¹ Compare the views of Bodley, , France, vol. ii, bk. III, ch. 5Google Scholar; Bagehot, , The English Constitution, 2d edition, pp. 47–52Google Scholar; Low, , The Governance of England, p. 118Google Scholar; and Bradford, , The Lesson of Popular Government, vol. i, ch. 15.Google Scholar

² On this point, see Duguit, , “Le Functionnement du Régime Parlementaire en France,” in the Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. xxv, pp. 363 et seqGoogle Scholar; Moreau, “Le Pouvoir Ministeriel,” ibid., vol. vii, p. 103; also his Pour le Régime Parlementaire, p. 308; Benoist, , “Parlements et Parlementarisme,” Rev. des. Deux Mondes, vol. 160, p. 583Google Scholar; also his book entitled La Réforme Parlementaire; Poincaré, , Questions et Figures Politiques, pp. 93 et seq.Google Scholar; Thiebaud, , “Le Crise du Parlementarisme” in the Rev. Hebdomadaire, May 2, 1908, p. 6Google Scholar; Ephraim, , “Le Régime Parl, en Angleterre et en France,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. vii, p. 125Google Scholar; Barthélemy, Le Rôle du Pouvoir Executif dans les Republiques Modernes,” pp. 680 et seq.

³ Compare Constant, Benjamin, Cours de Politique Constitutionnelle, vol. i, p. 469.Google Scholar

⁴ “If you wish to introduce the English government into France,” said Royer-Collard, “give us the physical and moral constitution of England, make the history of England our history and put into our political balance a powerful and honored aristocracy.” Quoted by Barthélemy, , L'Introduction du Régime Parlementaire en France, p. 17.Google Scholar

⁵ Michon, , Le gouvernement Parlementaire sous la Restauration, pp. 33–34.Google Scholar

⁶ Cf. Dupriez, , Les Ministrés dans les Principaux Pays d'Europe et d'Amérique, vol. ii, pp. 295–300.Google Scholar

⁷ In France, the ministers have the entrée to both chambers and must be heard whenever they demand it, whether they are members or not. In England, on the contrary, ministers may appear only in the chambers of which they are members and, consequently, a minister may address the chamber of which he is not a member only through the medium of an under secretary of state.

⁸ For the view that the government should have the power to dissolve the senate as well as the chamber, see Faguet, , Problèmes Politiques, p. 45.Google Scholar Thus in 1896, at the time of the conflict between the two houses over the question of appropriations for the expedition to Madagascar, a dissolution of the senate, which refused to consent to the appropriations, would have been the most effective solution of the difficulty.

