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Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 May 2010

THOMAS CUSACK ,
TORBEN IVERSEN  and
DAVID SOSKICE
THOMAS CUSACK*
Affiliation:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
TORBEN IVERSEN*
Affiliation:
Harvard University
DAVID SOSKICE*
Affiliation:
Duke University and Oxford University
*
Thomas R. Cusack is Senior Research Fellow, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin-Tiergarten, Germany ([email protected]).
Torben Iversen is Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 ([email protected]).
David Soskice is Research Professor, Duke University, 326 Perkins Library, Box 90204 Durham, NC 27708, and Oxford University, UK ([email protected]).
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Abstract

Protocorporatist West European countries in which economic interests were collectively organized adopted PR in the first quarter of the twentieth century, whereas liberal countries in which economic interests were not collectively organized did not. Political parties, as Marcus Kreuzer points out, choose electoral systems. So how do economic interests translate into party political incentives to adopt electoral reform? We argue that parties in protocorporatist countries were “representative” of and closely linked to economic interests. As electoral competition in single member districts increased sharply up to World War I, great difficulties resulted for the representative parties whose leaders were seen as interest committed. They could not credibly compete for votes outside their interest without leadership changes or reductions in interest influence. Proportional representation offered an obvious solution, allowing parties to target their own voters and their organized interest to continue effective influence in the legislature. In each respect, the opposite was true of liberal countries. Data on party preferences strongly confirm this model. (Kreuzer's historical criticisms are largely incorrect, as shown in detail in the online supplementary Appendix.)

Type
Forum
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 104 , Issue 2 , May 2010 , pp. 393 - 403
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2010

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