¹ Lorenz, R., Der Staat wider Willen (Vienna, 1938)Google Scholar.

² Braunias, K., Das Parlamentarische Wahlrecht (Berlin, 1932), Vol. 2, p. 22 ff.Google Scholar

³ For an exhaustive treatment of this period, see Jaszi, O., The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929)Google Scholar; also, Skottsberg, B., “Der Oesterreichische Parlamentarismus,” Goteborgs. Kungl. Veteskapsoch Vitterhets-Samhalles Handlinger, Foldjen, Femte, Ser. A, Band 7 (Goteborg, 1940)Google Scholar; and Voegelin, E., Der autoritaere Staat, Ein Versuch ueber das oesterr. Staatsproblem (Vienna, 1936)Google Scholar.

⁴ Wandruszka, A., “Oesterreichs politische Struktur,” in Benedict, H., Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich (Vienna, 1954), pp. 289–485Google Scholar. Wandruszka, a Catholic historian, maintains that the division of Austria into “three camps” (drei Lager) finds its origin in the national-liberalism of Georg V. Schoenerer who later became the leader of racial chauvinism, thereby paving the way for Hitler's doctrines. Though this theory is not without some originality, it implies that the rational secularism of the late 19th century, which was beginning to penetrate the semi-feudal structure of the Austrian Empire, must bear the responsibility for the breaking up of the political community of that Empire, thereby laying the groundwork for later social conflict. It is significant that the same theory of the common origins of these political movements and their later deterioration into the class struggles of the First Republic was also held by Albert Fuchs (1905–1946), literary historian, and member of the Austrian Communist party (1933–1946), in his work, Geistige Stroemungen in Oesterreich 1867–1918 (Vienna, Globus Verlag 1949), especially pp. 165–196Google Scholar. Wandruszka does not adequately acknowledge his debt to Fuchs.

⁵ Gulick, C. A., Austria from Habsburg to Hitler (Berkeley, 1949)Google Scholar; see also Schlesinger, R., Central European Democracy and Its Background (London, 1953)Google Scholar, and his Federalism in Eastern and Central Europe (London, 1945)Google Scholar, for an analysis of the “armed truce” aspects of relations between the parties in the First Republic.

⁶ For a more detailed account of this period, see: Eichstaedt, W., Von Dollfuss zu Hitler (Wiesbaden, 1955)Google Scholar; also MacDonald, Mary, The Republic of Austria, 1918–1934 (London, 1946)Google Scholar; other useful accounts are Braunthal, J., The Tragedy of Austria (London, 1946)Google Scholar; Spitzmueller, F., Und hat auch Ursach' es zu lieben (Vienna, 1955)Google Scholar; Schuschnigg, K. von, Austrian Requiem (London, 1947)Google Scholar.

⁷ There is scant documentary evidence concerning the manner of organization of governmental authority immediately following the entrance of the Red Army into Vienna. Probably the most dependable are personal memoirs, specifically, Dr.Renner, Karl, Denkschrift ueber die Geschichte der Unabhaengigkeits Erklaerung Oesterreichs, mit einem Nachwort von Prof. J. R. Salis (Zurich, 1946)Google Scholar; and Schaerf, Adolf, April 1945 in Wien (Vienna, 1946)Google Scholar. Both these prominent leaders are agreed that there were no nuclei of trusted leaders who had the confidence of the population regardless of their political convictions, and who could be used to give the new state a semblance of popular support. The constituting of the political parties was strictly a procedure from the top downward, and nobody knew how much support he could count on among the people. Even “resistance groups” were artificially manufactured, probably with Russian help, after the fall of Vienna. These “resistance groups” were in fact the cadres from which the regular parties later emerged. Eventually each party recognized only its own “resistance group” as legitimate, denouncing the others as fraudulent, and puppets of the Russians.

⁸ The formation of a provisional national government had, in fact, been preceded by the establishment of a similar proportionate government for the City of Vienna. The initially suggested ratio of 5(SPOe): 4(KPOe): 1(Christian Social) was rejected in favor of a 50:50 distribution of offices between SPOe on the one side and Communists and Christian Socialists on the other. Schaerf, op. cit., pp. 90 ff.