⁹ The late Professor Esmein, arguing mainly from English and Belgian practice and from French practice under the monarchy (1814–48), defended the thesis that the ministers were responsible only to the chamber of deputies. If, he said, the senate cannot itself be dissolved, yet (with the assent of the president), it may dissolve the chamber of deputies and may overthrow a ministry it is not the equal but the master of the lower chamber. Droit Constitutionnel, 5th edition, p. 738). But the contrary view is maintained by Professor Duguit and the vast majority of French publicists and political writers. See especially, Duguit, , Droit Constitutionnel, ed. of 1911, vol. ii, pp. 431 et seq.Google Scholar; Moreau, , Rev. du Droit Pub., vol., ix, pp. 79 et seqGoogle Scholar; Simon, Jules, “Le Régime Parlementaire en 1894” in the Rev. Pol. et Parl., fol. i, pp. 8 et seqGoogle Scholar; and Laffitte, , “Lettres d'un Parlementaire” in the Rev. Pol. et Lit., February 4, 1893, p. 151.Google Scholar They base their contention first of all, upon the language of the constitution which declares that the ministers shall be solidly responsible to the chambers. Thus says M. Laffitte, “The constitution of 1875 does not say that the ministers are responsible to the chamber; it says they are responsible to the chambers; the authors of the constitution knew what they wished to say and they said it in good French. They believed that in a democratic state the two chambers ought to be the expression of the general will; this being so, they desired that the cabinet should be responsible not to one half of the parliament, but to the parliament entire. And if this rule were freely observed, there would be fewer ministerial crises. Suppose that tomorrow the ministry, beaten in the chamber by a half dozen votes, but assured of a strong majority in the senate, should refuse to resign. Perhaps public opinion would be taken by surprise and more than one person would cry ‘parliamentary coup d'etat;rsquo; but I maintain that the ministry that should do this would be within the letter and spirit of the constitution and I defy anyone to prove the contrary from the text.” The argument from English practice and from French practice under the monarchy is, they maintain, inadmissible because in each case the upper chamber does not rest upon an elective basis. The French senate, they point out, has equal powers of legislation with the chamber of deputies; it may address questions and interpellations to the ministers and may vote orders of the day, of confidence and censure under exactly the same conditions as the chamber may. Finally, they argue that it was clearly the intention of the authors of the constitution to give these two chambers equality of power and the great republican leaders of the time such as Jules Simon and Gambetta so understood it. In practice, ministers have several times resigned in consequence of hostile votes of the senate, the last instance occurring in 1913, following the rejection by the senate of the electoral reform bill passed by the chambers in July, 1912. In 1896, the Bourgeois ministry was practically forced to retire because the senate refused to vote an appropriation for the expedition to Madagascar so long as the existing ministry remained in power as it insisted on doing “in violation of the constitution.” But the issue of this notable conflict, says Esmein, was not decisive. “It showed,” he says, “that the senate has the power to compel the resignation of a ministry but it did not demonstrate that it had the right to do so.” Whatever may be the correct legal interpretation of the constitutional power of the senate to unmake ministries, there is no doubt as Jules Ferry once remarked, that it may create a situation in which it is impossible for them to govern. In this connection it may be remarked that the chamber of deputies has many times overthrown cabinets that had the entire confidence of the senate. Two notable examples were the reversal of the Gambetta ministry in 1882 and the ministry of Jules Ferry in 1884.

¹⁰ Compare Esmein, op. cit., p. 138. Under the system of parliamentary government, observes M. Esmein, the power of dissolution is natural, legitimate and almost necessary. See also Duguit, , “Le Fonctionnement du Régime Parlementaire en France” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. xxv, p. 367.Google Scholar

¹¹ Reflexions sur les Constitutions, p. 30.

¹² Eleven times under the Restoration and six times during the July monarchy. See Matter, , Dissolution des Assemblées Parlementaires, pp. 66, 82.Google Scholar

¹³ Since 1783 there have been 29 dissolutions of the English House of Commons. See Todd, , Parliamentary Government in England, vol. i, p. 162Google Scholar, and Low, Governance of England, pp. 107–109.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Since 1873 the German Reichstag has been five times dissolved for the purpose of consulting the electorate.

¹⁵ “Parlements et Parlementarisme Rev. des Deux Mondes, vol. 160, pp. 574, 583.

¹⁶ Duguit, Compare, “Le Functionment du Régime Parlementaire,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. xxv, p. 367.Google Scholar

¹⁷ The Governance of England, p. 81.

¹⁸ The English Constitution, ch. 6.

¹⁹ Compare my article on “The Presidency of the French Republic” in the North American Review for March, 1913, pp. 334–349.

²⁰ Problèmes Politiques, p. 8; see also his Cult d'Incompetence, ch. II.

²¹ “Le Pouvoir Ministeriel,” Revue Politique et Parlementaire, vol. 7, p. 103.

