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Autocratic Stability in the Shadow of Foreign Threats

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2020

LIVIO DI LONARDO Open the ORCID record for LIVIO DI LONARDO [Opens in a new window] ,
JESSICA S. SUN Open the ORCID record for JESSICA S. SUN [Opens in a new window]  and
SCOTT A. TYSON Open the ORCID record for SCOTT A. TYSON [Opens in a new window]
LIVIO DI LONARDO*
Affiliation:
Bocconi University
JESSICA S. SUN*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
SCOTT A. TYSON*
Affiliation:
University of Rochester
*
Livio Di Lonardo, Assistant Professor, Department of Social and Political Sciences and Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Policy, Bocconi University, [email protected].
Jessica S. Sun, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, [email protected].
Scott A. Tyson, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Research Associate, W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester, [email protected].
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Abstract

Autocrats confront a number of threats to their power, some from within the regime and others from foreign actors. To understand how these threats interact and affect autocratic survival, we build a model where an autocratic leader can be ousted by a domestic opposition and a foreign actor. We concentrate on the impact that foreign threats have on the stability of autocratic leadership and show that the presence of foreign threats increases the probability an autocrat retains power. Focusing on two cases, one where a foreign actor and the domestic opposition have aligned interests and one where their interests are misaligned, we elucidate two distinct mechanisms. First, when interests are aligned, autocrats are compelled to increase domestic security to alleviate international pressure. Second, when interests are misaligned, autocrats exploit the downstream threat of foreign intervention to deter domestic threats. We also show that autocrats have incentives to cultivate ideological views hostile to broader interests among politically influential domestic actors.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 114 , Issue 4 , November 2020 , pp. 1247 - 1265
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association

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Footnotes

We thank Chris Anderson, Dan Bernhardt, Fernanda Brollo, James Fearon, Mark Fey, Scott Gehlbach, Kerim Can Kavakli, Brenton Kenkel, Gabriel Leon, Massimo Morelli, Jack Paine, Marina Petrova, Andrea Ruggeri, Ken Shotts, Konstantin Sonin, Vera Troeger, Stephane Wolton, participants at the Alghero Political Economy Conference and the Petralia Applied Economics Workshop, and seminar participants at Bocconi University and Warwick University for helpful comments and conversations.

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