Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T06:50:59.022Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Steven J. Brams  and
D. Marc Kilgour
Steven J. Brams
Affiliation:
New York University
D. Marc Kilgour
Affiliation:
Wilfrid Laurier University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We develop a model of crisis stability based on a deterrence game. Players are assumed to be able to choose any level of initial cooperation or noncooperation; the more cooperative player (if there is one) may then choose to retaliate. In a crisis, players are assumed to have escalated their conflict and desire to stabilize it before it explodes. Players can, by threatening their opponent, stabilize the new status quo. In addition, points of threat escalation are identified at which neither player can prevent the opponent from escalating further without threatening the opponent more severely than before the crisis erupted, thereby heating up an already tense situation. Crisis stabilization is aided by being close to the full-cooperation position, though, paradoxically, both players may benefit from having created a crisis that only escalating threats may resolve. We discuss ways of avoiding threat escalation and the increased risk of war that it entails, especially in conflicts between the superpowers.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 81 , Issue 3 , September 1987 , pp. 833 - 850
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evaluation of Cooperation. New York: Basics.Google Scholar
Bracken, Paul. 1983. The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J. 1985. Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. New Haven: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Davis, Morton D. 1987. The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Gametheoretic Analysis. In Interaction and Communication in Global Politics, eds. Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio, Merritt, Richard L., and Zinnes, Dina. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J., Davis, Morton D., and Straffin, Philip D. Jr. 1979. The Geometry of the Arms Race. International Studies Quarterly 23:567–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1985a. Optimal Deterrence. Social Philosophy and Policy 3:118–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1985b. The Path to Stable Deterrence. In Dynamic Models of International Conflict, eds. Luterbacher, Urs and Ward, Michael D. Boulder: Lynne Reinner.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1986a. Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-theoretic Analysis. In Modelling and Analysis in Arms Control, eds. Avenhaus, Rudolf, Huber, Reiner K., and Kettelle, John D. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1986b. Rational Deescalation. Physica (Amsterdam) 22D:337–50.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1987a. Optimal Threats. Operations Research 35. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1987b. Verification and Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis. In Arms and Artificial Intelligence, ed. Din, Allan M. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1987c. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalatiaon Occurs: A Game-theoretic Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 31. Forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brams, Steven J., and Kilgour, D. Marc. 1988. Game Theory and National Security. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Dacey, Raymond. 1987. Ambiguous Information and the Manipulation of Plays of the Arms Race Game and the Mutual Deterrence Game. In Interaction and Communication in Global Politics, eds. Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio, Merritt, Richard L., and Zinnes, Dina. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Gauthier, David. 1984. Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality. Ethics 94:474–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Intriligator, Michael D., and Brito, Dagobert L. 1976. Formal Models of Arms Races. Journal of Peace Science 2:77–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kavka, Gregory S. 1986. Morality and Nuclear Politics: Lessons of the Missile Crisis. In Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions, eds. Cohen, Avner and Lee, Steven. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.Google Scholar
Morgan, Patrick M. 1986. New Directions in Deterrence Theory. In Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions, eds. Cohen, Avner and Lee, Steven. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld.Google Scholar
Nash, John. 1951. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54:286–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
O'Neill, Barry. 1986. International Escalation and the Dollar Auction. Journal of Conflict Resolution 30:33–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
O'Neill, Barry. 1987. A Measure for Crisis Instability, with Applications to Arms Control Agreements and Space-Based Missile Defenses. Journal of Conflict Resolution 31. Forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Selten, Reinhard. 1975. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. International Journal of Game Theory 4:25–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shubik, Martin. 1982. Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Shubik, Martin. 1971. The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 15:109–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1985. The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis. International Security 10:137–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zagare, Frank C. 1985. Toward a Reformulation of the Theory of Mutual Deterrence. International Studies Quarterly 29:155–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zagare, Frank C. 1987. The Dynamics of Deterrence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Submit a response

Comments

No Comments have been published for this article.