²² Many other French writers have dwelt upon the consequences of the increasing tendency of the chambers to depart from their true rôle and to interfere in the ordinary administration. M. Laffitte (Le Suffrage Universel, ch. 4) emphasizes the unfitness of the chambers for governing and administering. In recent years, he adds, one might almost ask if there is a government and if so where is it. So great has become the practice of the deputies in meddling in the affairs of the ministers, and particularly in respect to appointments, promotions and removals, that according to Sabbatier, M. (Rev. Pol. et Parl., Nov. 10, 1911, p. 204)Google Scholar the term “parliamentarism” no longer describes the French system; the true name, he says, should be “deputantism.” Compare also Spuller, , “Quatorze mois de Legislature” in the Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. ii, p. 3Google Scholar; Eichthal, , “Nos Moeurs Parlementaires,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. vi, pp. 136–140Google Scholar; Duguit, article cited p. 367; Ferneuil, “Nos Moeurs Parlementaires” (1895); and Laveleye, , “Le Rég. Parl,” Rev. des deux Mondes Dec. 15, 1892.Google Scholar “The chamber of deputies,” remarks Barthélemy, M., Pouvoir Executif dans les Républiques Modernes, p. 681Google Scholar, “is not content to be a mere collaborator with the executive power in the formulation of general rules of policy; it wishes to govern alone, and this is not all: it wishes to administer, it descends into the smallest details of the execution of the laws—it does not counsel, it ordains, it is the supreme dictator of the administration. Its domination extends to all affairs, all interests, all functionaries, all citizens. We have reached the terminus of what Benjamin Constant called the ‘horrible route of parliamentary omnipotence.’”

²³ Réforme Parlementaire,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. ii, p. 238.

²⁴ From 1902 to 1906 there were 262 requests in the chamber of deputies for interpellations and of these 140 were actually discussed. See Onimus, , Questions et Interpellations, p. 91.Google ScholarBloch, (Réjime Parlementaire, p. 83)Google Scholar, gives somewhat different figures. From the time of the meeting of the present parliament in June 1910 to November 1911, 232 interpellations were addressed to the ministers, of which 108 had been discussed by the later date. See Etat des Travaux Legislatifs de la Ch. des Deps., ses. extra de 1911, p. 90. A writer in the magazine Lectures Pour Tous for November, 1901 (p. 106) states that a single ministry was subjected to 115 interpellations and 291 questions during its brief existence of less than two years.

The Casimir-Perier ministry was subjected to 22 interpellations and 26 questions within a period of less than six months. Five different interpellations were addressed to the Combes ministry in regard to the expulsion of an Alsatian priest—See an address by the president of the chamber, Jan. 10, 1893. (Rev. Pol. et Lit., Apr. 15, 1893, p. 472) where it is stated that 580 hours, amounting to one-third of the time of the chamber had been taken up in the discussion of interpellations since the beginning of the existing parliament.

²⁵ Discussing the abuses of interpellation in the French parliament, M. Faguet asks: “What do the members do during the eight months of the parliamentary session? Like the man in the comedy, they do nothing, although they act; they make an enormous fuss without any results. Their performances are a sort of gymnastics. They interpellate, they speak, they cry, they vociferate upon daily affairs—the results are deplorable: instability of the executive power, ephemeral and rapidly dissolving ministries—one every six months as a rule.—Their thoughts are absorbed and their time consumed in manoevuers, the making of combinations and the devising of schemes to avoid being overthrown, in answering interpellations on trivial matters or in listening to appeals from deputies for favors. Problèmes Politiques, p. 17. For further discussion of this subject, see Onimus, , Questions et Interpellations (1906)Google Scholar; Bloch, , Réjime Parlementaire (1903), pp. 82–83Google Scholar; Poincairè, , Questions et Figures Politiques, pp. 87 et seq.Google Scholar

²⁶ On the two-party system as an essential condition of cabinet government, compare Moreau, , “Pouvoir Ministeriel” in the Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. ii, p. 103Google Scholar, also his “Pour le Régime Parlementaire,” p. 106; Duguit, , Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. xxv, pp. 370–371Google Scholar; Lowell, , Government and Parties in Continental Europe, vol. i, p. 71Google Scholar; Low, , Governance of England, pp. 118 et seqGoogle Scholar; Bagehot, , The English Constitution, 2d., ed., p. 47Google Scholar; Bodley, , France, vol. ii, p. 176Google Scholar; Laffitte, , “Lettres d'un Parlementaire,” Rev. Pol. et Lit., Jan. 21, 1893, p. 73Google Scholar; and Saleilles, , “Develop. of the Present Constitution of France,” Annals, Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Social Science, vol. vi, p. 65.Google Scholar

²⁷ Cf. Ephraim, , “Le Régime Parlementaire,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. vii, p. 592.Google Scholar

²⁸ France, vol. ii, p. 176.

