¹ This preoccupation is typified by the directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, February 22, 1948, on agrarian reform work and the reorganization and purification of the Party ranks in old and semi-old areas, broadcast by the official Communist New China News Agency, North Shensi Radio, February 28, 1948, and included in I-chiu-ssu-ch'i nien i-lai chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chung-yao wen-hsien chi [Important Documents of the Chinese Communist Party since 1947] (Hongkong, 1949), pp. 62–69Google Scholar (hereafter cited as Important Documents … ). See also notes 7 and 16, below.

² North Shensi Radio, March 23, 1949. My italics. For further development of this heme, see K'uei-chang, Yang, Ch'eng-hsiang kuan-hsi wen-t'i [Problems of Relations between Town and Country] (Hongkong, 1949)Google Scholar, passim, and the authoritative speech of Li Fu-chun, later vice-chairman of the Northeast People's Government, on July 1, 1949: “Shifting the Emphasis of Our Activities from the Country to the City”, in Chieh Fang Jih Pao [Liberation Daily News] (Shanghai), July 19, 1949Google Scholar.

³ Speech to the First National Youth League Congress, Peip'ing, broadcast by Peip'ing Radio, April 13, 1949. Jen Pi-shih, a member of the Central Committee and Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, is also the Chief Political Commissar of the “People's Liberation Army”; his views have the force of a directive in Communist China.

⁴ The concept of “new democracy,” which has a specific dialectical meaning in Chinese Communist practice, is authoritatively developed in the major works of Mao Tse-tung, especially in: Chung-kuo ko-ming yü chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang [The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party], November 15, 1949; Hsin min-chu chu-i [On New Democracy], January 19, 1940; Lun lien-ho cheng-fu [On Coalition Government], April 24, 1945; and most recently in Lun jen-min min-chu chuan-cheng [On the People's Democratic Dictatorship], June 30, 1949. In the current orthodoxy of Marxist-Leninists, the “new democracy” is an advanced phase of the revolutionary process in which the “bourgeois democratic” revolution is displaced by a “people's democracy” of the revolutionary elements led by the Chinese Communist Party; the “new democracy,” in its turn, is to prepare for the Socialistic or Communist phase when the “feudal” and “imperialist” enemies of the “people's democracy” have been liquidated.

⁵ Cf. On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, op. cit. The leading role of the Party in the period of the “new democracy,” as distinguished from its role in the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” is drawn in the Foreword of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to a 1948 re-issue of Chapter 2 of Lenin, Left-wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder (New York, 1934)Google Scholar, broadcast by North Shensi Radio, June 11–12, 1948.

⁶ “The Soviets have been defined in Soviet law, always openly and frankly, as state organs of the proletarian dictatorship.” Vyshinsky, A. Y., The Law of the Soviet State (Babb, trans., New York, 1948), p. 152Google Scholar. In the Chinese situation, where it is desired to work in collaboration with certain non-proletarian classes and elements during the phase of the “new democracy,” Mao Tse-tung has specifically ruled out the exclusive investment of power “in the hands of workers, peasants and intellectuals.” See On Coalition Government, op. cit., part 4 (A).

⁷ Tse-tung, Mao, Mu-ch'ien hsing-shih ho wo-men ti jen-wu [The Present Situation and Our Tasks], December 25, 1947Google Scholar; see also his address to the Party cadres of the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area, April 1, 1948, broadcast by North Shensi Radio, May 10–12 1948, published under the paraphrased title, Tsai Chin-Sui kan-pu hui-i shang ti chiang-hua (Hongkong, 1948)Google Scholar. The same spirit of tactical expediency was evident in the New China News Agency editorial warning that “our organization and work in the cities must be adapted to the characteristics of the city.” Chieh Fang Jih Pao (Shanghai), June 23, 1949Google Scholar.

⁸ On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, op. cit.

⁹ An example is found in his speech of August 3, 1949: “How New China Fights USKMT Blockade”, China Digest, Vol. 6, pp. 14–16 (August 24, 1949)Google Scholar.

¹⁰ An early criticism of the pao-chia system was published anonymously in the Chinese Communist “Northwest” in 1941 under the title Pao-chia chih-tu yen-chiu [Study of the Pao-chia System] by the Hsi-pei yen-chiu she, probably in Yenan.

¹¹ On Coalition Government, op. cit., part 4 (B).

¹² New China News Agency, Peip'ing Radio, April 12, 1949 (shortly after Peip'ing Radio replaced North Shensi Radio as the principal Chinese Communist broadcasting outlet).