⁹ The Communists, in a now familiar pattern, successfully held out for the Ministries of Interior and Education. On April 27, 1945, this committee presented itself to Marshal Tolbuchin of the Red Army, who granted it de facto recognition as the Provisional Government of Austria. Characteristically, the first document issued officially by the new government—proclaiming the separation of Austria from Germany and her establishment as an independent, democratic republic—was signed by Renner, Kunschak, and Koplenig, not as the representatives of the Austrian people, but in their capacities as chairmen of the central committees of their respective parties. Renner, op. cit., p. 34 and StGBl 1/1945. Renner himself expressed misgivings over this arrangement, but did not see how it could be avoided. Theoretically, at least, it meant the recognition of the sovereignty of the parties prior to that of the state. Allied recognition of the new government was not obtained until June 1945 when the first occupation statute was drawn up.

¹⁰ Following are the results of the Parliamentary elections since 1945:

The second conservative party, the VdU (since 1955, FPOe) has no share in any proportionate arrangements. The slow absorption of its electoral following by the two major parties has minimized its political effectiveness. The Koalitionspakt (see below) serves effectively to prevent a coalition of the conservative parties, or Marxist parties, and of course, the memory of the First Republic serves as a warning against relegatng one or the other of the two major parties into the “permanent opposition.” (In Germany the unwelcome consequences of such a “permanent opposition” are again making themselves felt quite strongly.)

¹¹ StGBl. No. 134, Gesetz vom 22 August 1945, zur Wiederherstellung des oesterr. Beamtentuma (Beamten-Ueberleitungs Gesetz).

¹² Ibid. par. 6 (2) (c).

¹³ Protokoll des Parteitages der SPOe, Vienna 11/15–17/55, pp. 87 ff, pp. 93 ff, passim, and Protokoll …, 11/15–17/46, pp. 119–143 passim, pp. 207–212.

¹⁴ For partisan commentaries on the Proporz, see Kramer, H. G., “Die Frage des Parteienproporzes bei Stellenbesetzungen,” Oesterr. Monatshefte, No. 10 (1950), p. 597Google Scholar. For an early criticism of the Proporz, see “Ueber die Demokratisierung der Verwaltung,” Zukunft (Dec. 1946), p. 16Google Scholar. Recent typical, critical commentaries on the theory and practice of Proporz, primarily as a factor that undermines the “rule of Law” (Rechtsstaatidee), are the following: Maundorff, F., “Termiten im Bau der Democratic,” Die Presse, Feb. 3, 1957, p. 5Google Scholar; “Parteienkompromisz und die Wahre Democratie,” ibid., Jan. 6, 1957, p. 4; “Macht das Oesterr. Parlament Stark,” ibid., June 16, 1957, p. 5. Cf. also: Spanner, H., “Die Berufsbeamten und die Staatskrisen,” VDSZL, Heft 13 (1955), pp. 119 ffGoogle Scholar; “Die Rolle der Verfaasung im Gegenwaertigen politischen und sozialem Leben,” Zoeff R. NF. Bd. 7/1955, pp. 9ffGoogle Scholar. For an analysis of the legality of Proporz from the point of view of the Constitution, see Adamovich, L., Handbuch des Oesterr. Verfassungsrechts, 5th ed. (Vienna, 1957), pp. 118–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ For the official version of the Koalitionspakt, see Wiener Zeitung, June 27, 1956; an unofficial final version, together with the original demands put forward by the SPOe, can be found in IX. Taetigkeitsbericht der sozialistischen Abgeordneten und Bundesraete (Vienna, 1956)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Wiener Zeitung, June 27, 1956, par. 2.

¹⁷ Ibid., par. 5.

¹⁸ Ibid., par. 3. The pact also provides for the creation of a Coalition Committee in the National Assembly, which is to secure a harmonious cooperation of the parties. It is composed of five representatives from each of the two government parties. Its chairmen are the chancellor and vice-chancellor, and the two party whips must also belong to it. (Par. 4.)

¹⁹ The SPOe has the highest membership ratio of any party in Europe, excluding Communist parties. 1956: 36.89%, and not less than 36% at any election since 1945. Its dues collection is also Unequalled: 95.2% in 1956. Bericht an den Parteitag 1957. Similar figures are less easily available for the OeVP, due to its decentralized tripartite corporate structure, but it is conservatively estimated to have 600,000 dues-paying members. Both parties control huge economic enterprises that assure them continued sources of income, though the OeVP is not quite so well off in this respect as is its “collectivist” partner.

²⁰ Die Presse, June 8, 1957.

