¹ Public Law 86-149. 73 Stat. 322. Italics added.

² For fiscal 1962, when it requested $43,794, 345,000 in new obligational authority in the Defense Appropriation Bill, the administration was required under Section 412 to seek new legislative authorization for $11,974,800,000 for major weapons procurement.

³ See the discussion of Snyder, Richard C. and Robinson, James A. in National and International Decision-Making: A Report to the Committee on Research for Peace (New York: Institute for International Order, 1961), pp. 84–85, 145–148Google Scholar.

⁴ Not unusual in this respect is the treatment of Congress vis à vis the military by Janowitz, Morris in The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, 1960), pp. 354–360Google Scholar, which he entitles “Congressional Negativism.”

⁵ Hilsman, Roger, “Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus,” this Review, Vol. 52 (09, 1958), pp. 725ff.Google Scholar; and Huntington, Samuel P., “Strategic Planning and the Political Process,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38 (01, 1960), pp. 285ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^5a Since the completion of this paper, Bernard K. Gordon has published a study of Section 412: “The Military Budget: Congressional Phase,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (11, 1961), pp. 689ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. He ascribes much greater weight to committee rivalries, particularly in the House, as a factor in the origins of Section 412, and is more dubious of its benefits. He observes that Section 412 may have a “salutary effect,” but he concludes that the goal of “effective congressional—and civilian—control of the military establishment” is more likely to be achieved through “a single locus of the appropriations power …” (p. 710).

⁶ Huntington, op. cit., pp. 286–88.

⁷ See Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 407–409Google Scholar.

⁸ For a detailed analysis, see Macmahon, Arthur W., “Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse—I,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 57 (06, 1943), p. 174Google Scholar, Macmahon comments: “The risk of friction is inherent in the existence of two partly parallel sets of committees. Much irregularity attends the fact that the whole distinction rests on provisions in the rules of the chamber, enforced by points of order. Through inattention or comity, points of order that would be sustained are often not made. Sometimes a special rule is adopted at the request of the Committee on Appropriations which gives blanket protection against points of order. Much authorization is implied rather than expressed, furthermore, and in many situations there is a wide range for the judgment of presiding officers in applying the rules when points of order are made.”

With specific reference to this parallel structure in military affairs, see Huzar, Elias, The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress through Appropriations, 1933–1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 40–46Google Scholar.

⁹ 64 Stat. 321. For an analysis of the legislation, and the expressed intent of Congress in the authority voted, see Senate Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing the Composition of the Army … and the Air Force of the United States, S. Rept. 933, 81st Cong. (August 18, 1949)Google Scholar; and House Committee on Armed Services, Personnel and Composition of the Army and Air Force, H. Rept. 64, 81st Cong. (02 10, 1949)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Authorizing the Composition of the Army … and the Air Force …, S. Rept. 933, p. 2. The Act authorized a troop strength of 837,000 for the Army, plus 110,000 inducted trainees in service at any given time; and the Air Force was authorized 502,000 regulars plus 15,000 trainees. Appropriations then being sought by the National Military Establishment were considerably under these levels. “Obviously,” said General Omar Bradley in his testimony, “Congress cannot—and indeed will not—appropriate from year to year sufficient funds for the maintenance of this authorized force.” House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on H. R. 1437 … (81st Cong., 1st sess., Committee Paper No. 12), pp. 105–106Google Scholar.

¹¹ Congressional Record, Vol. 96 (81st Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 10998–11006, and 11083–85Google Scholar. The most recent suspension of the personnel limitations was voted in March, 1959. Ibid., Vol. 105 (86th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 1663–90, 3402–8.

¹² 10 U.S.C. §7341.

¹³ Cong. Rec., Vol. 105 (86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959), p. 13477Google Scholar. A useful history of the Vinson-Trammell Act, and subsequent Navy legislation, related in the context of executive-legislative relations, is in Chamberlin, Lawrence H., The President, Congress and Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), pp. 235 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The first suspension was in an act of July 2, 1940, and it was subsequently extended for the “duration plus six months” under the First War Powers Act. 54 Stat. 712 and 56 Stat. 312.

¹⁵ House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on H.R. 4122, Authorizing Military Construction (80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ President Eisenhower asked repeal of the proviso in his budget message in 1959, and in the fiscal 1961 budget message he stated that “the Attorney General has advised me that this section violates fundamental constitutional principles. Accordingly, if it is not repealed by the Congress at its present session, I shall have no alternative thereafter but to direct the Secretary of Defense to disregard the section unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise.”

As a result of this demand, the proviso was removed and a clause inserted in the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1960, which requires instead that real property transactions be “reported” to the Committees, in most instances thirty days pripr to the completion of the transaction. 74 Stat. 186.

¹⁷ Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, Hearings on S. 1765, Military Public Works Construction (84th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 273ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ A detailed analysis of air defense costs was in Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1959, S. Rept. 1982, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (07 28, 1958)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ House Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill for 1960, H. Rept. 408, 86th Cong., 1st sess. (05 28, 1959), pp. 15–16Google Scholar.

