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A Critique of “Democratic Administration” and Its Supporting Ideation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Robert T. Golembiewski
Robert T. Golembiewski*
Affiliation:
University of Georgia
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Abstract

This paper analyzes Vincent Ostrom's major work, The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration, which he offers as providing paradigmatic direction for public administration and political science. The analysis urges caution as to that theory's status, especially from five analytic perspectives. Basically, attention is directed at the methodology or mode of inquiry associated with Ostrom's grounding of his argument in public choice theory, with special attention to the role of values. The adequacy of major assumptions of Ostrom's argument as descriptions of reality also is evaluated. Moreover, the critical lack of content in several key concepts is established. In addition, the analysis shows how opposite and simultaneous courses of action are implied by the argument. Finally, attention is directed at how Ostrom's argument can lead to unexpected consequences, even some that are opposite those effects Ostrom intends.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 71 , Issue 4 , December 1977 , pp. 1488 - 1507
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1977

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Footnotes

*

This paper is one reflection of a substantial history of exchanges of ideas and papers that the author has had with a colleague, Dr. Keith Baker. Other reflections appear in Baker's works: “Public Choice Theory: Some Important Assumptions and Public Policy Implications,” in Public Administration, ed. Robert T. Golembiewski, Frank Gibson, and Geoffrey Y. Cornog, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), pp. 42–60; and “The Search for a New Paradigm in Public Administration,” paper delivered at the Annual Meeting, Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, La., November 1974. The author warmly acknowledges that interchange.

References

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2 Ibid., esp. pp. 28–29.

3 Ibid., esp. pp. 111–12.

4. For exceptions to the lack of critical attention, system of thought see De Gregori, Thomas R., “Caveat Emptor: A Critique of the Emerging Paradigm of Public Choice,” Administration and Society, 6 (08 1974), 205–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Baker, Keith, “Public Choice Theory: Some Important Assumptions and Public Policy Implications,” in Public Administration, ed. Warren, Robert T., Golembiewski, , Gibson, Frank, and Cornog, Geoffrey Y., 3rd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976), esp. pp. 42–60 Google Scholar.

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7 Ostrom, esp. pp. 50–51.

8 Buchanan and Tullock, p. vii.

9 Ibid., p. 3.

10 De Gregori, p. 208.

11 Niskanen, William A. Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), esp. p. 218 Google Scholar.

12 Ostrom, p. 52.

13 Long, Norton, Journal of Politics, 36 (08 1974), 804 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Shepsle, Kenneth A., “Theories of Collective Choice,” in Political Science Annual, Vol. 5, ed. Cotter, Cornelius P. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 4 Google Scholar.

15 For example, Niskanen, esp. p. 8.

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18 Ibid., p. 79n.

19 Ibid., p. 79n.

20 Ibid., p. 80n.

21 Illustratively, the Kaldor-Hicks and Little criteria have been developed to loosen the conceptual limits of the Pareto criterion. See Hicks, J. R., “The Rehabilitation of Consumer's Surplus,” Review of Economic Studies, 8 (1940–1941), 108–16CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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25 Ibid., p. 52.

26 Weinstein, Arnold A., “Individual Preference Intransitivity,” Southern Economic Journal, 34 (01 1968), 335 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

For an example of the empirical literature consult Tversky, Amos, “Intransitivity of Preferences,” Psychological Review, 76, No. 1 (1969), 31–48 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Tversky begins to specify the empirical conditions under which consistent and predictable intransitivities occur. Those conditions seem to be quite prevalent, which provides but little support for the ideation and argument underlying democratic administration.

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30 Shepsle, esp. pp. 31–42, provides ample doeumentation of this summary statement.

31 Buchanan and Tullock, p. 9.

32 This was the case, for example, in the famous 1930 studies of group atmospheres or climates. See especially Lippitt, Ronald, “Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology: Autocratic and Democratic Group Atmospheres,” American Journal of Sociology, 45 (07 1939), 26–49 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Janis, Irving, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972)Google Scholar, deals with a number of major political and military decisions which fit this characterization.

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35 De Gregori, p. 210.

36 Ibid., p. 209.

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43 Ostrom, p. 62.

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49 Ostrom, esp. pp. 49–50.

50 Merewitz and Sosnick, p. 63; emphasis added.

51 Coker, Francis W., “Dogmas of Administrative Reform,” American Political Science Review, 16 (08 1922), 399–411 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hyneman, Charles S., “Administrative Reorganization: An Adventure into Science and Theology,” Journal of Politics, 1 (02 1939), 62–74 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Latham, Earl H., “Hierarchy and Hieratics,” Employment Forum, 2 (04 1947), 1–6 Google Scholar; and Simon, Herbert A., “Proverbs of Administration,” Public Administration Review, 6 (Winter 1946), 53–67 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 Golembiewski, Robert T., Men, Management, and Morality (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965)Google Scholar; Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1962)Google Scholar; and Corey, E. Raymond and Starr, Steven H., Organization Strategy: A Marketing Approach (Boston, Mass.: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1971)Google Scholar.