²¹ See the program decided upon by the OeVP at a special party conference on January 28, 1952, in which mention of the Catholic principle of Solidarismus, once espoused enthusiastically by the party in 1945, was relegated to the preamble; the rest of the program dealt with socio-economic problems. Oesterr. Monatshefte, March 1952. At the Party Conference of November 1957, the SPOe officially broke with its traditional Marxist past by proposing for adoption a new set of party principles—the first since the Linzer Programm of 1926—admittedly patterned after those of the British Labor Party, and citing the errors of Marxian analysis. Arbeiter Zeitung, November 22–24, 1957.

²² In the province of Styria the following recent cases have turned on the principle of Proporz. Until December 31, 1957, OeVP and SPOe appointed beginning school teachers on the basis of their party membership. Presse 6/26/57. The principle applies equally to appointments of principals of secondary schools in the City of Vienna. All social welfare funds—milk subsidies, public housing loan funds and aid to private housing construction—are administered according to the Proporz. Die Wochen Presse, 2/23/57. The position of vice-president of the Vienna municipal police was left vacant for eight months due to Proporz considerations. Since seniority was involved, all promotions down the line had to satisfy the proportional arrangement. Die Wochen Presse, July 1, 1957. Most recently the question of political allegiance was raised in the filling of vacancies on the Supreme Judicial Bench of the Provinces. All four of the Superior State Judgeships during the preceding year were listed simultaneously in order to achieve an equitable distribution between the parties. Berichte und Informationen, 594 (1957) p. 2Google Scholar.

²³ For an historical account of the administrative problems of broadcasting reorganization, see Vodopivec, A. A., “Unser Rundfunk als Object der Innen Politik,” Berichte und Informationen, 457: (1955) p. 5Google Scholar.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 6.

²⁵ Sozialistische Korrespondenz, February 15, 1957.

²⁶ Wiener Zeitung, June 27, 1956, part II, par. 2 (a, b, c).

²⁷ SPOe: 2,259,975 (51.12%); OeVP: 2,160,551 (48.88%).

²⁸ Wiener Zeitung, July 16, 1957. For criticism of the “politicized” broadcasting system, castigating it as supposedly not in keeping with constitutional provisions concerning the division of powers between the states and the central government, see Die Presse, July 28, 1957, p. 3Google Scholar.

²⁹ Wiener Zeitung, October 20, December 17, 1955.

³⁰ Wiener Zeitung, December 23, 1955. At the time Air Austria threatened to bring the issue before the constitutional court, but it never acted on that threat.

³¹ The 1955 State Treaty establishing Austria's independence also provided for the return to her of formerly Western-owned oil fields that had been under Russian domination. It was the intention of Waldbrunner's ministry, which had been entrusted with temporary administration of these enterprises, to nationalize them completely. Since these oil fields were located in the OeVP-governed Land of Lower Austria, the Land government claimed them as Land property. It created an oil enterprise of its own, NIOGAS, backed by OeVP-oriented financial interests, and declared its intention to issue operating rights to United States and British oil companies. This scheme understandably aroused the opposition of the SPOe, which charged the OeVP with wanting to bring Austria again under the domination of foreign capital and to compromise its neutrality. Arbeiter Zeitung, February 2, 1956. For the highly complicated legal tangle that surrounded the returned oil properties (no less than 17 treaties were applicable) see Die Presse, January 20, 1957; also Wiener Zeitung, December 2, 1955.

³² The jurisdiction of Socialist Minister Waldbrunner was reduced from Transport and Nationalized Industries to Transport and Electricity. The nationalized industry complex, including oil, was transferred to the authority of a cabinet committee under the chairmanship of Chancellor Raab, which gave the OeVP a permanent one-vote majority. The authority of this committee also extended, as a board of directors, to a newly chartered corporation charged exclusively with the exploitation of Austrian oil deposits, in which the government held a majority interest. Koalitionspakt, IV and V, Wiener Zeitung, June 29, 1956. If this seems like a crushing defeat for the SPOe, it must be pointed out that despite the substitution of collegial for one-man rule in the nationalized industries, the SPOe influence on the managerial level went unimpaired. And in the case of oil, the SPOe at least secured a share in the control of these deposits. Neither arrangement would have been likely under a “normally” operating parliamentary system. For a detailed account of the administrative reorganization pursuant to the provisions of the Pakt, see “Das kleinere Ministerium und die grosse Holding-Gmbh,” Berichte und Informationen, 519 (1956), p. 7Google Scholar.

