¹ For a useful summary see Deutsch, Karl, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York, 1953)Google Scholar, ch. 1.

² Hans Kohn defines nationalism as “A state of mind permeating the large majority of the people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the source of all creative cultural energy and well-being. The supreme loyalty of man is therefore rooted in and made possible by its welfare.” The Idea of Nationalism (New York, 1944), p. 16 Google Scholar.

³ Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, 1960), p. 62 Google Scholar.

⁴ Marx and Engels wrote little on the national problem. For their views, see Carr, E. H., The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. I (New York, 1951), pp. 410–28Google Scholar and Pipes, Richard, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, 1957)Google Scholar, ch. 1.

⁵ For Communist views on the world state, see Goodman, Elliot, The Soviet Design for a World State (New York, 1960)Google Scholar, ch. 2.

⁶ These developments are analyzed in detail in Barghoorn, Frederick C., Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York, 1956)Google Scholar.

⁷ For a discussion of the future world culture as interpreted by the Communists, see Goodman, ch. 7.

⁸ At the 2d Congress of the Comintern in 1920 Stalin suggested that the future international Communist community be designated a confederation (“an alliance of independent states”) out of consideration for national differences, rather than a federation, which was the appropriate form within the framework of the old Russian Empire. Lenin rejected the proposal, and the future world state was referred to as a federation. See Goodman, pp. 232–33. Earlier, in his work Marxism and the National Question, Stalin had shown a rather conservative view toward socialist internationalism by incorporating elements into his description of the nation which magnified the importance of the nation and were therefore unacceptable to Lenin at the time. See Pipes, p. 39. Stalin also made a connection between national conditions and forms of Communist rule when, in 1928, he suggested that nations in which capitalism had only begun to develop (Poland and Rumania were used as examples) could not adopt Soviet institutions immediately; rather, these were areas where “the victory of the revolution, in order to lead to a proletarian dictatorship, can and will certainly require certain intermediate stages, in the form, say, of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry” Works, Vol. XI (Moscow, 1954), p. 162 Google Scholar. The rationale for a transitional period is here based on socio-economic conditions, and should be distinguished from the reasons behind the proposals for “proletarian united front governments” in the 1930s (infra).

⁹ “If … it will prove possible, and necessary, in the interests of the proletariat, to create a proletarian united front government, which is not yet a government of the proletarian dictatorship, but one which undertakes to put into effect decisive measures against fascism and reaction, the Communist Party must see to it that such a government is formed …” (italics in the original). Resolutions, Seventh Congress of the Communist International (New York, Workers Library), pp. 30–31 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See Friedrich, Carl and Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, 1956)Google Scholar, ch. 6, and Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1958), p. 391 Google Scholar.

¹¹ See the remarks of E. Varga that “the social structure of these states is distinguished from all known to us up to now; it appears as something completely new in the history of humanity.” “Demokratiia novago tipa,” Mirovoe khoziastvo i mirovaia politika, No. 3, 1947, p. 3 Google Scholar. For an exhaustive analysis of the term see Skilling, H. Gordon, “People's Democracy in Soviet Theory,” Soviet Studies, III, pp. 16–33 and 131–49Google Scholar.

¹² The origins of the theory of People's Democracy have been the source of some disagreement. For other views, cf. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, ch. 2, and Ginsburgs, G., Soviet Studies, XIII, p. 451 Google Scholar.

¹³ See Brzezinski, , The Soviet Bloc, pp. 32–36 Google Scholar, for a description of how the Eastern European parties and the Soviet Union adjusted their policies in the light of the strong nationalism of the Eastern European peoples immediately after the war. Brzezinski emphasizes how, in this period, the national parties masked their designs under appeals to national interests. Thus (p. 36), “the founding declaration of the Polish Workers (Communist) Party reads almost like a national harangue.”

¹⁴ See Hazard, John N., “Soviet Socialism as a Public Order System,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1959, pp. 36–37 Google Scholar. Border treaties carefully dealt with questions of land mass, waterways and airspace in a manner designed to protect the sovereign rights of each partner. Consular conventions between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies carefully defined diplomatic privileges and immunities—including the right to the use of cipher in communicating with the home country!

¹⁵ Although the term “economic autarchy” is normally used to describe the economic development of Eastern Europe in this period, the situation was complicated by the fact that each of the Eastern European nations depended heavily on trade, especially with the Soviet Union, to supply it with basic raw materials, and further by the tendency of the major partner to set the terms of this trade to its own advantage. Still, autarchy—in the sense of constructing all the components of heavy industry—was the goal of these countries.

