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Erratum to “Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods” American Political Science Review 101(1): 79–92.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2008

CRAIG VOLDEN  and
ALAN E. WISEMAN
CRAIG VOLDEN
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University
ALAN E. WISEMAN
Affiliation:
The Ohio State University
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Extract

The symmetric, stationary subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in Volden and Wiseman (2007) is characterized by cutpoints between regions of purely collective, mixed, and purely particularistic budget allocations. The cutpoints in our published article were derived by finding conditions under which the proposer receives a higher utility in one region than in another. However, a stationary equilibrium requires that the proposer would not unilaterally offer a different type of proposal, given that all other players continue to play their present strategies.

Type
Correction
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 102 , Issue 3 , August 2008 , pp. 385 - 386
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2008

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References

1 The authors thank Ken Shotts for alerting us to this error in our original manuscript.

2 This mixed strategy equilibrium exists for all , and thus also holds in region IId, along with the pure strategy equilibrium identified in the published article.

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