53 Baker, pp. 51–52.

54 Ostrom, p. 112.

55 Friedrich, Carl J., Man and His Government (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 667 Google Scholar.

56 Ostrom, esp. pp. 75–81.

57 Hart, David K., “Theories of Government Related to Decentralization and Citizen Participation,” Public Administration Review, 32 (10 1972), 606 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 Fesler, James W., “Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization,” Journal of Politics, 27 (08 1965), 549 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a balanced view deriving from extensive empirical research by one of Fesler's students, see Yates, Douglas, Neighborhood Democracy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973)Google Scholar.

59 Ibid., p. 549.

60 Kaufman, Herbert, The Limits of Organizational Change (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1971), pp. 101 ffGoogle Scholar.

61 Fesier, esp. pp. 539–46.

62 Graham, George, Morality in American Politics (New York: Random House, 1952), esp. pp. 42–53 Google Scholar.

63 Tannenbaum, Arnold S. et al., Hierarchy in Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974)Google Scholar.

64 Ostrom, p. 118; emphasis in original.

65 For example, Pachon, Harry P. and Lovrich, Nicholas P., “The Consolidation of Urban Public Services,” Public Administration Review, 37 (01 1977), 38–47 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, provide evidence which contradicts Ostrom's position with respect to large vs. small police systems. Such studies reinforce the notion that any relevant comparisons between large vs. small public agencies are likely to be very complicated, contingent on intervening variables, and so on. This certainly has been the case with industrial and commercial organizations. For example, substantial evidence implies that total organization size is likely to be less salient than the size of component “managerial units,” a managerial unit being defined as that portion of an agency monitored by some authoritative agent who can make reasonable decisions about some total “flow of work.” For the conceptual argument and a review of substantial evidence, see Golembiewski, , Men, Management, and Morality, pp. 113–15, 133–38, 144–47, 234–43, 268–71, and 279–83Google Scholar.

Size of managerial unit is not dependent on size of organization, but will vary with the degree of decentralized delegation in an organization. A decentralized organization, however, could be huge in total size.

66 Bish and Ostrom, p. 38. See also pp. 36–37.

67 Reidel, James A., “Citizen Participation: Myths and Reality,” Public Administration Review, 32 (05 1972), 211–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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70 Ibid., pp. 41–46.

71 Ostrom, Elinor et al., Community Organization and the Provision of Police Services (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973)Google Scholar; and Ostrom, Elinor and Whitaker, Gordon, “Black Citizens and the Police” (paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1971)Google Scholar.

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73 Ahlbrandt, Roger S. Jr., Municipal Fire Protection Services (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973)Google Scholar.

74 Bish and Ostrom, p. 47.

75 Ibid., pp. 40–41.

76 Ibid., p. 36.

77 It is also correct that larger urban schools do pose more challenging targets for change, in part because of the organizing concepts prevalent in them, as Ostrom argues. See Schmuck, Richard A. and Miles, Matthew B., eds., Organization Development in Schools (Palo Alto, Calif.: National Press Books, 1971), esp. pp. 236–37Google Scholar.

78 Ostrom, p. 59.

79 Ibid., p. 119; emphasis added.

80 Ibid., p. 121.

81 Ibid., p. 56.

82 Shepsle, p. 30.

83 van Dalen, Hendrik, “Some Theoretical Perspectives on Government's Role in Consumer Protection” (paper prepared for the Southwestern Public Administration Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, 11 12, 1975), p. 12 Google Scholar.

84 Gawthrop, Louis C., The Administration Process and Democratic Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), pp. 439, 439–40Google Scholar.

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86 Baker, p. 59.

87 De Gregori, p. 210.

88 Baker, p. 54.

89 McKean, Roland, “Product Liability,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84 (11 1970), 623 Google Scholar. Most public choice theorists incline to somewhat more government intervention, as in providing information about product safety. See Oi, W. Y., “The Economics of Product Safety,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 5 (Spring 1973), 26 Google Scholar.

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91 Kaufman, Herbert, “Administrative Decentralization and Political Power,” Public Administration Review, 29 (01 1969), 3 and 4 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

92 Waldo, Dwight, ed., Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1971), pp. 259–60Google Scholar.

93 Ostrom, p. 125.

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