¹³ “Six Months in Peip'ing”, China Digest, Vol. 6, pp. 14–15 (September 21, 1949)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Sin Wen Jih Pao (Shanghai), July 21, 1949Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Articles 6–8. The Basic Program promulgated by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on October 10, 1947, was broadcast in full English translation by North Shensi Radio, October 13, 1947, Important Documents …, pp. 10–14.

¹⁶ Jen Pi-shih, speech of January 12, 1948, to the Northwest Liberation Army Front Committee, broadcast by North Shensi Radio April 13–15, 1948; the full text of this major policy declaration appears in Important Documents …, pp. 33–36.

¹⁷ New China News Agency, Peip'ing Radio, April 16, 1949.

¹⁸ Article 12. A full translation of this Organic Outline is in China Digest, Vol. 5, pp. 8–9 (November 30, 1948)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ “People's” is an adjective with special dialectical meaning when used in this context. The “people” have been more precisely defined as those popular revolutionary elements which accept the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. See Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, op. cit., where “people's democratic dictatorship” is defined as “democracy among the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries.” A “people's democracy” is quite different from the more conventional “bourgeois democracy” of western democratic experience; see On New Democracy, op. cit.

²⁰ Similarly, the Northeast (Manchuria) Administrative Committee on April 21, 1949, decreed that all provinces, cities, hsien and other administrative levels should have “people's governments.” Peip'ing Radio, April 22, 1949. The provinces of China Proper already under Communist control are also in the process of being similarly re-designated.

²¹ See the directive cited in note 1, above, and the Central Committee directive of May 25, 1948, on the work of land reform and party reorganization for 1948, broadcast by North Shensi Radio, May 29–30, 1948. Important Documents …, op. cit., pp. 116–127.

²² Article 7, Central Committee directive of February 22, 1948.

^23a Article 14. The text of the Common Program appears in the works cited in note 45, below.

^22b Chieh Fang Jih Pao (Shanghai), December 6, 1949Google Scholar, gives the texts of the regulations as well as the New China News Agency editorial interpretation.

^22c Ibid., December 5, 1949. A highly-colored account of the second conference in Peip'ing is given in Lai-chi, Tang, “People's Democracy in People's Capital”, China Digest, Vol. 7, pp. 10–11 (December 14, 1949)Google Scholar. In recognition of its restored status as the national capital, the name of the city was changed from “Peip'ing” to “Peking” in September, 1949; but, except in directly quoted material, the older form is used throughout this article.

A second “all circles” conference was held in Shanghai on December 5–11, 1949. While arrangements were made for a permanent organization, this conference failed to attain the stature gained by the corresponding conference in Peip'ing. Enlightening comment on this question was made by the official Communist daily in Shanghai, Chieh Fang Jih Pao, December 14, 1949: “It has to be admitted that, in nature, this conference is still not of the type of people's conference as approved by the Central Government for Peking. … As a result of the absence of certain objective conditions—the organizational power and the political consciousness of the masses are not yet up to the required standard—this conference can only follow in the footsteps of the first [Shanghai conference, … and] not yet assume powers similar to those of the Second People's Conference in Peking. … This conference … is rather an inevitable extension and development of the first. … Given further time for development, this conference shall naturally assume the character of the people's conference convened in Peking.” A comparable declaration was made at the opening session of the second Shanghai conference by its Secretary-General, Chou Lin. Ta Kung Pao (Shanghai), December 14, 1949Google Scholar.

²³ In Communist China, common practice has been to promulgate politically important directives over the joint signatures of (1) the Party secretary, (2) the military commander, and (3) the chairman of the government who share responsibilities on the same administrative level within the jurisdiction affected.

²⁴ As the Communists took the military offensive late in 1947, Mao Tse-tung declared that “the major objective [of military operations] is the annihilation of enemy manpower and not the holding or taking of cities and places” whose fall was only a “result of the annihilation of enemy manpower.” Nevertheless, the assault and capture of cities becomes feasible in proportion as the deterioration in the enemy's position reduces his capacity to defend: “Resolutely wrest all enemy strongpoints and cities which are weakly defended. At favorable times, wrest from the enemy all strongpoints and cities which are defended to a medium degree and where circumstances permit. Wait until conditions mature, and then wrest all enemy strongpoints and cities which are powerfully defended.” The Present Situation and Our Tasks, op. cit., part 3.