¹⁶ The economic benefits of such a policy for Eastern Europe were argued by Granick, David, “The Pattern of Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe and Its Relations to Economic Development,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 68, pp. 366–400 Google Scholar. Granick suggested that the satellites were following a policy of “balanced national economy,” meaning that “each country should produce sufficient agricultural and industrial products to meet its own consumption needs, that it should provide the means of production necessary to make this possible, and that the remainder of its production should be geared to heavy industry and the construction of machinery with which to further industrialize its economy.” Dealing with this problem at a later date, Granick suggested that the forced pace of economic development led to repeated bottle-necks and uncertainty of supply, compensated by efforts to be self-sufficient. This general pressure toward autarchy can be observed in the Soviet enterprise and can be extended, in principle, to the nations of the Communist bloc. See Pounds, Norman J. G. and Spulber, Nicolar (eds.), Resources and Planning in Eastern Europe, p. 140 Google Scholar. The small size of the Eastern European states may not have been as great a barrier to the policy of economic autarchy as was once thought; a recent discussion of the economic problems posed by the limited size of nations suggests that it is easy to over-estimate the role of economies of scale achieved by large states. See Robinson, Austin (ed.), The Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations (New York, 1960), p. xvii Google Scholar. Only in “small” countries of under 10 to 15 million do economies of scale make it unwise to engage in the construction of certain key industries such as large machine tools or heavy electrical equipment (without access to an adequate foreign market). This very rough criterion suggests that in Eastern Europe, Albania and Bulgaria were too small to engage in an all-out program of heavy industry construction, while Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania and Czechoslovakia were borderline cases.

On the other hand, the policy of economic autarchy produced obvious distortions in the Eastern European economies, and was subject to bitter attack after 1955 by the more liberal Communist elements as economically indefensible. See Nagy, Imre, On Communism (New York, 1957)Google Scholar, ch. 20, and Lange, Oscar, The Political Economy of Socialism (The Hague, 1958)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Granick, in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, rejected the thesis that the pattern of economic development in Eastern Europe was governed by Soviet interests in exploiting the area, suggesting that if this were the case, the Soviet Union would not have encouraged heavy industry, but a type of economy more complementary to her own (consumers goods, for example). For a contrary view—that the Soviets were primarily interested in exploiting the East European economies in the Stalinist period—see Zauberman, Alfred, “Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects,” Problems of Communism, VIII, No. 4, pp. 23–29 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ A term coined by Brzezinski, , The Soviet Bloc, p. 52 Google Scholar, to refer to the adaptation to local circumstances by a national party within the general pattern

¹⁹ See Ulam, Adam B., Titoism and the Cominform (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 174–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ There is evidence that the Yugoslavs associated themselves with the Zhdanov faction within the Soviet leadership, and that the discrediting of this group in the spring of 1948 helped touch off the attack on Yugoslavia. See Conquest, R., Power and Policy in the USSR (New York, 1961), pp. 101–02Google Scholar.

²¹ See Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute (London, 1948)Google ScholarPubMed.

²² Cf. Brzezinski, , “Deviation Control,” this Review, Vol. 56 (March 1962), pp. 5–22 Google Scholar.

²³ See, in particular, Sperans [Edvard Kardelj], Razvoj slovenačkog nacionalnog pitanja (2d ed; Belgrade, 1958)Google Scholar. Kardelj defined the nation as “a specific community of peoples arising on the basis of the social division of labor in the epoch of capitalism in a compact territory and within the framework of a common language and close ethnic and cultural similarity in general” (p. 104). The insertion of the phrase, “on the basis of the social division of labor in the epoch of capitalism,” differentiates this from Stalin's classic definition of a nation given in Marxism and the National Question. For Kardelj, this addition was meant to signify that nations are a progressive factor in developing socio-economic relations, and will not disappear until they have exhausted their functions in this regard, the victory of a Communist revolution notwithstanding.

²⁴ A statement of these plans for Eastern Europe can be found in the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Part Two, Section VI, “Communist Construction in the USSR and Cooperation of the Socialist Countries.”

²⁵ For the development of economic integration generally, see Zauberman, pp. 23–29. Information on the coordination of heavy industry under the Council for Mutual Economic Aid can be found in Kent, Nikolai, “Soviet Plans for Developing Heavy Industry in the Satellite Countries,” Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR, VIII, No. 2, pp. 3–9 Google Scholar. Eastern Europe, XI, No. 7, p. 30 Google Scholar, contains an account of recent developments, including the publication of the “Basic Principles of the International Division of Labor,” approved at the June, 1962, meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. For the principles governing economic integration see the reference in note 24, above.

²⁶ The differences among the Eastern European states over economic interests are well described by Gamarnikow, Michael, “The Future of COMECON,” East Europe, XI, No. 6, pp. 3–10 Google Scholar.

²⁷ The origins of such a dispute are, of course, quite another matter. In the Yugoslav case, as we have seen, nationalism of the second type was a result, not a cause, of the break with the Soviet Union.

²⁸ Thus, in 1958 in China the Great Leap Forward, by departing from accepted methods of industrialization and putting great strains on the Chinese social and economic structure, gave rise to nationalistic appeals to discard Western methods in favor of traditional Chinese practices in the sciences, medicine, and other fields. See Hudson, Geoffrey et al. , The Chinese Communes (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1960), p. 35 Google Scholar. Conditions in Yugoslavia dictated the more theoretical approach of Kardelj, supra.

²⁹ For a discussion of the concept of the “Socialist Commonwealth,” which the Communists have developed recently in response to changing conditions within and outside the bloc, see London, Kurt L., “The ‘Socialist Commonwealth of Nations’: Pattern for Communist World Organization,” Orbis, III, pp. 424–42Google Scholar. London speaks of the problem of “establishing a conceptual framework vast and flexible enough to contain the organizational structure within which world communism could be achieved,” and sees this in the concept of the Socialist Commonwealth. The term still lacks clarity, however, and is used by the Communists almost interchangeably with the phrases “socialist camp” and “world socialist system” (ibid., p. 430).