¹ On social systems, see: Homans, George, The Human Group (New York, 1950)Google Scholar; Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 1957)Google Scholar; Parsons, Talcott and Shils, Edward, Toward A General Theory of Action (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 190–234CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Most helpful with reference to the political system has been Easton, David, “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,” World Politics (04, 1957), pp. 383–400Google Scholar.

² On the idea of subgroups as used here, see Johnson, Harry M., Sociology (New York, 1960), ch. 3Google Scholar. On role, see specifically Newcomb, Theodore M., Social Psychology (New York, 1951), p. 280Google Scholar; see generally Gross, N., Mason, W. and McEachern, A., Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role (New York, 1958)Google Scholar. On differentiation and its relation to integration, see Greer, Scott, Social Organization (New York, 1955)Google Scholar.

³ The usage here follows most closely that of Robert Merton, op. cit., pp. 26–29.

⁴ This and all other generalizations about member attitudes and perceptions depend heavily on extensive interviews with Committee members. Semi-structured interviews, averaging 45 minutes in length were held with 45 of the 50 Committee members during the 86th Congress. Certain key questions, all open-ended, were asked of all respondents. The schedule was kept very flexible, however, in order to permit particular topics to be explored with those individuals best equipped to discuss them. In a few cases, where respondents encouraged it, notes taken during the interviews. In most cases notes were not taken, but were transcribed immediately after the interview. Where unattributed quotations occur in the text, therefore, they are as nearly verbatim as the author's power of immediate recall could make them. These techniques were all used so at to improve rapport between interviewer and respondent.

⁵ “History of the Committee on Appropriations,” House Doc. 299, 77th Cong., 1st sess.. 1941–1942, p. 11Google Scholar.

⁶ The bureaus being studied are all concerned with domestic policy and are situated in the Agriculture, Interior, Labor, Commerce, Treasury, Justice and Health, Education and Welfare Departments. For a similar pattern of Committee decisions in foreign affairs, see Carroll, Holbert, The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs (Pittsburgh, 1958), ch. 9Google Scholar.

^6a See, for example, Foss, Philip A., “The Grazing Fee Dilemma,” Inter-University Case Program, No. 57 (University, Alabama, 1960)Google Scholar.

⁷ Masters, Nicholas A., “House Committee Assignments,” this Review, Vol. 55 (06, 1961), pp. 345–357Google Scholar.

⁸ In the period from 1947 through 1959, (80th to 86th Congress) 79 separate appointments were made to the Appropriations Committee, with 14 going to freshmen. The Committee filled, in other words, 17.7 per cent of its vacancies with freshmen. The Rules Committee had 26 vacancies and selected no freshmen at all. The Ways and Means Committee had 36 vacancies and selected 2 freshmen (5.6 per cent). All other Committees had a higher percentage of freshmen appointments. Armed Services ranked fourth, with 45 vacancies and 12 freshmen appointed, for a percentage of 26.7. Foreign affairs figures were 46 and 14, or 30.4 per cent; UnAmerican Activities figures were 22 and 7, or 31.8 per cent. cf. Masters, op. cit.

⁹ In the 1960 elections, 41 out of the current 50 members received more than 55.1 per cent of the vote in their districts. By a common definition, that is, only 9 of the 50 came from marginal districts.

¹⁰ The 106 members came to Appropriations from every committee except Ways and Means.

¹¹ One was personally requested by the Speaker to move to Ways and Means. The other was chosen by a caucus of regional Congressmen to be his party's representative on the Rules Committee. Of the 21 members who were forced off the Committee for lack of seniority during a change in party control, or who were defeated for reelection and later returned, 20 sought to regain Committee membership at the earliest opportunity.

^11a A sidelight on this attitude is displayed in a current feud between the House and Senate Appropriations Committees over the meeting place for their conference committees. The House Committee is trying to break the century-old custom that conferences to resolve differences on money bills are always held on the Senate side of the Capitol. House Committee members “complain that they often have to trudge back to the House two or three times to answer roll calls during a conference. They say they go over in a body to work, while Senators flit in and out …. The House Appropriations Committee feels that it does all the hard work listening to witnesses for months on each bill, only to have the Senate Committee sit as a court of appeals and, with little more than a cursory glance, restore most of the funds cut.” Washington Post, 04 24, 1962, p. 1Google Scholar.

