Hostname: page-component-5c6d5d7d68-ckgrl Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-08-24T06:11:12.836Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Executive Council, with Special Reference to Massachusetts1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

A. N. Holcombe
Affiliation:
Harvard University

Extract

The Massachusetts constitution of 1780 provided that there should be a council “for advising the governor in the executive part of the government.” The governor was authorized to convene the council at any time at his discretion “for the ordering and directing the affairs of the commonwealth.” Without the advice and consent of the council, the governor was declared to be incapable of exercising any of his powers of convoking, adjourning, or proroguing the legislature, of making appointments to office, of pardoning criminals, or of authorizing by warrant the expenditure of public moneys. The governor was not made dependent upon the advice and consent of his council in exercise of his legislative powers. He might at discretion recommend measures to the legislature and veto legislative enactments, but no executive authority whatsoever was entrusted to him alone, to be exercised without his council's advice and consent, except the command of the armed forces of the commonwealth. In short, the governor, though declared to be the supreme executive magistrate of the commonwealth, without the consent of his council was impotent in the conduct of state administration.

In the beginning the Massachusetts council was chosen by the legislature, and constituted one of the chief agencies relied upon by the revolutionary “fathers” to protect the people against the menace of executive usurpation and tyranny. Similar bulwarks of liberty were established in most of the other states.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1915

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 A paper read at the eleventh annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.