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The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

William K. Domke ,
Richard C. Eichenberg  and
Catherine M. Kelleher
William K. Domke
Affiliation:
University of California, Davis
Richard C. Eichenberg
Affiliation:
Florida Slate University
Catherine M. Kelleher
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
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Abstract

Research on the tendency of governments to trade off welfare spending for defense has generated diverse and often contradictory findings. This study attempts to clarify the issue of trade-offs by examining expenditure patterns since 1948 for the four major NA TO allies: United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and France. When viewed from the perspective of long-term trends in shares of outlays, trade-offs are evident. When short-term changes in expenditure, which are more germane to the potential for one spending category to benefit at the expense of the other are studied, no pattern of trade-off can be detected. A three-equation model is estimated to control for the variety of possible determining factors of public resource allocation. In none of the four nations does a pattern of trade-off emerge, except in periods of wartime or postwar reconstruction. These findings are consistent with the ability of governments to finance new spending through either increased taxes or larger budget deficits. The growing disinclination to use these methods, however, suggests that the potential for trade-offs has perhaps reappeared in the 1980s.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 77 , Issue 1 , March 1983 , pp. 19 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1983

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