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Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1985

Arthur Denzau ,
William Riker  and
Kenneth Shepsle
Arthur Denzau
Affiliation:
Washington University
William Riker
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
Kenneth Shepsle
Affiliation:
Washington University
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Abstract

This article is aimed at integrating two kinds of analysis of legislators' calculations of advantage. We assume that legislators operate in two arenas, in the legislative arena itself, where their calculations of advantage concern simply their effectiveness in voting (Farquharson), and in the electoral arena, where their calculations concern the rewards for their position-taking as well as their effectiveness (Fenno). Our analysis is introduced by an interpretation of voting on the Powell amendment, 1956, when some legislators apparently voted strategically and others, equally able to do so, still did not. We then develop an expected utility model of voting that accounts for such divergent choices in terms of legislators' individual beliefs about the distribution of opinions in the legislature (Farquharson) and in their constituencies (Fenno). We conclude with an analysis of the Nash equilibria of choices to vote strategically or nonstrategically.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 79 , Issue 4 , December 1985 , pp. 1117 - 1134
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1985

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