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Influences on Executive and Congressional Budgetary Priorities, 1955–1981

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Mark S. Kamlet  and
David C. Mowery
Mark S. Kamlet
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
David C. Mowery
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
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Abstract

A reduced form equation system is used to analyze the influence of economic, political, and institutional influences on the budgetary priorities of the executive branch and Congress during fiscal 1955–81. Three related issues are considered: the extent to which political and macroeconomic factors affect priorities; the degree of interdependence among the components of the federal budget and between spending and revenues; and differences between the executive branch and Congress with respect to these issues. Both types of interdependence are present within both executive branch and congressional budgeting, although this interdependence is stronger within the executive branch. The influence of economic conditions on budgetary outcomes is strong but varies considerably across spending categories. There is no evidence of apolitical business cycle. Political variables exert a modest influence on the budgetary outcomes examined; differences between Democratic and Republican budgetary policies, as well as differences in the budgetary priorities of different presidential administrations, are small by comparison with the differences between executive and congressional policies.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 81 , Issue 1 , March 1987 , pp. 155 - 178
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1987

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