Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T05:36:16.024Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Inefficient Redistribution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2002

Daron Acemoglu  and
James A. Robinson
Daron Acemoglu
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
James A. Robinson
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

There are many well-developed theories that explain why governments redistribute income, but very few can explain why this often is done in a socially inefficient form. In the theory we develop, compared to efficient methods, inefficient redistribution makes it more attractive to stay in or enter a group that receives subsidies. When political institutions cannot credibly commit to future policy, and when the political influence of a group depends on its size, inefficient redistribution is a tool to sustain political power. Our model may account for the choice of inefficient redistributive policies in agriculture, trade, and the labor market. It also implies that when factors of production are less specific to a sector, inefficient redistribution may be more prevalent.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 95 , Issue 3 , September 2001 , pp. 649 - 661
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2001

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Acemoglu, Daron, and Jorn-Steffan Pischke. 1999. “The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training.” Journal of Political Economy 107 (June): 539–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alesina, Alberto, and Spear, Stephen. 1988. “An Overlapping Generations Model of Electoral Competition.” Journal of Public Economics 37 (December): 359–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alt, James E., Frieden, Jeffry, Gilligan, Michael J., Rodrik, Dani, and Rogowski, Ronald. 1996. “The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry.” Comparative Political Studies 29 (December): 689–717.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arnold, Douglas R. 1990. The Logic of Congressional Action. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1991. “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters.” Economics and Politics 3 (March): 73–92.Google Scholar
Austen-Smith, David. 1995. “Campaign Contributions and Access.” American Political Science Review 89 (September): 566–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Averyt, William F. 1977. Agropolitics in the European Community: Interest Groups and the Common Agricultural Policy. New York: Praeger.Google Scholar
Baldwin, Richard E. 1985. The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Baldwin, Richard E. 1989. “The Political Economy of Trade Policy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (Autumn): 119–35.Google Scholar
Bates, Robert H. 1981. Markets and States in Tropical Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Bates, Robert H. 1997. Open Economy Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Becker, Gary S. 1983. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (August): 371–400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Becker, Gary S. 1985. “Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs.” Journal of Public Economics 28 (December): 329–47.Google Scholar
Becker, Gary S. 1986. “The Public Interest Hypothesis Revisited: A New Test of Peltzman's Theory of Regulation.” Public Choice 49 (3): 223–34.Google Scholar
Becker, Gary S., and Mulligan, Casey B.. 1998. “Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government.” NBER Working Paper No. 6789.Google Scholar
Brainard, S. Lael, and Verdier, Thierry. 1994. “Lobbying and Adjustment in Declining Industries.” European Economic Review 38 (April): 586–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, James M., and Tullock, Gordon. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Cameron, David R. 1988. “Distributional Coalitions and Other Sources of Economic Stagnation: On Olson's Rise and Decline of Nations.” International Organization 42 (Autumn): 561–603.Google Scholar
Caves, Richard E. 1976. “Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff Structure.” Canadian Journal of Economics 9 (May): 278–300.Google Scholar
Christenson, Reo M. 1959. The Brannan Plan: Farm Politics and Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coate, Stephen T., and Morris, Stephen E.. 1995. “On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests.” Journal of Political Economy 103 (December): 1210–35.Google Scholar
Coate, Stephen T., and Morris, Stephen E.. 1999. “Policy Persistence.” American Economic Review 89 (December): 1327–36.Google Scholar
Coleman, William D., Atkinson, Michael M., and Montpetit, Eric. 1997. “Against the Odds: Retrenchment in Agriculture in France and the US.” World Politics 49 (July): 453–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cukierman, Alex. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Osha G. 1993. Under Fire: The NRA and the Battle for Gun Control. New York: Henry Holt.Google Scholar
Dixit, Avinash K., Grossman, Gene E., and Helpman, Elhanan L.. 1997. “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making.” Journal of Political Economy 105 (August): 752–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dixit, Avinash K., and Londregan, John B.. 1995. “Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency.” American Political Science Review 89 (December): 856–66.Google Scholar
Dixit, Avinash K., and Londregan, John B.. 1996. “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics.” Journal of Politics 58 (November): 1132–55.Google Scholar
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1985. Politics against Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Franklin, S. H. 1969. The European Peasantry: The Final Phase. London: Methven.Google Scholar
Gardner, Bruce L. 1987. “Causes of U.S. Farm Commodity Programs.” Journal of Political Economy 95 (April): 290–310.Google Scholar
Golden, Miriam. 1997. Heroic Defeats: The Politics of Job Loss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Green, Jerry R., Andreu Mas-Colol, and Whinston, Michael D.. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gisser, Micha. 1993. “Price Support, Acreage Controls, and Efficient Redistribution.” Journal of Political Economy 101 (August): 584– 611.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grossman, Gene E., and Helpman, Elhanan L.. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review 84 (September): 833–50.Google Scholar
