¹ I am already indebted for very helpful critiques to V. O. Key, Jr., Harvey C. Mansfield, Franklin L. Ford, Harry Eckstein, and especially Duncan MacRae, Jr.

² World Politics, Vol. 9 (April 1957)Google Scholar.

³ This does not imply a “progressive” as distinguished from a “conservative” bias, since the goals may include maintenance of the status quo.

⁴ Numbers in parentheses refer to pages in my Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy (New York, 1959)Google Scholar, where the concepts used in this paper were put to work in a less systematic fashion, and which contains many concrete illustrations that could not be included here.

⁵ This distinction is not meant to suggest that issues about fundamentals are more important than those about circumstantials.

⁶ This should not be confused with substantive “boundary maintenance”; a political system may be stable even though its scope and membership fluctuate, that is, expand, contract, and overlap or merge with those of other systems preoccupied with the solution of similar or different problems. See also p. 595 below.

⁷ See my “Responsibility and the Goal of Survival,” Responsibility: Nomos III (New York, 1960), pp. 290–303Google Scholar.

⁸ For an earlier application of the norm of responsibility, see my “Co-Determination in Germany,” this Review, Vol. 48 (December 1954), pp. 1114–1127Google Scholar. “Purpose” has been added as a fourth ingredient since then, for reasons that may be apparent.

⁹ “Decision-making” was deliberately avoided, because the phrase is redundant: a decision is not a decision unless it has been made. By speaking of decision-making we suggest repeated cut-offs between successive but “separated” powers or functions and thereby deny the fluid continuity of the political process.

¹⁰ Almond, Gabriel A., “The Functional Approach to Comparative Politics,” in Almond, and Coleman, James S., eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960), p. 17Google Scholar; Lasswell, Harold D., The Decision Process (University of Maryland, 1956), p. 2Google Scholar.

¹¹ Friedrich, Carl J. and Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 9–10Google Scholar.

¹² For a brief effort in this direction, see my Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara (Englewood Cliffs, 1962)Google Scholar.

¹³ Eckstein, Harry, A Theory of Stable Democracy (Princeton, 1961), p. 7Google Scholar. He calls for formulation of “more discriminating,” “less ambiguous” categories; p. 45.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁵ Wahl, Nicholas, “The French Political System,” in Beer, and Ulam, , eds., Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe (New York, 1958), pp. 216–220Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Eckstein, op. cit., p. 46.

¹⁷ This bias was brought to my attention by Reginald Bartholomew of the University of Chicago. For an illustration, see Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 52, 533, and passim.

¹⁸ Deutsch, Karl W. et al. , Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957)Google Scholar, cited by Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, 1958), p. xvGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

²⁰ Banfield, Edward C., The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Glencoe, 1958)Google Scholar; Wylie, Laurence, Village in the Vaucluse (Cambridge, 1957)Google Scholar.

²¹ Banfield, op. cit., p. 10, note 2.

²² Ibid., p. 163.

²³ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 169.

²⁵ Wylie, op. cit., p. 59.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 182.

²⁷ See my Politics in Africa, p. 155 and passim.

²⁸ How much this approach owes to Aristotle should by now be evident.

²⁹ Banfield, op, cit., p. 173.

³⁰ Wylie, op. cit., p. 210.

³¹ See Politics in Africa, p. 143.