²⁹ Pour le Réjime Parlementaire, p. 319. Compare also Laffite, (“Lettres d'un Parlementaire,” Rev. Pol. et Lit., May 13, 1893, p. 604)Google Scholar who emphasizes the fact that in France elections are made upon personalities and abstractions, that each candidate frames his own “profession of faith” and that often candidates belonging to the same party have conflicting programs.

³⁰ For further development of this point, see my article on “Electoral Reform in France” in the American Political Science Review for November, 1913.

³¹ See Briand's, M. letter in the Revue du Droit Public, vol. 28, p. 332.Google Scholar

³² See Esmein, , Droit Constitutionnel, 5th edition, p. 210.Google Scholar

³³ This practice has been followed since 1879.

³⁴ In this connection, it may be remarked, however, that the French president of the council is not the head of the cabinet in the same sense that the English premier is. The latter official exerts an important control over his colleagues, directs them and may even dismiss them. He is, in fact, the political ruler of England. The French president of the council, on the contrary, is merely primus inter pares and has little power of control over his colleagues (Compare Dupriez, ii, p. 353). In short, the ascendency of the prime minister is not regarded as an essential element in the French parliamentary system. “In the whole English constitution,” observes Marriott, (English Political Institutions, pp. 83–84)Google Scholar there is nothing more characteristically English that the possession of this great function.” If any French premier should attempt to exercise such authority, the cry of “dictator” would be raised, as Gambetta's career demonstrated.

³⁵ Thus fourteen days were consumed in 1898 in constituting a ministry following the downfall of the Méline cabinet. The circumstances under which this cabinet was selected may be described here with some detail, since they fairly illustrate the difficulties under which French ministries are formed. On June 7, President Faure, after having consulted the presidents of the chambers, invited M. Ribot to form a cabinet of concentration. M. Ribot, after consulting various political leaders, informed the president of the failure of his efforts. M. Sarrien was then summoned to the Elysée and entrusted with the task of forming a cabinet of conciliation. After consulting with various members of the radical and progressist parties, he consented to undertake the task. But the demand of the progressists that the portfolio of the interior should be given to one of their number caused the combination to fall through. M. Sarrien made an official announcement that in consequence of the withdrawal of support that had been promised him by certain persons belonging to the progressist party, it was impossible for him to form a cabinet under the conditions. The president thanked him for the efforts he had made and after having again consulted the chambers, confided to M. Peytral the mission of forming a new cabinet of conciliation. After consulting a number of political men, he went to the Elysée and informed the president that he would accept the task. After interviewing certain members of the radical and progressist parties, he offered the portfolio of war to General Cavaignac. But after the ministry had been made up, the proposal of M. Peytral to give the portfolio of under secretary of state to a member of the radical socialist party caused the break up of the combination, and he was obliged to ask the president to relieve him from the task. M. Henri Brisson was then summoned to the Elysée and charged with constituting a ministry, which he succeeded in doing after some days. For the facts regarding this ministerial “crisis” see Muel, La Septiéme Legislature, (1898–1902), pp. 7–11. Another example of the kind was afforded by the crisis of 1894 following the downfall of the Casimir-Perier ministry. President Carnot after the customary interviews with the presiding officers of the chambers summoned M. Lèon Bourgeois to the Elysée and asked him to form a cabinet. After a “profound examination” of the situation, he declined the honor. M. Dupuy was then summoned, but after two interviews, it was agreed that the situation indicated the choice of someone else. Senator Peytral was next summoned to the Elysée, but he declined the honor. M. Brisson was next offered the mission, but he asked to be excused. M. Bourgeois was then resummoned and urged to undertake the task of constituting a ministry, but again he refused. Again the President summoned M. Dupuy and made an appeal to his devotion and patriotism. Finally he consented, but in his demarches for colleagues he encountered great difficulties, the portfolio of finance being offered to four different men in succession before it was accepted.