Hansen, J. Mark. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–1981. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Harper, Richard K., and Aldrich, John. 1991. “The Political Economy of Sugar Legislation.” Public Choice 70 (3): 299–314.Google Scholar
Jones, Bryan D., True, James L., and Baumgartner, Frank R.. 1997. “Does Incrementalism Stem from Political Consensus or from Institutional Gridlock?” American Journal of Political Science 41 (October): 1319–39.Google Scholar
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1951. “Group Behavior and International Trade.” Journal of Political Economy 59 (February): 30–46.Google Scholar
Kristov, Lorenzo, Lindert, Peter H., and McClelland, Robert. 1992. “Pressure Groups and Redistribution.” Journal of Public Economics 48 (July): 135–63.Google Scholar
Lazear, Edward P. 1990. “Job Security Provisions and Employment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (August): 699–726.Google Scholar
Lindbeck, Assar, and Snower, Dennis J.. 1989. The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and Unemployment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Lindbeck, Assar, and Weibull, Jurgen. 1987. “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition.” Public Choice 52 (3): 273–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lohmann, Susanne. 1995. “Information, Access and Contributions: A Signalling Model of Lobbying.” Public Choice 85 (3/4): 267–84.Google Scholar
Lohmann, Susanne. 1998. “An Informational Rationale for the Power of Special Interests.” American Political Science Review 92 (December): 809–28.Google Scholar
Lowi, Theodore. 1969. The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority. New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
Marshall, William J., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (February): 132–63.Google Scholar
Martin, Lisa L. 2000. Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Moe, Terry. 1980. The Organization of Interests. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Moyer, H. Wayne, and Josling, Timothy E.. 1990. Agricultural Policy Reform: Politics and Process in the EC and the USA. Ames: Iowa State University Press.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur C. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Pontusson, Jonas. 1992. “Introduction” to Miriam Golden and Jonas Pontusson, eds. Bargaining for Change: Union Politics in North America and Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Ray, Edward J. 1981. “The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States.” Journal of Political Economy 89 (February): 105–21.Google Scholar
Ray, Edward J. 1991. “Protection of Manufactures in the United States.” In Global Protectionism: Is the U.S. Playing on a Level Field? ed. David Greenaway. London: MacMillan. Pp. 61–85.Google Scholar
Robinson, James A. N.d. “Incomplete Contracting, Capital Accumulation and Labor Market Institutions.” Economic Journal. ForthcomingGoogle Scholar
Rodrik, Dani. 1986. “Tariffs, Subsidies and Welfare with Endogenous Policy.” Journal of International Economics 21 (November): 285–99.Google Scholar
Rodrik, Dani. 1996. “What Does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us that We Ought to Know?” In Handbook of International Economics. vol. III, ed. Grossman, Gene M. and Rogoff, Kenneth. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Pp. 203–43.Google Scholar
Rothstein, Bo. 1985. “The Success of Swedish Labour Market Policy: The Organizational Connection to Policy.” European Journal of Political Research 13 (June): 153–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rothstein, Bo. 1992. “Labor-Market Institutions and Working-Class Strength.” In Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. ed. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 33–56.Google Scholar
Saint-Paul, Gilles. 1992. “The Political Economy of Labor Market Flexibility.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual. ed. Stanley Fischer. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pp. 70–112.Google Scholar
Saint-Paul, Gilles. 1996. “Exploring the Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions.” Economic Policy 23 (October): 265–315.Google Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibria in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Political Science Review 23 (March): 27–59.Google Scholar
Slichter, Sumner H. 1941. Union Policies and Industrial Management. Washington, DC: Brookings.Google Scholar
Sloof, Randolph. 1998. Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic.Google Scholar
Staiger, Robert W., and Tabellini, Guido. 1987. “Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection.” American Economic Review 77 (June): 340–8.Google Scholar
Tosini, Suzanne, and Tower, Edward. 1987. “The Textile Bill of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns.” Public Choice 54 (1): 19–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tracy, Michael. 1989. Government and Agriculture in Western Europe, 1880–1988. New York: New York University Press.Google Scholar
Tullock, Gordon. 1983. The Economics of Income Redistribution. Boston, MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff.Google Scholar
Weingast, Barry R. 1998. “Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment and American Democracy.” In Analytic Narratives. ed. Robert H. Bates, Avner Grief, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pp. 148–93.Google Scholar
Wittman, Donald. 1989. “Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results.” Journal of Political Economy 97 (December): 1395–426.Google Scholar
Wittman, Donald. 1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Wilson, John D. 1990. “Are Efficiency Improvements in Government Transfer Policies Self-Defeating in Political Equilibrium.” Economics and Politics 2 (November): 241–58.Google Scholar
Wright, Brian D. 1995. “Goals and Realities for Farm Policy.” In Agricultural Policy Reform in the United States. ed. D.A.Sumner, Washington, DC: AEI Press. Pp. 3–25.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.