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Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2006

BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA
Affiliation:
New York University and Hoover Institution, Stanford University
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Abstract

James Russell and Quincy Wright suggested in the Review in 1933 that the danger of conflict could be diminished by looking within states to discern what contributes to the risk of war. Revolutions in game theory technology and political economy modeling are helping to advance those goals. The combination of non-cooperative game theory as an analytic tool and the assumptions of political economy models about leaders' domestic interests and incentives offer a different explanation of international relations from that suggested by realist theories and other state-centric viewpoints. Together with more macro-level theorizing we gain insights into what makes some polities more prone to international conflict than others. By adding the micro-level, game theoretic investigation of domestic factors to the analytic repertoire we have now supplemented the aspects of received wisdom that are consistent with the record of history with explanations for puzzling facts about conflict that no longer seem anomalous.

Type
“THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE” ESSAYS
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 100 , Issue 4 , November 2006 , pp. 637 - 642
Copyright
© 2006 by the American Political Science Association

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