²⁵ This was the indictment oL a New China News Agency editorial, “Reorganize Organs in the Rear to Help Win Victory at the Front,” North Shensi Radio, January 31, 1948; also in Cheng-pao ch'u-pan she, Kuan-yü chih-chih fen-tzu kai-tsao [On the Re-education of the Intelligentsia] (Hongkong, 1948), pp. 1–3Google Scholar.

²⁶ In preparation for the attack on Changchun, Mukden and other Manchurian cities, a special set of “eight rules” to govern the discipline of troops was formulated by the Northeast People's Liberation Army on May 25, 1948. North Shensi Radio, June 19, 1948. In addition to directing the protection of life and property, factories and shops, schools, warehouses, public installations and other facilities, the rules admonished soldiers to avoid brothels, to guard their language, and to protect the “honor” of the revolutionary army by maintaining the strictest personal discipline.

A comparable set of 17 rules was laid down by the political department of a field army assigned to capture cities in the Yangtze Valley in 1949. Special emphasis was laid on directives designed to avoid or minimize friction between assault troops and local civil and police authorities: arrests of individuals by the soldiery were limited to direct offenses against the occupying authority; otherwise, arrests remained within the jurisdiction of the local police, and troops were warned not to disregard the orders of the municipal police “without a good reason.” North Shensi Radio, January 21, 1949. Such self-denial, accepted in the interests of assuring the continued normal operation of civil government even during the assault phase, is probably without parallel in modern practice; certainly, for the urban citizenry of China, this sharply distinguished Communist practice from the practice of the Kuomintang military.

²⁷ Typical of these were the proclamations broadcast to the people of Kaifeng on June 19, 1948, three days before the fall of the city; to the people of Tsinan on September 21, 1948, four days prior to that city's capture; and the “model” 8-point proclamation of Generals Lin Piao and Lo Jung-huan to the people of Peip'ing and Tientsin on December 22, 1948, several weeks before the occupation of those cities was completed.

²⁸ This was broadcast by Peip'ing Radio, April 25,1949, as an incident to the capture of Nanking, but was formulated in sweeping general terms and made applicable to all cities and localities.

²⁹ See note 21, above.

³⁰ North Shensi Radio, June 22, 1948. Related materials are included in Tse-tung, Mao et al. , Hsin min-chu chu-i kung-shang cheng-t'se [The Industrial and Commercial Policy of the New Democracy] (Hongkong, 1949), pp. 19–34Google Scholar; and in Ch'ao-sheng, Fang, Hsin chung-kuo ti kung-shang cheng-ts'e [Industrial and Commercial Policy of the New China] (Hongkong, 1949)Google Scholar.

³¹ The Peip'ing Military Control Commission was set up in the outskirts of the city on January 1, 1949, one month before Communist troops entered Peip'ing. General Yeh Chien-ying, a member of the Party Central Committee, became Director of the “Peip'ing Area Military Control Commission,” responsible to the Peip'ing-Tientsin Front Headquarters commanded by General Lin Piao (North Shensi Radio, January 11, 1949). Simultaneously, a “People's Democratic Government” of Peip'ing was proclaimed, with General Yeh serving concurrently as its Mayor (North Shensi Radio, January 18, 1949). The Peip'ing M.C.C. functioned within the city on February 1, 1949; and on February 4, the new municipal government began to take over some functions of the local administration (North Shensi Radio, February 7, 1949). A similar sequence of events occurred in Tientsin, Nanking, Taiyuan and Shanghai. The complete coordination between the M.C.C. and the municipal government tended to soften the rigors of military occupation, while enabling the military to make effective use of civilian personnel for the enforcement of its urban policy.

The Peip'ing M.C.C. is hot to be confused with the “Joint Executive Office” formed on February 1, 1949, under the terms of the capitulation accepted by Nationalist General Fu Tso-yi on January 24, 1949.

³² See note 26, above.

³³ Details were given in the North Shensi Radio broadcast of October 22, 1948.

³⁴ On the operation of the Shanghai M.C.C, see Lai, H. M., “First Twelve Days in Liberated Shanghai”, China Digest, Vol. 6, pp. 15–17 (June 14, 1949)Google Scholar, and the report of Yi, General Chen, “Two Months' Work in Shanghai”, China Digest, Vol. 6, pp. 8–9 (September 21, 1949)Google Scholar. In Chengchow, the M.C.C. included a “Propaganda Department” (North Shensi Radio, October 28, 1948). In Nanking, a “Finance and Economic Take-over Committee” was set up (Nanking Radio, May 9, 1949).

³⁵ North Shensi Radio, January 11, 1949.

