⁴⁸ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. LXV. The discussion on August 3 is in columns 1827–1853; on August 4, 1925–7; on August 5, 1963–4.

⁴⁹ Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. L, 1317; cf. Mr. Gladstone's statement in 1886, above. The premier's words above, it will be noted, do not refer to “understandings.”

⁵⁰ Studies in History and Jurisprudence, 553.

⁵¹ Wharton, Francis, Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, 61.Google Scholar

⁵² Similar organization has frequently appeared when a nascent state has developed only its sovereign assembly.

⁵³ See additional instructions to Benjamin Franklin, Silas Dean e and Arthur Lee, commissioners from the United States of America to the king of France. Wharton, op. cit., II, 172.

⁵⁴ On the whole subject of government of foreign affairs by committees of congress see Wharton, op. cit., Introduction, sees. 15, 103, 104, 180, 209.

⁵⁵ Wharton, op. cit., I, 251.

⁵⁶ Wharton, op. cit., I, 662–3.

⁵⁷ Farrand, , Records of the Federal Convention, III, 599.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Farrand, op. cit., III, 622.

⁵⁹ Farrand, op. cit., I, 292.

⁶⁰ The law shows internal evidence of being largely based on a persistent project in the constitutional convention to provide for a cabinet in the fundamental document. The project as given in the journal of August 20, 1787, reads:

“To assist the President in conducting the Public affairs there shall be a Council of State composed of the following Officers:

“4. The Secretary of foreign affairs who shall be appointed by the President during pleasure. It shall be his duty to correspond with all foreign ministers, prepare plans of Treaties, and consider such as may be transmitted from abroad—and generally to attend to the Interests of the United States, in their connections with foreign Powers.” (Farrand, op. cit., II, 335–6.)

⁶¹ The attitude of the constitutional convention toward the executive is illustrated by the definition of Mr. Wilson (Farrand, op. cit., I, 70): “An executive ought to possess the powers of secrecy, vigor and dispatch—and to be so constituted as to be responsible.”

⁶² True only if the executive and legislative departments do not themselves agree to preserve secrecy.