¹² This proposition is spelled out at some length in Thibaut, J. and Kelley, H., The Social Psychology of Groups (New York, 1959), p. 247Google Scholar, and in Cartwright, D. and Zander, A., Group Dynamics: Research and Theory (Evanston, 1953), p. 420Google Scholar.

¹³ This figure is 9 per cent greater than the next most stable House Committee during this particular period. The top four, in order, were Appropriations (35.7%), Agriculture (26.7%), Armed Services (25%), Foreign Affairs (20.8%).

¹⁴ The Committee's permanent and well integrated professional staff (as distinguished from its temporary investigating staff) might be considered as part of the subsystem though it will not be treated in this paper.

¹⁵ “Newcomers” are defined as men who have served no more than two terms on the Committee. “Men of moderate experience” are those with 3–5 terms of service. “Veterans” are those who have 6 or more terms of Committee service.

¹⁶ A statement of expected behavior was taken to be a Committee norm when it was expressed by a substantial number of respondents (a dozen or so) who represented both parties, and varying degrees of experience. In nearly every case, moreover, no refutation of them was encountered, and ample confirmation of their existence can be found in the public record. Their articulation came most frequently from the veterans of the group.

¹⁷ See, for example, the internal conflict on the subcommittee dealing with the Labor Department. 93 Cong. Record, pp. 2465–2562 passim; Cong. Record, pp. 7605–7607.

¹⁸ See, for example, the unusual minority report of Committee Republicans on the foreign aid appropriations bill in 1960. Their protest against Committee cuts in the budget estimates was the result of strenuous urging by the Eisenhower Administration. House Report No. 1798, Mutual Security and Related Agency Appropriation Bill, 1961, 86 Cong. 2d sess. 1960.

¹⁹ Truman, David, The Congressional Party (New York, 1959)Google Scholar; Turner, Julius, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, 1951)Google Scholar.

²⁰ The ideas of “reciprocity” and “complementarity,” which are used interchangeably here, are discussed in Gouldner, Alvin, “The Norm of Reciprocity,” American Sociological Review (04, 1960)Google Scholar. Most helpful in explaining the idea of a role system has been the work of J. Wahlke, H. Eulau, W. Buchanan, L. Ferguson. See their study, The Legislative System (New York, 1962), esp. IntroGoogle Scholar.

²¹ For example, the Committee on Education and Labor, see footnote 26.

²² See the exchange in 101 Cong. Rec. pp. 3832, 3844, 3874.

²³ 99 Cong. Rec., p. 4933.

²⁴ Cf. Marvick, Dwaine, “Congressional Appropriations Politics,” unpublished manuscript (Columbia, 1952)Google Scholar.

²⁵ See Nelson, Dalmas, “The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950,” Journal of Politics (05, 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ This view has been confirmed by the results of interviews conducted by the author with members of the House Committee on Education and Labor, together with an examination of that Committee's activity in one policy area. They indicate very significant contrasts between the internal structure of that Committee and the Appropriations Committee—contrasts which center around their comparative success in meeting the problem of integration. The House Committee on Education and Labor appears to be a poorly integrated committee. Its internal structure is characterized by a great deal of subgroup conflict, relatively little role reciprocity, and minimally effective internal control mechanisms. External concerns, like those of party, constituency and clientele groups, are probably more effective in determining its decisions than is likely to be the case in a well-integrated committee. An analysis of the internal life of the Committee on Education and Labor, drawn partly from interviews with 19 members of that group, will appear in a forthcoming study, Federal Aid to Education and National Politics, by Professor Frank Munger and the author, to be published by Syracuse University Press. See also Nicholas R. Masters, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 354–555, and Scher, Seymour, “Congressional Committee Members as Independent Agency Overseers: A Case Study,” this Review, Vol. 54 (12 1960), pp. 911–920Google Scholar.