³⁶ Peip'ing Radio, April 28 and May 11, 1949.

³⁷ Even where the hated pao-chia were abolished, orders were issued to exempt pao-chia workers “from censure of their previous actions” so that public organs could continue to function. See the notice promulgated by the Huanglung Sub-area Executive Commission of the Northwest Liberated Area, North Shensi Radio, March 30, 1948.

³⁸ Several articles in the joint proclamation of Mao Tse-tung and General Chu Teh of April 25, 1949 (note 28, above) specifically concerned this question. Article 1 promised punishment for “counter-revolutionary elements or other disruptive elements who take advantage of the situation to create disturbances, or to loot and destroy,” but Article 2 expressed the hope that “workers and employees of all trades will continue production and that all business would operate as usual.” While the enterprises of “bureaucratic capital” were to be confiscated, “all personnel working in the enterprises of bureaucratic capital … must remain at their posts as usual,” and those persons “willing to continue to serve after the People's Government has taken over will be employed in accordance with their capabilities so that they will not become displaced” (Article 3). Hope was expressed that personnel of all public welfare enterprises would “remain at their posts as usual” (Article 4). Apart from the “incorrigible war criminals and counterrevolutionary elements with heinous crimes,” personal immunity was offered to “high and low ranking officials under the Kuomintang central, provincial, municipal [and] county governments of different levels,” who were “enjoined to stay at their posts;” capable personnel were promised continuing employment “provided they do not engage in counterrevolutionary activities and their personal record is not seriously besmeared” (Article 5). A similar offer was contained in Article 8 (clause 20) of the proposed draft agreement for domestic peace submitted by Chinese Communist Party plenipotentiaries to Kuomintang representatives on April 15, 1949.

³⁹ North Shensi Radio, January 13,1949, based on Tsinan dispatches.

⁴⁰ General Chen Yi, loc. cit.

⁴¹ New China News Agency, North Shensi Radio, February 2, 1948.

⁴² A similar directive of the Central China Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, September 29, 1948, developed the same theme, describing the “winning over, consolidation, re-education and cultivation of the intellectual elements” as one of the “current important tasks of all liberated areas.” On the Re-education of the Intelligentsia, op. cit., pp. 4–7.

⁴³ A particularly cogent argument was developed in his The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Parly, op. cit.

⁴⁴ Resolution III, “The Administrative Program for the Peaceful Reconstruction of the Country”, in Political Consultative Conference (International Publishers, Shanghai, 1946), Vol. 2, p. 23Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Organic Law, Article 2. Text in Chung-hua jen-min kung-ke-kuo k'ai-kuo wen-hsien [Documents on the Establishment of the People's Republic of China] (Hongkong, 1949), pp. 18–22Google Scholar; Jen-min min-chu chuan-cheng ti li-lun yü shih-chien [Theory and Practice of the People's Democratic Dictatorship] (Hongkong, 1949), pp. 109–113Google Scholar; English translation in China Digest, Vol. 7, pp. 7–10 (October 19, 1949)Google Scholar. An informative gloss on the principle of democratic centralism is given by Chang Chih-jang, Vice-Chief Justice of the new Supreme People's Court, in China Digest, Vol. 7, pp. 4–6 (November 2, 1949)Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Organic Law, Article 7, (9), b.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Article 15, (2), (5), and (6).

⁴⁸ Ibid., Articles 18 and 28.

⁴⁹ New China News Agency editorial, January 6, 1948, in China Digest, Vol. 3, p. 12 (February 24, 1948)Google Scholar. Cf. note 25, above.

⁵⁰ Jao Shu-shih, “How New China Fights US-KMT Blockade,” loc. cit.

⁵¹ Succinctly summarized in The Present Situation and Our Tasks, op. cit., and On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, op. cit.

⁵² On New Democracy, op. cit.

⁵³ Some aspects of state-planning under the Chinese Communists are developed in a friendly article by Canning, C. J., “The Question of Recognition”, China Weekly Review, Vol. 114, pp. 33–36 (June, 1949)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Jao Shu-shih, “How New China Fights US-KMT Blockade,” loc. cit. The leading editorial of the Chieh Fang Jih Pao (Shanghai), July 27, 1949Google Scholar, dealt with the necessity for decentralizing the population and removing industrial establishments to the interior in the interests of increasing national production and relating industrial production to new national economic requirements. Early in August, 1949, the East China Bureau of the Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party, issued a detailed directive on the transfer of populations under the guise of “repatriating refugees” from Shanghai. Ibid., August 4, 1949.