³³ Wiener Zeitung, July 11, 1957. A complication arose involving the 30% to be raised by foreign capital. What would be the situation if any of the foreign shareholders wanted to sell out? Which party would be permitted to acquire that share? The OeVP proposed to use the key 60:40 equally for the share of the withdrawing party. The SPOe objected on the ground that this would give the OeVP an absolute majority; it suggested instead that the 60:40 key should be used only to the extent that it would not give more than 50% of the shares to either one of the Austrian groups. Since the negotiations on this point seemed to endanger the whole project, the foreign shareholders finally prevailed upon the two parties to let this point ride and trust the good judgment of the withdrawing party. Perhaps too weary to object, both parties accepted. Die Presse, July 11, 1957.

³⁴ Wiener Zeitung, July 5, 1956.

³⁵ In February 1956, Parliament had passed a law designed to raise salaries of federal public employees gradually to the level of those paid by private industry. Due to inflation, public salaries had fallen far behind those in private industry. The law promised to raise public salaries up to 85% of parity by July 1957. But in a surprise move the city government of Vienna (SPOe) announced that its employees would receive their full salaries by January 1, 1957. The SPOe entered upon this course, reluctantly, knowing full well the low state of federal finances, but it felt obliged to give in to the pressures of the public service trade union (SPOe dominated). It also hoped to put the OeVP into the embarrassing position of having to hedge on one of its campaign promises.

³⁶ Die Neue Tageszeitung, October 11, 1956.

³⁷ Arbeiter Zeitung, October 12, 1956.

³⁸ BGBl, December 18, 1956.

³⁹ Die Presse, February 7, 1957.

⁴⁰ The negotiations on this point hardly caused a ripple in the press. The Koalitionspakt merely stated, par. 3, that “The about-to-be-established Federal Ministry of Defense takes over those tasks that until now have been performed by Division VI, heretofore under the authority of the Federal Chancellory.” Although this Division VI had been responsible to OeVP Chancellor Raab, the Vice Chancellor (SPOe) had had the right to veto its decisions.

⁴¹ Migsch, Alfred, Anschlag auf Oesterreich, SPOe Party Publication (Vienna, 1951)Google Scholar. See also Klenner, F., Putsch Versuch oder nicht?, OeGB (Austrian Trade Union Federation) publication (Vienna, 1951)Google Scholar.

⁴² Bundesverfassungsgesetz (1929) BGBl 392/3. Art. 60 and Art. 80 (1). Austria and Finland are the only European countries that elect the President by direct popular vote. So far all three heads of state in Austria have been members of the SPOe. The exercise of his authority as Commander-in-Chief is, however, restricted by Art. 80 (2), which makes that authority dependent on the passage of a Military Service Law (Wehrgesetz) which vests command authority in the Minister of Defense (Art. 80 (3)) who is, of course, responsible to the National Assembly.

⁴³ BGBl 181/1955.

⁴⁴ Wiener Zeitung, July 26, 1956.

⁴⁵ For a “profile” on the new General Troop Inspector, see the West German Weekly, Der Spiegel, October 10, 1956, p. 27Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ For an excellent analysis of the politics of the Austrian army and especially the early problems of the Austrian general staff, see Jedlicka, L., Ein Heer im Schatten der Parteien (Graz, 1955)Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ This writer had the opportunity to be present when the new army first presented itself to the public at the Presidential Inaugural parade on May 22, 1957. There was unanimous agreement among the officials of both parties that this was a “people's army” (Volksheer). For representative comments praising the new formations, see Arbeiterzeitung, May 23, 1957 (SPOe); Die Neue Tageszeitung, May 23, 1957 (OeVP); Salzburger Nachrichten (independent, but close to FPOe), May 23, 1957. Even the Communist Volksstimme failed to castigate the army as an instrument of class oppression (5/23/57).

⁴⁸ Die Wochenpresse, December 21, 1957.

⁴⁹ This was the private opinion not only of responsible government leaders, but also of scores of “men in the street” whom this writer interviewed. The view was widely expressed that as a symbol of unity, the coalition and its corollary, the Proporz, have in fact become the first acceptable substitute for the “Dynastic symbol” of the Empire. Many voters agreed freely that when casting their ballots they were really voting “for, or against, the coalition,” rather than for any individual party. A public statement by prominent personalities in the arts and sciences, specifically endorsing the Proporz as a safeguard of public responsibility, was issued in the course of the 1957 presidential campaign. Though some of the signers of this campaign document were close to the SPOe, a major part could not be identified with any of the parliamentary parties. Die Presse, April 9, 1957, p. 3Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Wiener Zeitung, May 23, 1957.