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The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance 1880–1914: A Collective Goods Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

John A. C. Conybeare  and
Todd Sandler
John A. C. Conybeare
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
Todd Sandler
Affiliation:
Iowa State University
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Abstract

The distribution of burdens in alliances may be explained in terms of public and private outputs. A joint product model is applied to the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, using generalized least squares-auto regressive moving average (GLS-ARMA) techniques and time series data. Results indicate that countries regarded allies' military effort more as complements than as substitutes, though several examples of free-riding behavior are noted. The method used here may provide more accurate estimation of publicness problems than is found in the usual static tests.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 84 , Issue 4 , December 1990 , pp. 1197 - 1206
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1990

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