³⁶ For example, the portfolio of foreign affairs in the Monis cabinet (1911) was offered to four different men in succession. It was first offered to M. Ribot who declined to accept it. It was then offered to M. Poincaré, who conditioned his acceptance upon the inclusion of M. Millerand in the cabinet. It was then tendered to M. Deselves who declined for certain reasons. Finally it was offered to M. Cruppi who was won over by the arguments of his colleagues.

³⁷ I have compiled the above statistics from Muel's Les Ministères de la Troisième République.

³⁸ The Czar Alexander III is said to have once made the following remark to M. Hanotaux: “During the last sixteen years, the French minister of foreign affairs has been changed fifteen times, so that one never knows if one can rely on any real continuity of French foreign policy” Vizetelly, , Republican France, 1870–1912 p. 432.Google Scholar This forms a striking contrast to the history of the foreign office of Russia, where only three different men occupied the post of foreign affairs between 1813 and 1895, a period of 82 years.

³⁹ They were the ministries of Jules Ferry (2 years, 1 month and 13 days); Méline (2 years and 2 months) ; Waldeek-Rousseau (2 years, 11 months and 16 days) and Clémenceau (2 years, 8 months, and 26 days). Occasionally an individual minister may hold office for a longer period. Thus Delcassé held the portfolio of foreign affairs for seven consecutive years and was only forced out by the demands of Germany, but this example is quite unprecedented. See an article entitled, “Le Septennat de Delcassé” in the Rev. Pol. et Parl. vol. 46, pp. 532 et seq.

⁴⁰ Under the monarchy, ministerial instability was the rule as now, and few cabinets held office for a longer period than a year. Thiers' two cabinets (1836, 1840) remained in power six and seven months respectively; that of the due de Broglie less than a year (1835–6); that of Guizot (1347) one year and that of Casimir-Perier (1831–2), one and a half years.

⁴¹ Ex-ministers, “ministrables” as they are called in France are naturally to be found in large numbers in both chambers. Senator Freycinet, for example, has been a member of eleven different cabinets and the chief of four of them. See M. Faguet's amusing and sarcastic remarks concerning “ministrables” in his Problèmes Politiques, p. 10. In 1910 there were 33 ministers and exministers in the Senate alone.

⁴² “Reforme Parlementaire,” Introduction p. xxvii, and Ephraim, , “Le Régime Parlementaire,” etc. Rev. Pol. et Parl., vol. 7, p. 134.Google Scholar

⁴³ “The parliamentary system in France,” says Mr.Bodley, , “has had one consistent result: ministerial instability with its corallary, governmental anarchy” France, vol. ii, p. 262.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ A possible exception to this statement was afforded by the general elections of 1902, at which the policy of the ministry was an issue, and which was followed by the voluntary retirement of Waldeck-Rousseau.

⁴⁵ There have, of course, been exceptions to the truth of this general statement. Thus it was clear that the Caillaux ministry in 1911 had lost the confidence of the country and it took advantage of a minor “incident” to resign, although no appeal was made to the electorate.

⁴⁶ This fact has been emphasized by Sidney Low in his The Governance of England. “In our modern practice,” he says, “the cabinet is scarcely ever turned out of office by parliament whatever it does” (p. 81). Again he remarks “that between 1867 and 1900 there were eight changes of government and in six of these cases ministers resigned, not because they were defeated in the house of commons, but because the verdict of the constituences at a general election was decidedly against them. The power which determines the existence and extinction of cabinets has shifted from the crown to the commons and from the commons to the constituencies” (p. 101).

⁴⁷ I have compiled these statistics from Muel's, Les Ministères de la Troisième République and from Les ministères Français (1789–1911) a publication of the “Société d'Histoire moderne (Paris, 1911).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Compare on this point the views of ProfessorShotwell, J. T. in an article entitled, “The Political Capacity of the French,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. xxiv, p. 119.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ “Really,” says ProfessorSchapiro, , “the French government has been the most stable of any in Europe for the same group has been continually in power for the last twelve years.” “The Drift in French Politics,” American Political Science Review, November, 1913, p. 385.Google Scholar