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Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2006

MATIAS IARYCZOWER ,
PABLO T. SPILLER  and
MARIANO TOMMASI
MATIAS IARYCZOWER
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
PABLO T. SPILLER
Affiliation:
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley and NBER
MARIANO TOMMASI
Affiliation:
Universidad de San Andrés and CEDI
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Abstract

This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 100 , Issue 1 , February 2006 , pp. 85 - 97
Copyright
© 2006 by the American Political Science Association

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