²⁰ Senator Stennis referred to committee concern about the “effectiveness” of Nike and “its range or lack of range,” and to the groat expense incurred on air defense. He concluded: “… I certainly have always steered away from the idea that this subcommittee was a policy making committee on missiles for defense installations except we do approve this when we keep recommending these sites and this money ….” Senator Jackson maintained that for Congress to agree to finance both Nike and Talos was simply to compromise service rivalries. Hearings on S. 3122, Military Public Works Construction (84th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 395–96.

²¹ Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill for 1957 (84th Cong., 2d sess), p. 87.

²² Lt. Gen. Mickelsen, S. R., in House Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1956 (84th Cong., 2d sess.), pt. 1, p. 396Google Scholar.

²³ On the air staff analysis “leak,” see Leviero, Anthony, New York Times, May 21, 1956, p. 1Google Scholar. This was but one of a deluge of leaks from the military departments during that spring and summer.

²⁴ Authorizing Construction for Military Departments, S. Rept. 2364, 84th Cong., 2d sess. (06 26, 1956), pp. 10–11Google Scholar.

²⁵ Cong. Rec., Vol. 102 (84th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 12167–77Google Scholar.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 12959.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 14634, 14884.

²⁸ Ibid., Vol. 104 (85th Cong., 2d sess.), p. 15543.

²⁹ Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1959, S. Rept. 1982, 85th Cong., 2d sess. (07 28, 1958)Google Scholar. See also the military construction subcommittee Hearings on S. 3756, S. 3863, and H.R. 13015, Military Construction Authorization, Fiscal Year 1959.

³⁰ See his article, “Our Guided Missile Crisis,” Look, Vol. 20 (05 15, 1956), pp. 46–52Google Scholar. Gardner had been special assistant for research and development to the Secretary of the Air Force.

³¹ Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1958, H. Rept. 471, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 19–20.

³² Ibid., pp. 7–8. This point came up repeatedly, not only in the reorganization hearings but also in the special investigations launched after Sputnik. See Senate Armed Services Subcommittee, Hearings, Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs (85th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1957–1958)Google Scholar; and House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Investigations of National Defense Missiles … (85th Cong., 2d sess., 1958)Google Scholar.

³³ Hearings, DOD Reorganization Act of 1958, pp. 31–32.

³⁴ Military Construction Authorization …, Fiscal Year 1960, S. Rept. 296, 86th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 15–16.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 13–14. The Nike was defined as a “point” defense weapon.

³⁶ Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1960, p. 33Google Scholar.

³⁷ The memorandum was reported in detail by Watson, Mark S., Baltimore Sun, 05 23, 1959, p. 1Google Scholar.

³⁸ Cong. Rec., Vol. 105 (86th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 8642Google Scholar.

³⁹ A revised bill, drawn on the basis of the “master plan,” was reported to the Senate by the Stennis subcommittee on June 25 (S. Rept. 434, 86th Cong.).

⁴⁰ Army Navy Air Force Journal, 05 23, 1959, pp. 1, 3Google Scholar.

⁴¹ In the 87th Congress, five members of Armed Services are also members of the defense subcommittee of Appropriations, and three members serve ex officio on the Appropriations subcommittee.

⁴² Army Navy Air Force Journal, 05 30, 1959, p. 12Google Scholar.

⁴³ Baldwin, Hanson W., New York Times, 05 28, 1959, p. 13Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ 73 Stat. 322. In addition to the Senate reports already cited, see Vinson, defense and explanation of the amendment to the House, Cong. Rec., Vol. 105 (86th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 13476–77Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Procurement Authorization Fiscal Year 1962 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 26–27Google Scholar. The original Eisenhower request under 412 had been for $10,572,181,000.

⁴⁶ The supplemental procurement bill—S. 2311 —passed the Senate on July 28 and the House on August 2, in both instances without dissent and after perfunctory debate. Cong. Rec. Vol. 107 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), daily ed., pp. 12905–12919, and 13312–13322Google Scholar.

See House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on H.R. 6151, Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels for the Armed Forces (87th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Paper No. 10), p. 1533Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels. H. Rept. 380 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 10.

⁴⁹ Senate, , Procurement Hearings, p. 462Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵¹ See Ibid., pp. 290–291.

⁵² Cong. Rec., Vol. 107 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), daily ed., p. 7412Google Scholar. The Army's drive for Nike-Zeus production was “kicked off” by the February issue of Army magazine, published by the Association for the United States Army. Speeches were made on the floor on behalf of the Zeus by Congressmen Daniel Flood, George P. Miller, and John McCormack; and by Senators Thurmond and Mundt. See ibid., pp. 1580, 1727, 2022, 2439, 3560, 4425.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 8321.

⁵⁴ House Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels, pp. 4, 6Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵⁶ Senate Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels, S. Rept. 253, 87th Cong., 1st sess., p. 4Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ Cong. Rec., Vol. 107 (87th Cong., 1st sess.), daily ed., pp. 9314–9315Google Scholar. The Senate agreed to a House amendment for additional funds for new engines for the C-135 and a compromise was reached on the procurement of guided missile frigates by the Navy.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 14262–14265.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 13624–13633.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 8218.

⁶¹ On the preeminence of the appropriations committees, an interesting comment will be found in Cater, Douglas, “The Lonely Men on Capital Hill,” The Reporter, Vol. 21 (10 15, 1959), pp. 23–26Google Scholar.

⁶² See the remarks of Kissinger, Henry in The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1961), p. 3Google Scholar.