Hostname: page-component-6587cd75c8-6rxlm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-24T03:53:58.971Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1985

Thomas R. Palfrey  and
Howard Rosenthal
Thomas R. Palfrey
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
Howard Rosenthal
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters. In game-theoretic models of voter participation under complete information, equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high. In contrast, when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present, only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 79 , Issue 1 , March 1985 , pp. 62 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1985

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Beck, N. The paradox of minimax regret, American Political Science Review, 1975, 69, 918.10.2307/1958403CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chamberlain, G., & Rothschild, M. A note on the probability of casting a decisive vote. Journal of Economic Theory, 1981, 25, 152–162.10.1016/0022-0531(81)90022-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, A. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.Google Scholar
Feller, W. An introduction to probability theory and its applications (2nd ed., vol. 1). New York: Wiley, 1957.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M. Closeness counts only in horseshoes and dancing. American Political Science Review, 1975, 69, 920–925.10.2307/1958405CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M. The paradox of not voting: A decision theoretic analysis. American Political Science Review, 1974, 68, 525–536.10.1017/S0003055400117368CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foster, C. B. The performance of rational voter models in recent presidential elections, American Political Science Review, 1984, 78, 678–690.10.2307/1961836CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian Players, I-III, Management Science, 1967–1968, 14, 149-182, 320-334, 486–502.10.1287/mnsc.14.7.486CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed strategy with equilibrium points. International Journal of Game Theory, 1973, 2, 1–24.10.1007/BF01737554CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Key, V. O. Jr. Southern politics. New York: Knopf, 1949.Google Scholar
Kousser, J. M. The shaping of southern politics: Suffrage restrictions and the establishment of the one-party South, 1880-1910. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974.Google Scholar
Ledyard, J. The paradox of voting and candidate competition: A general equilibrium analysis. In Horwich, G. & Quirk, J. (Eds.). Essays in contemporary fields of economics. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1981.Google Scholar
Ledyard, J. The pure theory of two candidate elections. Public Choice, 1984, 44, 7–41.Google Scholar
Mayer, L., & Good, I. Is minimax regret applicable to voting decisions? American Political Science Review, 1975, 69, 916–917.10.2307/1958402CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, R., & Ordeshook, P. Symmetric spatial games without majority rule equilibria. American Political Science Review, 1976, 70, 1172–1184.10.2307/1959383CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meehl, P. The selfish voter paradox and the thrown-away vote argument. American Political Science Review, 1977, 71, 11–30.10.1017/S0003055400259273CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Palfrey, T., & Rosenthal, H. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice, 1983, 41, 7–53.10.1007/BF00124048CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Palfrey, T., & Rosenthal, H. Participation and provision of discrete public goods: A strategic analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1984, 24, 171–193.10.1016/0047-2727(84)90023-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, W., & Ordeshook, P. A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, 28–42.10.1017/S000305540011562XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosenthal, H., & Sen, S. Electoral participation in the French Fifth Republic. American Political Science Review, 1973, 67, 29–54.10.2307/1958526CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rudin, W. Principles of mathematical analysis (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw Hill, 1976.Google Scholar
Shepsle, K. The strategy of ambiguity: Uncertainty and electoral competition. American Political Science Review, 1972, 66, 555–568.10.2307/1957799CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stephens, S. The paradox of not voting: A comment. American Political Science Review, 1975, 69, 914–915.10.2307/1958401CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, F. Closeness counts in horseshoes and dancing … and elections. Public Choice, 1982, 38, 305–316.10.1007/BF00144855CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G. The paradox of not voting for oneself. American Political Science Review, 1975, 69, 919.10.2307/1958404CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tullock, G. Toward a mathematics of politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967.Google Scholar
Vickrey, W. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 1961, 16, 8–37.10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wolfinger, R., & Rosenstone, S. Who votes? New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.